Violence and political opportunities : a social movement study of the use of violence in the Nigerian Boko Haram by Amaechi, Kingsley Ekene
VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDY OF 
THE USE OF VIOLENCE IN THE NIGERIAN BOKO HARAM 
 by 
 
 
 KINGSLEY EKENE AMAECHI 
 
 
 Submitted in accordance with the requirements for 
 the degree of 
 
 
DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES             
 
 at the 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 SUPERVISOR:  PROFESSOR JOHAN STRIJDOM 
 
 CO-SUPERVISOR: DR. RAFUDEEN AUWAIS MOHAMMED  
 (20TH June, 2019)  
i 
 
SUMMARY 
This study investigates the use of violence by Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations. Drawing 
mostly from Social Movement Theory’s “political opportunity” and “resource mobilisation” 
thesis, it uses the Northern Nigerian-born Boko Haram (BH) to study how such organisation 
evolved and used different forms of violent activisms for goal attainment. On that basis, three main 
research questions were formulated: (1) What socio-political structures enabled the evolution of 
the organisation in Northern Nigeria? (2) Under what conditions did BH begin to use armed 
violence against the Nigerian State?  (3) What specific forms of armed violence did BH use and 
how were such forms of strategy sustained within the organisation? In answering these questions, 
the study relied on data collected through one-on-one semi-structured interviews from religious 
leaders in Northern Nigeria (particularly those within the Salafi networks); selected politicians in 
the areas where the group operates; some Nigerian security personnel, and on focus group 
interviews from victims of BH violence. In addition, the study also drew from other documentary 
sources (videos and audio recordings from different leaders in the group), and from internal 
correspondence between BH leaders and those of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Along the 
primary data, these documentary sources showed a striking historical continuity about the 
emergence and activities of BH from inception, up until they began using violence as a means for 
goal attainment. The data showed that while the emergence of the group was dependent on specific 
Northern Nigerian socio-political and mobilisatory structures, the adoption and sustenance of 
different forms of violence in the group were re-enforced by the interactions between the group’s 
leadership and the Borno state government; the violent response of the Nigerian government to the 
group's initial anti-state rhetoric; the mobilisation of different material resources (accruing from 
the organisation’s interactions and collaborations with similar international Salafi networks) and 
the internal dynamics in the group (competition between the different factions in the organisation). 
These inter-related conditions provided the windows of opportunity upon which both the 
establishment of the group, as well as the internal logic for the development and justification of 
different forms of violence were sustained within the organisation. 
KEY TERMS: Boko Haram; Movement organisations; Northern-Nigeria; Political opportunities; 
Religion; Resources; Salafism; Salafi-oriented movement organisations; Social movement 
theories; Violence.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background of the Study  
The last five decades (1970-2018) have seen the rise of Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations 
(SOMOs) (Teplesky, 2016), and an increasing adoption and use of violent activism by such groups 
(Esposito, 2015; Juergensmeyer, 2003; 2008; Moghadam, 2008). The case of al-Qaeda, al-
Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in Iraq and Levante (which has 
now changed its name to Islamic State) and BH in the Northern Nigeria are all prominent 
examples. In an effort to achieve certain objectives, these kinds of organisations have all developed 
and used violent strategies to attack different segments of the society, which they construe as 
“threats” or “stumbling blocks” to achieve their goals (Ansari, 1984; Appleby, 2000; Franks, 2006; 
Gunning, 2009; M, 2014; Solomon, 2017; Wiktorowicz, 2004).Using such strategies, they have 
attacked individuals, state institutions, political establishments, and even fellow Islamic 
organisations and institutions. In some cases, they have gone as far as using tactics such as 
executions, throat slitting, decapitation, be-heading, rape, kidnapping, drive-by shootings, 
ramming innocent civilians in public places using trucks/cars, and suicide bombings (Drevon, 
2017). From their point of view, they hope that such strategies would eventually lead to the 
acquiescence of their political/religious demands by their host governments or the international 
communities.  
However, violent activism is not unique to the SOMOs. In the past, organisations with major 
religious backgrounds such as Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, as well as 
from other traditions of Islam have all used violent activisms as a strategy for goal attainment 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003; 2008; Hall, 2003; Gregg, 2014). In fact, before the 1970s, there was not 
much use of violence in modern Islamic-oriented movement organisations (particularly, those with 
Salafi backgrounds). Most of the organisations known to have used such strategies were those with 
roots in Christianity and other world major religious traditions (Hall, 2003). It was not until after 
the 1970s that such organisations particularly those with Salafi backgrounds, began to increasingly 
evolve and adopt different forms of violent activism, as a strategy for goal attainment within the 
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socio-political environment where they operated. Given that Salafi traditions1 are infused with 
histories and narratives, which theologically legitimise such strategies in different and specific 
historic epochs of this tradition, activists with such backgrounds have appropriated and embraced 
violent ideologies and political identities (Hall, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2008). Faced with difficult 
and often complicated socio-political terrains, they have relied on these identities and ideologies 
to justify the violent strategies they adopt. 
Salafism is a key element for understanding the adoption of these forms of activism, since it 
provides the theological background upon which such organisations evolved and used violence. 
They can also produce images of cosmic warfare, as well as socio-political and religio-political 
worldview, which make activists believe that they are waging not merely physical battles, but also 
spiritual ones. Yet, this does not mean that Salafism ‘causes’ violence, or that violent expressions 
within SOMOs cannot be justified by some means other than Salafism. Generations of scholars 
from different social science disciplines have shown that violent activism by different social 
movement organisations (including SOMOs often referred (Teplesky, 2016) to as “Salafi-
jihadis”2) have also surfaced. Such organisations have often adopted violent strategies, not simply 
as an ideological imperative that emanated from the Quran or texts generated within the Salafi 
traditions, but from psychological, historical, socio-political, and cultural interpretations of 
religious actors’ interests and identities, within the contexts upon which such particular SOMOs 
identify (Crenshaw, 1992; Franks, 2005; Gunning, 2007; Gunning et. al., 2009; Gunning and 
Baron, 2013; Horgan, 2006; Jenkins, 1994; Laqueur, 2001; Wiktorowicz, 2004).  
Social Movement Theory (SMT) inspired studies such as Gunning (2007), Gunning et. al (2009), 
Gunning and Baron (2013:1-60), M (2014), and Wiktorowicz (2004) show that different forms of 
activism (be it violent or not) in such organisations are often influenced by diverse access to 
resources,  changing ideological or political attitudes towards violence and other types of protests 
-what Sydney Tarrow (1994) calls “protests circles”. These “political opportunity structures” as 
                                                            
1 A detailed description of Salafism is provided below in 1.7.5 (Clarification of key terms, Salafism).  
2 I have intentionally avoided using this term (Salafi-jihadism). I acknowledge that the term has in the last few years 
been used by scholars mainly within the religious studies field, to refer to the Salafi-oriented groups who subscribe to 
violent activism, because it points to a more precise ideological representation of such groups. However, it also 
connotes an exceptionalisation of one form of activism within such group-namely "jihadi violence". Ipso facto, such 
categorisation downplays not only the temporal nature of such violent tactics; it also diminishes the significance of 
other forms of activism that evolves within such organisations. 
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they are referred to in some SMT scholarship, which were produced by Wiktorowicz (2004) and 
Guning (2009:156-176), provide the window of “political opportunity” for the different forms of 
violent activisms to evolve within such organisations. The reality is that, no single element, be it 
religious, political, psychological, or cultural, is the sole motivator in itself for the use of violence 
in such organisations. Given the right conditions, any social movement organisation, Salafi-
oriented or not, can draw legitimacy from the mores and traditions within their religious traditions 
or from their peculiar context-based situations they identify with; they do this to justify the use of 
violent activism within their environment. Salafism could be significant, but it is more meaningful 
when interpreted in the context of how it interacts with other political opportunity structures to 
provide a conducive environment for SOMOs to adopt violent activism as a strategy for goal 
attainment. Within such interpretations, it becomes one among other possible resources, which 
provide mobilisation for the inception and development of violent activisms by a SOMO.  
It is within this theoretical background that this study uses BH (a Salafi-oriented organisation that 
first evolved in Northern Nigeria but has in the last five years expanded to other neighbouring 
West and Central African countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad) as a case study, to 
investigate the use of violence by SOMOs. For this, the study investigates the evolution of the 
group, contextualising it to the conditions in the region, where the organisation first emerged. 
Taking off from there, it identifies how the group evolved from a mere anti-state activist group, to 
a group that now fully uses and justifies different forms of violent strategies, such as lone 
professional assassinations, suicide bombings, kidnappings for ransom, bank robberies, and 
guerrilla warfare. Using these different forms of violent strategies, the organisation has attacked 
the Nigerian security forces, Nigerian government officials, politicians, as well as ordinary 
civilians in different parts of the region.  
Largely, drawing from the SMT’s theoretical paradigm, the study acknowledges that different 
ideological concepts within Salafism may be very key in understanding the evolution and 
justification of violence in the group; however, such thesis alone seems insufficient to explain the 
justification and continuity of the sophisticated forms of violent activism that have now ensued in 
the group. To explain these developments, the study attributes the evolution of BH and the use of 
violence within it, to the Northern Nigerian socio-political contexts and the internal dynamics 
within the organisation. Besides the various concepts that have been generated within Salafism, 
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these conditions provide a better explanation for both the evolution of such strategies and the 
fluidity that characterises them within such organisations.   
Semi-structured interviews were employed to collect data from people who have in-depth 
knowledge about both the region and possible inner working of BH in the region. Such people 
include security personnel, Salafi religious clerics, politicians and victims of BH violence. In 
addition, the study also draws from documentary sources, such as recorded videos and audio 
sermons of BH’s founding member; his manifesto, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna wa-Manhaj Da 'watina 
(This Is Our Creed and the Method of Our Preaching) and some internal documents as well as the 
correspondence between the current BH and AQIM leaders. This dataset shows a striking 
structural and ideological continuity regarding Boko Haram’s activism, from the time it started, 
until the end of 2016. It also contains quality ethnographic data, which contextualises both the 
evolution of the group and the development of violent activism in the group in Northern Nigeria. 
 
1.2 A Brief Profile of Boko Haram  
As a SOMO, BH is believed to have evolved from a group of Salafi youths, who left Northern 
Nigerian city centres in 2002 in search of a more austere Salafi religious life style in Kanama 
(Amaechi, 2016; 2017; Brigaglia, 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Comolli, 2015; Loimeier 2012; 
Harnischfeger, 2015; Hentz and Solomon, 2017; Thurston, 2016; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012; 
Zenn, 2018). Kanama by the way is a remote village close to the Nigerian border with Niger 
Republic. Initially led by one Ali Mohammed (Kassim, 2018; Zenn, 2018), the group launched 
violent attacks on several parts of the Nigerian community. However, they were quickly 
dismantled by the Nigerian security authorities in a series of violent confrontations that left many 
of the group members dead (including Ali, the leader of the Kanama group). Ustaz Mohammed 
Yusuf (one of the spiritual leaders of the group) fled to Saudi Arabia, in fear of the Nigerian 
authorities. He was only allowed back into the country after an intervention by the then (2005) 
deputy governor of Borno state Alhaji Dibal and other Salafi actors in the region, after he had 
promised not to be involved in any form of violence in the region (Williams and Guttschuss, 2012; 
Zenn, 2018).  
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Upon his return, Yusuf re-established the group in Maiduguri, the capital of Bornu state, (a state 
still in the north-eastern part of Nigeria). In earnest, he re-united with the Kanama group (Amaechi, 
2017; Kassim, 2018), and in disregard of his promise started to criticise the states in the region for 
their lack of seriousness in the implementation of the Sharia, which were newly established in the 
region. In identification with the group's Salafi background, he took the name Jama’atu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-jihad (People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and 
jihad). The new group's activism at this time was built around Yusuf's conviction that the Western-
based democratic system is haram (sinful/prohibitted). The BH leader argued that despite having 
adopted Sharia as their state’s penal codes, different states in the region still had what he regarded 
to be “religious weaknesses, moral decadence and socio-economic disadvantage” (Amaechi, 
2013). According to the BH leader, this situation was bestowed by the European colonisation and 
subsequent introduction of Western values (boko). In addition, Yusuf constantly criticised the 
region's politicians, whom he likened as "yan boko", literarily translated as “child of the book”, 
and most of whom occupied major political positions. For him, such individuals are the products 
of Western democracy, imposed on the region by the British colonialists. If such a system and its 
concomitant products remained in place in the country, he believed, the country would never be 
able to attain its potential. The only way the region (and the country by extension) could do this is 
only if they returned to al-Shari'a3, and Qur’anic dictates, which governed it before the colonial 
era. In Yusuf's estimation, this is the only way to restore the region back to its rightful religious, 
political, social and moral path (Amaechi, 2016). This was, however, problematic. 
Although agitation for change at the time and hatred for the region's politicians was a feeling that 
was shared by most people in the region (Amaechi, 2013), the idea of a strict Salafist lifestyle was 
not very popular (Brigaglia, 2015). So, in rejection of this extreme lifestyle that Yusuf and his 
organisation championed, the Northern Nigerian public started referring to Yusuf and his group as 
the “Boko Haram people”. In fact, the name “Boko Haram” was a derogatory name given to the 
group to denigrate what was considered to be extreme and austere lifestyle by the group's 
leadership. And despite repeated efforts by the group to explain that this name did not really 
                                                            
3 Al-Sharia is an Islamic-based theocratic or a legal system built from Sharia law. The system entails a unification of 
political authority with religious authority in an Islamic state (Falola, 2009). 
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represent what the group stood for (Onuoha, 2015), the name "Boko Haram"4 had persisted The 
name has also found its way into both the local and Western media, largely because it captured 
“all the stereotypes that have daily currency in Islamo-phobic discourses”-obscurantism, 
primitivism, and archaic Islamic lifestyle according to Andrea Brigaglia (2012a:38).  
From 2005 to early 2007, BH operated as a social movement organisation, more like a “moderate 
activist group that attempted to implement social change” in the region (Amaechi, 2016; 2017). 
The wave of violent activism only started in 2009, after a confrontation with the Borno5 state's 
highway security unit known as "Operation Flush". At that time the group was not well established 
in the region (Amaechi, 2016). This confrontation later led to an escalated violent interaction with 
other segments of the Nigerian security forces, sent from Abuja to help the Borno state government 
to deal with the BH crisis. By July the same year, Yusuf and his group had also launched a series 
of minor violent attacks that included schools, beer parlours and local police stations, using mostly 
the region’s known well-known traditional knives, bows and arrows, as well as few AK 47s. 
However, within a few days, the Nigerian security forces was able to overpower the group, and an 
estimated 1,100 people, including Yusuf himself were killed (Comolli, 2015; Smith, 2015).  
In the aftermath of the 2009 revolt, the group went underground, only to re-surface in early 2010, 
more emboldened in a sophisticated manner that took both the Nigerian population and the 
international community by surprise. From then onwards, BH has grown from a local organisation 
that attacked different parts of the region with this traditional bows and arrows, to a more 
coordinated and sophisticated organisation, which was capable of carrying out attacks inside and 
outside the region. In the last nine years (2009–2018) the group has also metamorphosed from this 
minor activist group that operated only in north-eastern Nigeria to a group which now carries out 
violent attacks within and beyond the Nigerian borders; in countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and 
Chad. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau (who became the leader of the organisation in 
2009, after the death of Yusuf), the group has attacked security personnel, state institutions, 
international institutions, churches, mosques, media houses, religious leaders, politicians and 
ordinary civilians both within and outside the region. From the use of locally made knives, bows 
and arrows, BH has also gradually improved its attacks with advanced military equipment such as 
                                                            
4 For the sake of uniformity, I will throughout the study use this name “Boko Haram” to refer to the organisation. 
5 Borno State is one of the 6 states in the North-eastern Nigeria, where BH first established and evolved (?).  
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sophisticated car explosives, and suicide bombings6. While different governments (Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger) are increasing security to subdue the group, the group has continued 
to develop more sophisticated means to continue to carry out their attacks in these countries.  
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
When I first started researching about BH in early 2010 for my Masters’ thesis7, not many 
academic papers had been written about the group. In fact, very few researchers paid attention to 
a marginal Salafi organisation known as “the Boko Haram people” in the north-eastern Nigeria. 
Although, the group had already begun to use different forms of armed violence to terrorise the 
different parts of Northern Nigeria; comprehensive potential violence from the group was neither 
adequately recognised, nor anticipated in the academic circle. However, with the group's increased 
string of armed violent attacks, especially after two major attacks on the UN building and Nigerian 
Police Head Quarters in Abuja in 2011 (Amaechi, 2016; Onuoha, 2015), BH has become a very 
significant topic in both local and international scholarship. This is not only because of its 
significance regarding the global intellectual Salafi discourse, but for the empirical implications 
on regional security. In the last eight years, SOMO has become one of the "most deadly" groups 
around the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2015)8. The organisation’s use of armed violence has 
in many ways surpassed its jihadi counterparts, AQIM in Algeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia, in 
terms of tactical sophistication and regularity of its attacks (Zenn, 2018: iii).  
Currently, BH could be estimated to have killed over 16,000 people, including women and 
children. It's activism and violent interactions with security forces in the region have disrupted 
governance and caused severe humanitarian crises in both Nigeria and the surrounding countries 
                                                            
6 A detailed explanation of how the group were able to develop this will be provided in the coming chapters 5 and 6). 
7 My Masters’ degree thesis was based on a comparative study of Boko Haram and Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger-Delta (MEND). MEND itself is not a SOMO, but its use of violence is like that of BH. It is a social 
movement organisation that is based in the Southern part of Nigeria, working to localise the control of Nigeria's oil 
and to secure reparations from the federal government for pollution caused by the oil industry.      
8 A more significant analysis of how BH had become deadlier than many similar organisations can be found in a 
New York Times article of November 18, 2015 by Searcey, D. & M. Santora. The article  titled "Boko Haram Ranked 
Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror Group"  is available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/africa/boko‐haram‐ranked‐ahead‐of‐isis‐for‐deadliest‐terror‐
group.html.  
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(Amaechi, 2017; Brigaglia, 2015; Comolli, 2015; Thurston, 2016; Zenn, 2018). From a minor 
Salafi group that operated only in the Northern Nigeria, the organisation has become a very 
formidable organisation capable of carrying out attacks in major cities of the region and beyond. 
To carry out these attacks, the group's leadership has consistently used violent Salafi rhetoric 
(Amaechi, 2016; 2017; Onuoha, 2015) that is drawn from the region's Islamic history (Amaechi, 
2017; Zenn, 2018) to justify the group's use of armed violence. They have also consistently used 
an extremely narrow criteria to define who counts as potential victims (Kassim, 2018; Thurston, 
2016), whom they regard as “not-true Muslims”.  
In a bid to defeat BH, the Nigerian government used military force from the beginning. With a 
formation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Military and Police, they have continued to mount 
pressure on the organisation. In 2014, the Nigerian government had also joined forces with the 
neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad, Cameroon), leading to the dismantling of the group's ad hoc 
Islamic Caliphate and reclaiming of some of the major towns originally taken by the group in 2014. 
However, the success of these forces has not been enough to eradicate the security threats posed 
by BH. The organisation's continued attacks, including kidnapping of the widely reported Chibok 
girls (2014) and the kidnappings of other schoolgirls in Dapchi (2018), shows that the battle against 
Boko Haram is far from over. The organisation has in the last years continued more sophisticated 
forms of armed violence to attack Nigeria and its neighbouring countries (Amaechi, 2017). Joint 
military efforts by Nigeria and its neighbours have failed to stop these attacks. It is unlikely that 
these attacks would stop unless there is a more deepened understanding of BH and a resultant 
change on how the organisation is approached. Both policy makers and the public need to have 
holistic understanding of BH in the region as a social movement organisation. They need to 
understand how the religious, social and political legitimation for armed violence in the 
organisation is influenced and sustained by the availability of different resources and political 
opportunities within both the organisation and the northern Nigerian contexts where the 
organisation identifies. This is what this study hopes to provide. This will be done through a 
systematic study of the group as fluid and responsive to the conditions and changes in the specific 
northern Nigerian socio-political opportunities and availability of resources in the organisation.  
To be fair, previous studies (Anonymous, 2012; Brigaglia, 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Comolli, 2015; 
Hentz & Solomon, 2017; Kassim 2015; Kassim & Nwankpa, 2018; Marlatt 2014; Pérouse de 
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Montclos, 2015; Thurston, 2015; Zenn, 2018) about BH in the last few years have tried to address 
this problem. The Anonymous scholar (2012) and Andrei Brigaglia (2015) particularly 
passionately discuss the religious and theological justifications upon which ideologies in Salafism 
influence the evolution of armed violence in the group. For these studies, the fact that the 
organisation subscribes to Salafi-jihadism, where violence against secular rulers are justified 
makes the group inherently susceptible to the use armed struggle against a political state such as 
Nigeria. Implicitly, violence was bound to be used by the group, because of this Salafist ideological 
perspective. Other studies (Comolli, 2015; Walker, 2016) who do not subscribe to this religious 
argument on the other hand have de-emphasised the role of Salafism or Islam. Instead, they analyse 
a unique set of elements like the socio-psychological, environmental, and economic factors within 
the Northern Nigerian region as the basis for the overall advent of armed violence in the group. 
Generally, the adoption and the use of armed violence are regarded as a natural avenue or means 
within which these activists respond or express their frustrations or dissatisfaction towards on their 
political oppositions. Hence, violence provides the needed ideological, symbolic, strategic and 
tactical tool upon which the organisation tries to achieve certain goals within the Nigerian political 
environment.   
Indeed, these kinds of explanations are important. However, they do not adequately account for 
the 'fluidity' that characterises the emergence and proliferation of different forms of violence in the 
organisation. While exclusivists Salafi ideology or socio-economic factors may represent integral 
issues, which motivate the forceful conditions for activist groups to adopt violence; an analysis of 
such factors do not explain the timing and decision of the group to adopt the different forms of 
violent activism that evolves within the group. Like most collective activist groups, SOMOs such 
as BH, are constantly influenced by contextual and social movement organisational dynamics 
within both the organisation and the political environment they identify with (Gunning, 2007; 
2009; Wiktorowicz, 2004). This means, they are influenced by the dynamics of interactions 
between prevailing political situations, state practices and socio-economic changes; and not just 
one or two ideological or socio-political factors. Hence, conceiving one of these elements as the 
sole element(s) which necessitates violent activism is grossly inadequate, and obscures the fluidity 
that characterises how these elements interact with each other to influence the development of 
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different forms of violent activism. Hence, they may not provide a comprehensive explanation on 
the use of violence in the group. 
In this light, this study therefore introduces SMT paradigms into the analysis of how BH evolved 
and why the different forms of violent activisms evolved within the group, on different intervals 
in the organisation. Within the SMT scholarship, the evolution of movement organisations, as well 
as the different forms of activism within them, are conceptualised as "fluid and responsive" to the 
availability of material and ideological resources, contextual conditions and changes in both the 
organisations and environments in which such movement organisations identify with (Gunning, 
2009; Gunning and Baron, 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2004). These socio-political conditions provide 
the window of political opportunity upon which social movement actors establish organisations 
and develop the different forms of activisms that they regard as useful for the attainment of their 
goals. Using this theoretical paradigm on the Northern Nigerian-born SOMO, the study will 
conceptualise the group as an activist "movement organisation"9.  
While acknowledging its Salafi orientation, the study analyses the evolution of the group as 
emanating from political opportunities, evolving from the specific socio-political structures around 
the region. Such political opportunity structures include: The Northern Nigerian history of 
religious activism, the Nigerian colonial legacy, the al-Sharia advocacy in the dawn of democracy 
in 1999, the conflictual relationship between Mohammed Yusuf and actors within the main Salafi 
networks in the region and finally, the relationship between al-Qaeda and the initial founder of the 
group at Kanama. Similarly, the evolution of violence in the group is also analysed not merely as 
an ideological imperative or tactical choice to intimidate or terrorise, but as a result of capitalisation 
of political opportunities by the group's leadership actors. These political opportunities largely 
evolved as a result of BH’s involvement with the region's al-Shari'a politics; the group's volatile 
interactions with the security forces; the availability of material and mobilising resources from 
both local sponsorships and the mutual cooperation with similar international Salafi-oriented 
organisations; and the internal competitions between the different factional actors within the 
organisation. Significantly, the analysis would not exceptionalise one or more of these conditions 
as the only element (s) responsible for the development of violent activism. Rather, it will see them 
as interrelated. Together, these interrelated conditions create conducive "political opportunities", 
                                                            
9 A detailed description of social movement organisations is provided below in 1.7.2 
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upon which activists establish groups, as well as develop the different forms of activism they 
construe as relevant for goal attainment.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The main objective of the research is to use BH as a case study to explore the use of violent 
activisms in SOMOs.  
Specifically, the study aims to; 
• Shed light on the socio-political and religious background upon which such groups 
evolve; 
• Identify under what conditions such organisations use armed violence as a strategy for 
their goal attainments;  
• Explore how these types of violent methods are used and sustained by such groups. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
In the light of the above listed objectives, the study specifically formulates a few key questions: 
• Under what conditions did BH evolve in the Northern-Nigeria?  
• At what stage, and under what conditions did the group begin to use armed violence as a 
strategy for goal attainment?  
• What specific forms of armed violence does the group use; and how are such strategies 
sustained in the group?  
 
1.6 The Significance of the Study  
The significance of this study is two-fold: theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, the study 
adopted SMT to conceptualise of the interaction of political structures and organisational dynamics 
as re-occurring elements for the development and sustenance of activism within movement 
organisations. Unlike traditional analysis of economic induced grievances and religious symbols 
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as the primary proponents of violence, SMT-inspired research analyse how mobilisation of 
resources for violence within movement organisations, particularly in the Middle-East and North 
Africa are linked to factors such as material resources, cooperation between such groups and 
similar brother networks, changes in political situations and framing of activism to socio-political 
realities of potential activists (Della Porta, 2009; Gunning, 2009; 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2004). This 
study would replicate such kinds of analysis to the Northern Nigerian-born SOMO group. Thus, 
looking beyond Salafist ideologies or socio-political factors as elements which necessitate such 
violent activism, the study evaluates how such conditions interact with other organisational and 
contextual dynamics to influence the support for various forms of violent activisms that are used 
in the Nigerian group. My assumption is that operating within a particular historically extended 
social and political context, BH is influenced not only by the violent rhetoric within Salafism or 
socio-economic grievances in the region, but also by other internal organisational dynamics and 
political opportunities which evolve as they navigate their specific socio-political terrain. This kind 
of analysis is important in the sense that, using the social movement theory the study will give an 
insight on how violence is developed, as well as provide a new testing ground for social movement 
theory building; a perspective that has been concentrated on movement organisations, which 
operate in the West and Middle East.  
Empirically, the study also offers opportunity for new insights on how a SOMO like BH, could 
develop and sustain violent activisms that evolve within an organisation. My understanding from 
the literature is that although the organisation is contextually unique; these kinds of developments 
are not unique to BH, they run across many organisations with similar ideological orientation.  
1.7 Clarification of Key Terms  
For clarity and contextualisation, the following key terms used in the thesis are discussed below: 
Violence, Political Opportunities, Resources, Social Movement Organisations, Salafism and 
Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations. 
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1.7.1 Violence 
The understanding of violence in the thesis has been drawn from SMT literature. In the SMT 
scholarship, violence is often conceived as intentional destruction of property or the 
injuring/killing of people in an effort to achieve a purpose, either by an individual, a group of 
people or a state (Gunning, 2009; Rucht, 2003; Neidhardt, 1986; Wiktorowicz, 2004). This kind 
of understanding of violence is broad and accommodates all varieties of contentions that are 
perpetrated by either individuals or groups of peoples within either a group or outside the group; 
as such individuals seek to promote a particular social, religious or political agenda(s). Here, all 
forms of intentional use of power, force or action against oneself, another person or a group of 
individuals (communities), which either results in or has a likelihood of resulting to discomfort, 
injury, harm (either psychological or physically), death, mal-development or deprivation to the 
target is categorised as “violent”. If such actions are meant to inflict pain either psychologically or 
socially to others, or to oneself, they should be considered as violence.  
Some obvious examples of such actions may include but are not limited to verbal threats, physical 
assaults, knife attacks, gun attacks, guerrilla warfare, bomb explosions, kidnappings, armed 
robberies, assassinations, suicide bombings. This definition undermines the conventional tendency 
to assume that violence is always physical and deviant. It acknowledges that violence can take 
many forms including psychological, cultural, social and even spiritual. In as much as such actions 
cause pain either to oneself or to another, it is considered as violence.  
This kind of broadening of the understanding of violence is important because it makes it easier to 
analyse issues such as threats (in any form), isolation, silent treatments, and symbolic exhibitions 
and brandishing of weapons as part of violent behaviours. Even though such actions are not in the 
same level with physical actual violent attacks, adopting them is in this sense considered as violent. 
Using such actions, organisations often put pressure on either the state or individuals within their 
host communities, to either negotiate or address some of the issues raised by the organisations 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004). 
Another important aspect of this conceptualisation of violence is the inclusion of State actions as 
a form of violence. By broadly conceiving all forms of intentional use of power, force or action to 
inflict harm or pain as violence, such State actions are regarded as violence. When states engage 
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in activities, which aims to inflict pain and harm on others, either legally or not, such actions could 
also be equally considered as a violent action. In SMT scholarship, state actions have often been 
included in the analysis of violence in movement groups. Scholars such as Jeroen Gunning (2007), 
and Donatella Della Porta (1995; 2009) among others, discussed how the violent actions of the 
Israeli and Italian governments affected the escalation of violent activism in Palestinian and Italian 
movement groups. The emphasis of state actions has generally stemmed from the political process 
model, where a state’s action is often seen as one of the external constraints that limits, and at 
times encourages the emergence of anti-system ideologies in movement organisations. Although 
conclusions regarding the effect of such practices vary; many studies concur that such state 
practices are part and parcel of violence. Such actions also impact on the social movement’s 
behaviours and should be considered in the analysis of how organisations develop, and justify the 
use of violence, other than other forms of activism. 
 
1.7.2 Social Movement Organisation 
Like violence, the idea of "social movement organisation" is drawn from SMT literature. In that 
regard, the term is often used interchangeably with "social movements", as a network of informal 
interactions between a plurality of individuals or groups of individuals, engaged in a political or 
cultural conflict, on the basis of shared collective identity (Diani, 1992; Furseth, 1999; M, 2014; 
Rucht, 2003). The assumption of earliest social movement scholars was that social movements 
emanates from “a collective attempt to further a common interest or secure a common goal through 
collective action outside the sphere of established institutions” (Giddens, 1989:19). The concept 
was first used in sociology in the early 1960s, mainly by American and European scholars to 
designate collective efforts by relatively non-governmental groups, who use extra-institutional 
means to promote or resist social change” (Furseth and Repstad, 2006). Most of these groups had 
foundation on issues related to political, religious, cultural, economic, ethnic and sexual identities.  
Some of the most studied groups during this period include: The Pro-life & Pro-Choice group, the 
National Rifle Association & Handgun Control, the American Civil Rights Movement Groups, 
Black Panther and the Ku Klux Klan. All these groups were regarded as “social movement 
organisations” because they engaged in collective activist behaviours, with the hope for a change 
or advancement of specific goals of the movement. Following the emergence of groups with more 
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specific environmental, religious based, peace/anti-war, human rights, social justice, consumer 
protection, animal liberation objectives in the 1980s, the understanding of movement organisations 
has broadened (Bevington and Dixon, 2007). Most studies now consider three main characteristics 
as very important aspects of social movement organisation: (a) organisation, (b) a clear set of goals 
and (c) an action plan. 
For an organisation to be classified as a social movement organisation, it must be organised. This 
is to say, the group of individuals involved in such groups are not just any group of people, rather, 
they should have a clearly defined membership, a charter or statutes, binding agendas, and in most 
cases, a hierarchical leadership structure. Secondly, a social movement organisation must have a 
set of clear goals and objectives. It is the effort to achieve these goals that drive different forms of 
activism that a particular movement organisation adopts. Finally, a social movement organisation 
must have an action plan and the potential ability to carry out collective actions in such a way that 
it aims at accomplishing its defined goals (Rucht, 2003: 369). As long as an organisation has a set 
of defined goals and is able to mobilise resources to conduct collective actions, hoping to achieve 
their respective goals, it could be classified as a movement organisation.  
On this basis, many of the so-called Salafi-jihadi organisations have been categorised as movement 
organisations and have hence become the object of study by a new generation of social movement 
scholars. Such groups include Hamas (Gunning, 2007; 2009), the Muslim Brotherhood, (Munson, 
2001), Gama'a Islamiyya (GI) (Hafez and Mohammed, 2004), and al-Qaeda (M, 2014). Given that 
these groups have organisational features, goals, leadership structures, and action plan, which can 
be described as social movement organisations, it has become sensible for these organisations to 
be studied as social movement organisations.  
It is on this ground that the present study has also conceived a group like BH as a “social movement 
organisation”. The understanding of this type of organisation is that it is an organisation that 
consists of any group of individuals who use collective activism to promote or resist ‘change’ or 
promote a set(s) of objectives in socio-political environments upon which they are associated with, 
in spite of what constitutes such change or objectives. Such changes could be social, economic, 
religious, cultural, political, or ethnic. What is important is such organisation’s leaders involved 
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can unite such objectives into one unified collective identity, and thus pre-dispose individuals 
within the organisation for a collective effort to achieve these identified goals.  
 
1.7.3 Resources  
By resource I refer to the tangible and material components or means by which social movement 
actors mobilise and accomplish activities within movement organisations. These resources are 
often financial, but can include other less tangible elements, such as ideology, military or 
organisational expertise, mobilisation tactics, time and dense social networks (Gunning, 
2009:159). The assumption is that the acquisition of and access to such resources is crucial for a 
social movement organisation’s success and vitality. Because of the mobilisation potential of such 
resources, they can help in the shaping of movement behaviours and the different forms of 
activisms that develop within movement organisations. 
The idea of "resources" came from the SMT model known as "resource mobilisation". The 
resource mobilisation model first evolved in social movement studies in the late 1960s, as a part 
of a shift from previous SMT paradigms, which saw the evolution of movement organisations as 
emerging from system disequilibrium and psychological “pathologies”. Rather than continue to 
view social movement organisations as such, proponents of this new model (Jenkins, 1983; 
McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Oberschall, 1973; 1993) re-conceptualised movement organisations as 
rational organised manifestations of collective action. Scholars argue that the evolution of the new 
American and European movement organisations, and the subsequent evolution of new types of 
movement activities within such groups were results of more flexible schedules for activists 
involved in the group, instead of an increase in grievances and resentments against the system. 
Such flexible work schedules, for example, facilitated movement participation and provided the 
activists with opportunities to come up with new movement activities. In this regard, an increase 
in resources is considered as the ultimate cause of organisational viability, professionalisation 
(such as having professional staff, membership registrations, bureaucratic structures), which 
enables different organisations to engage in new organisational behaviours. 
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Given the striking similarities of the role of these kinds of elements in movement organisations 
like BH, the study appropriated this idea to understand different organisational dynamics that 
evolve in the Northern Nigerian-born SOMO (particularly violence). The organisation's seemingly 
professional structures (Onuoha, 2015), the availability of financial resources, the group's Salafist 
ideology and the mutual corporations between the groups and the similar international Salafi 
networks such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb (AQIM) are here considered as important 
resources. The assumption is that the availability of these resources could provide vital information 
on conducive channels for micro-mobilisation for collective action, and intense activism (violent 
and otherwise), developed and sustained within a group. Rational decisions to adopt one form of 
activism or another are weighed along the availability of material resources for the group to carry 
out designated form of activism.10 
 
1.7.4 Political Opportunity Structures 
Political opportunity structure is a term widely used within social movement theory studies to refer 
to the ideological, social, economic and political conditions which encourage political 
opportunities for the emergence and sustenance of several dynamics within movement 
organisations (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Gunning 2009; Gunning & Baron, 2013; McAdam, 
1982; 1996; McAdam et. al. 1996; Wiktorowicz, 2004). The main assumption here is that, social 
actors do not operate in a vacuum: they act within a broader social milieu characterised by shifting 
and fluid configurations of 'enablements' and constraints, provided by political opportunity 
structures (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Gunning, 2009; 2013). It is these conditions or contexts that help 
shape and determine the different dynamics that evolve in a movement organisation. They provide 
an opportunity where social movement actors adopt different kinds of strategies, which evolve 
within organisations. In other words, social actors adopt different dynamics (including violence) 
in situations where there is availability of resources, and when there is an enabling socio-political 
environment to act. These political opportunities also empower, determine and often define the 
social viability of a strategy, actions, and choices, which individuals adopt within a particular 
                                                            
10 This is only a brief introduction of the resource mobilisation model. A detailed theoretical discussion of this model, 
and the role of resources in the mobilisation of movement behaviours will be presented in the Literature Review 
chapter (Chapter 2). 
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political context. Without the availability of resources such as money to purchase weapons, for 
example, movement organisation actors would largely limit their violent activism to verbal threats 
or protests, even in the face of increased state violence or other ideological violence.   
 
1.7.5 Salafism 
Salafism is a small but influential tradition within Sunni Islam, from the 18th-century  Wahhabi 
movement11 that originated in the Najd region of the modern day Saudi Arabia (Beutel et al., 2017; 
Esposito, 2003). Its method (manhaj) is characterized by strict and sharp emphasis on theological 
purity and identification with the practices of Islam's first “devout ancestors” (the first three 
generations of the early Muslim community, also known as Salaf as-salih). Adherents of Salafism 
often reference and identify these immediate predecessors of Prophet Mohammed, as the epitome 
of Islamic practice. For them, the Islam that was practiced by these first three generations was 
pure, unadulterated, and as the ultimate authority for the interpretation of the Sunnah. According 
to their understanding, it is only by emulating every detail of the prophetic practice, the manner he 
pursued governance and the lifestyle that these salafs displayed can Muslims truly live an authentic 
Islamic-life (Beutel et. al., 2017).  
Working with this theological foundation, Salafis often reject any role of human speculative 
philosophy (kalam) in the re-interpretation of the Qur’an and in the development of the Islamic 
creed. For them, these are all foreign imports from the Greek philosophy, which are alien to the 
                                                            
11 Wahabism was a movement within the Sunni tradition, which was first founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
(DeLong-Bas, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2006). Adherents of this movement were known for their more emphasis on the 
ultraconservative, fundamentalists, austere and puritanical way of of life, much more than the recent modern day 
Salafis. The movement began in the 18th century when the Nejd (in the Arabia Peininsula)-born religious scholar 
started his advocacy for a purge of the widespread Sunni practices, which he considered "idolatrous impurities and 
innovations in Islam (bid'a) (Esposito, 2003: 333). He and his followers would eventually form a pact with a local 
leader, Muhammad bin Saud (From the Saudi Royal family), through whose sponsorship and endorsement the 
movement was gradually established. With the eventual proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, this 
alliance would prove to be a very useful resource for the spread of this tradition to other parts of the Islamic world. 
Today, some of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings have remained the official, state-sponsored form of Sunni Islam in 
Saudi Arabia. With the Saudi government's influence, Wahhabism has also continued to generate worldwide influence 
in the Islamic world, especially within the Sunni tradition. In the recent time, the gap between Wahhabis and Salafis 
has also narrowed. Adherents of this school  often reject the term; prefering instead to be called Salafis or Muwahhid 
(DeLong-Bas, 2004: 123-124; Commins, 2009: ix; Wiktorowicz, 2006: 235). However, majority of Sunni and Shia 
Muslims worldwide disagree with the interpretation of Wahhabism. Many do denounce them as a faction or a "vile 
sect" (Simon, 2015: 16). 
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original practice of Islam (DeLong-Bas, 2004: 123). As they see it, it is only the Qur’an, the Hadith 
and the concensus (ijima) of the approved scholarship (ulama), along with the understanding of 
the salaf us-salih, that is sufficient guidance for every true Muslim; nothing much, nothing less 
(Beutel et. al, 2017). It is only by adhering to these principles that people can keep their human 
animistic desires in check as well as prevent evil and oppression from spreading in the world. 
Contemporary Salafis also believe that they constitute the historical embodiment of the ‘saved 
sect’ (al-firqa al-nājiya). Hence, they often criticise and reject some of the practices and 
innovations of other Sunni traditions, categorising them as spurious (bid’a) or as outright 
scepticism (kufr) (Beutel et. al., 2017).  
In the modern era, this emulation has also extended beyond the individual's private religious belief, 
to the rejection of all other forms of human innovations both within the Islamic religious tradition 
and in the public sphere. A typical example of this is the rejection of democratic system of 
government, which they often anchor on the principle of Tawhid12. To arrive at this conclusion, 
Salafis often argue that democracy is at odds with God's sovereignty (Anjum, 2016). For them, 
democracy's ability to create alternative human-made laws puts it at odds with God's laws. God’s 
sovereignty in their assumptions is made to manifest only through the implementation of His will 
in the Shari’a13. Any system that goes contrary to the dictates of such wills is guilty of ascribing 
sovereignty to something other than God;  h en ce ,  i t  should be prohibited. In place of democracy, 
Salafis, therefore, advocate for the adoption of a theocratic system14  that involves the 
implementation of Shari’a; that is, ruling in accordance with Allah’s will. As long as innovations 
are not constructed from the Qur’an or Hadith, they are more often than not interpreted by Salafis 
as haram. 
 
                                                            
12 Tawhid refers to God’s absolute unity and indivisibility and is frequently translated as “monotheism.” For Salafis, 
tawhid implies that only God alone has the right to be worshipped.  
 
13 Shari'a is the ideal body of law in Islam which encapsulates God’s will for humankind. It is derived from the 
religious traditions and practices of Islam, particularly the Qur'an and Hadith.  
14 I will elaborate a bit more on this in the Chapter two (literature review) 
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1.7.6 Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations 
Instead of Salafi-jihadism as often used in most discussions of these kinds of organisations, this 
study has purposefully appropriated "Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisation" (SOMO) as a more 
theoretical appropriate term for groups such as BH. By SOMO, the study refers to activist groups 
within the Salafi tradition, who use ideologies within Salafism, to propagate or implement what 
could be regarded as political, social or religious activism within the context of modern nation-
state. Often political agendas intended are inherently political, but not necessarily associated with 
political violence. They include a broad repertoire of social movement activisms such as protests, 
campaigns, seminars, general da'wa (religious proselytising), preaching, partisan political 
involvements, rendering of social and welfare services, publications and political violence 
(including suicide bombing). Typical examples of such organisations include Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State and of course BH.  
 
1.8 Chapter Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters. This chapter (Chapter one) serves as the general 
introduction of the study, explaining the rationale, justification and the scientific background upon 
which the research is based. Therefore, it begins with a general background of the study, brief 
profile of the group, the significance of the study, the research objectives, the corresponding 
research questions and the definitions of key terms and concepts, in a contextualised manner.  
Chapter two focuses on literature review and the theoretical framework that guided the study. 
Here, significant literature on the subject of research, as well as similar social movement theories 
and social movement-inspired studies are reviewed. 
Chapter three provides the components and the philosophical assumptions upon which the 
research was conducted. Some of the important research components include: the research 
approach, the research design, sampling techniques, the study area, the study population, data 
collection procedure, ethical considerations and data analysis. Through a detailed discussion of 
these elements, the chapter presents the subject studied, the data involved, the instruments used, 
the procedures followed and how such procedures were followed in the data analysis.  
21 
 
Chapter four focuses on the analysis of socio-political, ideological and the organisational 
background upon which BH evolved in northern Nigeria. It does this through the analyses of six 
main political opportunity structures: The Northern Nigerian culture of Islamic activism evolving 
from the history of Islam in the region; the Northern Nigerian Colonial legacy; Northern people’s 
Congress;  Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999; the intra-ideological dispute between the two 
main Salafi-networks (Izala, and Ahlus Sunna); and mobilization of resources from corporation 
with al-Qaeda, particularly Osama Bin Laden. The central argument in the chapter will be that 
these main structures/conditions provided political opportunities upon which Ali Mohammed 
(2002, Kanama) and later Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf (2005, Maiduguri) established the group in the 
region.  
In Chapter five, the thesis discusses the evolution of violence in the organisation. It explains how 
violence emerged in the organisation despite Yusuf’s initial insistences on non-violence. It also 
shows how the internal logic and the decision to use violence in 2009 was influenced by the 
organisation's involvement with the Borno State’s local politics and the State's violent interactions 
with the group. As a result, Yusuf was able to capitalise on the opportunity provided by these 
interrelated conditions to adopt violence as means for goal attainment, against both the Nigerian 
State-supported security forces and the Borno State government. 
Chapter six will identify some of the significant forms of violence (professional hit and run 
attacks, guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, kidnapping and armed robbery) which have evolved 
in the organisations. The chapter explained how the evolution and sustenance of these forms of 
violence are rooted in the organisation's mutual cooperation and interactions with similar 
international Salafi networks, as well as the internal competitions between the different factional 
leaders of the group. The organisation's dependency on the similar international Salafi networks 
meant that the evolution of specific form of violence within those similar networks directly 
impacted the mobilisation and adoption of similar forms of violence, in the face of increased 
violent interaction with both the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) and regional Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF).   
Chapter seven, the last chapter will conclude the thesis. The chapter will be divided into two 
parts. While the first part will provide a summary of all the research findings and their implications 
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in relation to previous research; the second part will give a brief discussion on the limitations of 
the research and the general conclusions, based on the findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. It prefaces the 
discussion with a synopsis of significant literature on the use of violence in SOMOs, especially as 
discussed in Religious Studies and Sociology of Religion. Through this, it identifies significant 
gaps in the literature, and provides the rationale behind the research questions of the study. 
Furthermore, the chapter will also present a detailed discussion of social movement theories, 
(particularly resource mobilisation, political opportunity process and framing process models), 
arguing that the theoretical paradigms of these models, are better suited for analysing and 
addressing the gaps in the literature and the concomitant research questions formulated for the 
study. 
 
2.2 Religion and Violence (Conceptualising the Use of Violence in Salafi-Oriented Movement 
Organisations)  
Discussions about the use of violence in SOMOs has for years engaged scholarly attention from a 
variety of disciplines (Caschetta, 2015; Elster, 2006; Franks, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2003). In the 
wake of increasing evolution and use of violence in such groups, scholars have focused on 
unravelling how groups with ideological foundation in a religious tradition containing binding 
proscription such as “thou shalt not kill”15 are associated with life-ending strategies? How could a 
religion such as Islam with a name cognate to ‘salam’ (the Arabic word for ‘peace’) be associated 
with brutal activism? Mark Juergensmeyer (2008:30) has, for example, asked: Is there a connection 
between Salafism (or religion in general) and violence? Amaechi (2016), Caschetta (2015), Elster 
(2006), Franks (2006) have also asked: What are the motivates of the evolution of such groups in 
a given socio-political environment? (Gunning, 2007; M, 2014; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Given that 
these kinds of groups have continued to evolve and have continued to use these strategies in recent 
times, answers to these kinds of questions remain important. Answers to such questions not only 
                                                            
15 The Qur’an, 5:32. 
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help provide insight into the ideological foundation upon which such groups use and adopt violent 
strategies, they can also help identify the socio-political contexts under which such groups evolve. 
The reviewed literature is mostly about the use of violence in SOMOs. In reviewing the literature, 
the discussions are categorised into two loosely interpreted positions: those that see violence as 
primarily connected to Salafism (or religion in general), and those that see it as having little or no 
connection to Salafism. The chapter mostly focused on literature within the religious studies and 
the sociology of religion, the point of which is to situate the study to these particular fields of social 
sciences.  
 
2.2.1 Salafism as the Driver of Violence 
Salafism has been discussed in many studies as the main element, which drives the evolution of 
violence in SOMOs (Caschetta, 2015; Hafez, 2000; Jansen, 1986; Onuoha, 2015). Scholars have 
analysed different Salafism doctrines, as the ideological platform upon which such groups adopt 
violence, as a strategy for goal attainment. Often, the Islamic tradition’s immutable sources of 
knowledge — the Qur’an and the Hadith (that is, the canonical collections of Muhammad’s sayings 
and actions) are conceived as the main elements, which inform decisions about the evolution of 
violence. Given that these sacred scriptures contain historical traditions and ideological elements, 
which are fused with violent activism, they provide ideological and moral imperative for justifying 
the evolution and development of violent activism in such groups. In this case, SOMOs who resort 
to violence do so on the basis of the theological justification Salafism provides. Under certain 
conditions or circumstances that meet specific religiously sanctioned criteria, such groups easily 
evolve and readily rely on these sources to develop and justify violent strategies against state 
opposition, or other groups regarded as legitimate targets.  
This kind of understanding was first promoted in religious studies and sociology of religion by 
scholars within the so called “fundamentalism literature”. In analysing the origin of the religious-
motivated violent groups (referred to as ‘fundamentalists’), scholars on fundamentalism argued 
that, such groups are often driven from “an intolerant self-righteous and narrowly dogmatic 
religious literalism” (Umar, 1983: 23). For such studies, the evolution of such groups is not just a 
social imperative, but a feature which always flows from “religious radicalism”, when the society 
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departs from the desired ideal, or divine-intended religious situation (Appleby 2000; Bruce 2008; 
Martin et al., 1996). Disgusted by undesirable societal situations, religious groups, therefore, 
evolve and draw violent strategies from ideologies within their religious traditions, to correct the 
ills of the society. In other words, the evolution of violent activism in such groups is a natural 
response that emanates from the groups’ religious ideological sources.  
Samuel Huntington’s (1993; 1997) “clash of civilisations” exacerbated this idea. Leaning on the 
literature concerned with the notion of fundamentalism, the American scholar believes that 
religious identities would be the main driver of international conflict in the new world order 
following the end of the Cold war between the US and Russia. According to him, although Nation 
States would remain the most powerful actors in the international arena, the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
would be the new force fuelling international conflicts. Huntington (1993) first categorised the 
world into nine different civilisations, mostly based on religious lines and cultural constructs. He 
contends that, conflicts occur either on a religious ideological level within States with groups 
belonging to different civilizations, or on global level between and among States that belong to 
different religious civilizations (“core-state conflicts”). Although these civilisations bring with 
them different, and sometimes contradictory violent ideologies, religions create the possibilities 
for violent clashes among the different countries that are identified with them. While I 
acknowledge with many other scholars (Asad, 2007; Silvestri and Mayall, 2015) this argument 
cannot account for how religions become intertwined with other factors, and as such it is difficult 
to separate it from other political, economic and social factors (which might give better 
explanations for conflict dynamics inside and between neighbouring countries). Thus, Huntington 
(2003) gives credence to the idea that religious ideologies (civilisations) drives violence. 
Following his reasoning, it is possible to infer therefore that international conflicts and violence 
could evolve not necessarily because of historical or socio-economic factors, but also because of 
the religious ideologies, which form part of these civilisations.  
On the same note, Bruce (2008: 42) regards religion as the main driver of violence for 
“fundamentalist groups”. In “Islamist fundamentalist’s movements”, he noted two main features 
within religion: lack of a clear division between the spiritual and religious power, and the centrality 
of the law. As he rightly observed, Islam, unlike Christianity and most of the other monotheistic 
religious traditions, achieved its political power in the lifetime of its founder, Prophet Mohammed. 
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Partly for this, the British sociologist of religion argues that the original Muslim community did 
not develop an image of faith that is isolated from secular powers. It also did not develop an idea 
of faith, which is separated from politics. For that, the religion is very much susceptible to be used 
for mobilisation of violent activism. Under an undesirable context, for example, it is easier for a 
religious leader in ‘Islamic fundamentalist group’ to draw on these historical narratives and 
religious ideologies within the religion, to mobilise violent activism against the perceived enemies 
of the religion. Violence within such situation is not something that is rooted in environmental 
factors, but rather something that can be drawn from the religious sources and traditions within the 
Islamic religion.  
It is from this background that many recent scholars (Hafez, 2000; Moghadam, 2009; Onuoha, 
2015) have connected the use of arm struggle to the violent ideologies within Salafism. In the 
analysis of the use of suicide violence in al-Qaeda for example, Assaf Moghadam (2008/2009) 
particularly identifies religious exclusivist ideologies within Salafism as the main justifications for 
the group’s use of this form of violence. Tracing the evolution of al-Qaeda itself, this scholar 
describes how this form of violence had been justified and made popular by the group leadership’s 
framing of ‘jihad’ as key element in the battle between true Muslims and the West. Within the 
boundaries of such framing, he argues al-Qaeda’s leadership is able to elevate violent attack, 
(specifically suicide violence) against the West and its allies as within the realm of the “five pillars 
of Islam”16. They were also able to appropriate the idea of takfir (the process of labelling fellow 
Muslims as infidels), within which they are able to support and justify the use of violence as 
representing “the ultimate form of devotion to God and the optimal way to wage jihad” 
(Moghadam, 2009:62). Inferably, al-Qaeda activists who commit suicide violence against 
identified targets, operate with a conviction that “he/she does not kill him/herself for personal 
reasons, but sacrifices him/herself for God. He/she is therefore not committing suicide, but 
achieving martyrdom” (Moghadam, 2009:62). Although this is theologically unsound and quite 
debatable, since the idea of suicide is a disapproved practiced among most Salafi Islamic scholars; 
however, it helps make the case that religious ideologies within Salafism play a very important 
                                                            
16 “Five Pillars of Islam” represent the main framework of correct spiritual life in Islamic traditional religion. The 
framework includes: Testimony of faith, prayer, giving zakat (charity to the needy), abstinence and fasting during the 
month of Ramadan, and making pilgrimage to Makkah once in a lifetime for those who are able to do. A reference 
will be useful.  
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role in the use of violence within SOMO. By helping reduce the suicide attacker’s reservations to 
perpetrate the acts of violence and killing of him/herself, helps him or her justify violent actions 
against identified targets.  
Arguably, this kind of analysis was set in motion by Wiktorowicz’s (2006) categorisation of 
Salafis, in his Anatomy of the Salafi Movement. Wiktorowicz divided groups within Salafism into 
three categories:  
 the quietist-those who focus on ‘nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and 
education’. These kinds of actors discourage their followers from political activism, 
sticking to the classical, Sunni principle which entails total obedience to the Muslim ruler;  
 the jihadi-those who call for ‘violence and revolution’ to overthrow the governments of 
their countries; and  
 finally, the politicos-those who emphasise application of the Salafi creed in the political 
arena and allow the formation of Islamist parties. These people are mostly not interested in 
arm struggle.  
 
In Wiktorowicz’s categorisation, Salafism is far from monolithic. While Salafis in general agree 
on most points of religious belief and socio-political end goals (creating an Islamic political 
community governed by their interpretation of Shari’a), he argues, the difference between them 
lies in the means to achieve these goals. For him, the “Quietists” and “Politicos” within Salafism 
eschew the use of violence whatsoever (they rather focus on bottom-up “education and 
purification” of society, or non-violent political activism that tend to reject democratic means of 
engagement respectively). It is mostly the “Jihadis”, who believe in the revolutionary overthrow 
of existing state structures through armed struggle. For this set of Salafis, such systems need to be 
replaced by theocracies that implement a strict interpretation of the Shari’a. Their jihadi 
interpretation of the two concepts of al-ḥukm bi-ghayr mā anzala Allāh (judgements, other than 
what God has revealed) and al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ (loyalty to Islam and disavowal of everything 
else) is also more rigid or extreme than that of the ones advocated by the quietists and the politicos.  
SOMOs who use violence fall within the trend of Salafi-jihadists. Following their interpretations 
and convictions on the use of this strategy for goal attainment, they would not hesitate to adopt 
arm struggle or violence against their host communities, in order to achieve their goals. This 
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means, the use of violence is bound to evolve in such groups; it is only a matter of “when”. Thus, 
the evolution of violence in such organisations is a religio-political response emanating from the 
ideological imperative that exists within their Salafi ideological tradition.  
This kind of analysis dominated recent scholarly discussions about the use of violence in BH 
(Anonymous, 2012; Brigaglia, 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Kassim, 2015; 2018; Thurston, 2016). Writing 
in the Journal of Religion in Africa, an Anonymous (2012) scholar logically identified BH’s 
Salafist ideology and the resultant violent activism in the group to the second trend (the jihadist) 
in the global Salafi discourse, which favours the use of violence. In analysing how the Northern 
Nigerian-born SOMO adopted violence against the Nigerian state, the Anonymous (2012:139) 
author contrasts Yusuf’s position (what he called “Salafi Radicalism”) with that of the other 
established Salafi networks (“counter Salafi Radicalism”), in the Northern Nigeria. These positions 
championed violent and non-violent approach respectively (Anonymous, 2012:139).  
Both positions are dependent on key Salafi doctrines, and hence agree on the desirability of a 
struggle to establish an ‘Islamic’ form of government in Nigeria. However, the former’s answer to 
the question of how Muslims should establish the desired government, the author argued, led him 
to break away from the main Salafi establishments in the region (Ahlus Sunna and Izala17), and 
later to his group’s declaration of jihad and “violent confrontation with the Nigerian government” 
(Anonymous, 2012: 139). Thus, while Yusuf and his group adopted a violent approach for the 
establishment of a theocratic al-Shari’a state, other established Salafi networks in the region 
followed the non-radical path. They tactically accepted the necessity of working within the 
Nigerian non-Islamic government to achieve incremental improvement with the already existing 
state (albeit an imperfect one), pending the establishment of an Islamic one18. Instead of using the 
Salafi narrative to urge Muslims to remove their oppressors forcefully, as Yusuf championed, they 
invoked the narrative to warn Muslims against confrontation with Nigerian government because 
they didn’t think they could win.   
                                                            
17 An elaborate discussion of the Ahlus Sunna and the Izala will be provided in the Chapter four. 
18 Brigaglia, (2015) and later Kassim, (2018) have in the light of new evidence shown that it was actually the old Salafi 
establishments in the region who took a doctrinal shift, and not Yusuf. I will elaborate more on this in the preceding 
section and in Chapter 4. 
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Thurston (2016) would modify this argument a bit. In identifying the significance of the global 
radical Salafi discourse in the development of armed struggle in Yusuf’s group; he recognised the 
debates between Boko Haram and the established Salafi networks in the region as identical to the 
local manifestation of a tension existing between global quietist and Salafi-jihadi trends within 
Salafism. For him, BH is the purest representation of the Salafi-jihadi trend in Nigeria. Being able 
to internalise Salafi-jihadi ideas, Thurston (2016) infers that these thoughts were the main 
intellectual influence upon which Yusuf and BH activists developed an “exclusivist worldview”, 
within which the group’s leadership were able to mobilise their followers for armed struggle 
against the Nigerian state. The militant call in the group, as he saw it, was based on a more rigid 
application of the principle of takfīr (excommunication) of the Muslim ruler who rules and issues 
judgements, other than what God has revealed (al-ḥukm bi-ghayr mā anzala Allāh). Also, the 
associated principle of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ (loyalty to Islam and disavowal of everything else), 
which implies that a deficiency shown in one’s loyalty to the laws of Islam, or in the disavowal of 
non-Islamic systems constitutes an act of unbelief (kufr) in itself. It also puts the one (in this case, 
the Muslim ruler) who commits it, out of the fold of Islam (Brigaglia, 2015). This disposition made 
it possible for Yusuf, and later Shekau, to demand their audience to “choose between Islam and a 
set of allegedly anti-Islamic practices: democracy, constitutionalism, alliances with non-Muslims, 
and Western-style education”, and possibly resort to violence, as their message was not accorded 
positive reception by the Nigerian government. This doctrinal theology, albeit being the 
fundamental ingredient for armed violence, Thurston (2016:5) will further add was also possible 
to motivate violence in BH because it is combined with the group’s “politics of victimhood”, 
fiercely propagated by the group’s leadership at the time.  
Other scholars such as Andrea Brigaglia (2015) have also promoted this ideological significance 
of Salafism in the use of violence in BH. Building on his previous research (Brigaglia, 2012a; 
2012b) on the group, Brigaglia (2015) shed more light on how BH’s exclusivist ideology created 
the conditions for hybridisation and subsequent evolution of the group and the use of violent 
strategy against the Nigerian state. Subtly critical of Wiktorowicz’s (2005) categorisation upon 
which most of the previous scholars (Anonymous, 2012; Thurston, 2015) deduced their 
categorisation of Salafists, he (Brigaglia, 2015) presented the intra-Salafi debates between 
Mohammed Yusuf and the mainstream Salafis “as a gradual process that probably involved 
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complex strategic considerations as well as local and global negotiations” (Brigaglia, 2015:193). 
His thesis challenges Thurston’s (2015) and the Anonymous scholar’s position which seem to 
portray that it was Mohammed Yusuf and his followers who made a gradual movement towards 
jihadism, away from the mainstream Salafis. On the contrary, Brigaglia (2015) correctly explained 
that it was indeed the mainstream Salafi networks in Nigeria who withdrew from their initial 
flirtation with the “jihadi project”. Hence, he argued that Yusuf and his followers should not be 
regarded as the actors who abandoned the quietist strategy for a jihadi one. To prove this, he traced 
Yusuf’s violent inclinations to both the Salafi sources within the region before 2003, particularly 
the theological sources that emanated from the different religious concepts (including the concept 
of excommunication). These sources, he correctly explained were learnt from the writings of Bakr 
b’Abdallāh Abū Zayd19 and from the global Salafi discourse. Before Yusuf’s BH, most actors 
within the Ahlus Sunna and the Izala had supported armed struggle against the Nigerian state. 
However, for some reasons they (particularly Ja’far Mahmoud Adamu, who had begun to work 
with the Nigerian government) stepped away from the jihadi position, stressing instead the need 
to work with the Nigerian state. It was probably for this reason, that they rejected Yusuf’s position 
and rather encouraged their followers to avoid confrontations with the Nigerian authorities. Yusuf, 
on the other hand, remained faithful to the jihadi project. Brigaglia (2015) further explained that it 
was Yusuf’s steadfastness to this idea that finally pushed Yusuf and his group into confrontation 
with the Nigerian government. On that basis, the group’s ideology was already “geared toward the 
preparation of a cataclysmic confrontation with the secular authorities in Nigeria” (Brigaglia, 
2015: 187). Once the group had moved towards this radical jihadi position, violent activism was 
bound to happen.  
This kind of ideological explanations of violence heightens the significance of religious ideology 
and theological sources for structuring violent behaviours within SOMOs. However, I would 
slightly hesitate to use such explanation for the analysis of the development of violence in Boko 
Haram for several reasons. Firstly, such explanation readily assumes that there is a direct 
relationship between a given ideology and the chosen action repertoire. Research shows that this 
is not necessarily and empirically correct in most situations (Gunning and Baron, 2013; Della 
                                                            
19 Bakr b. ‘Abdallāh Abū Zaa is a well-placed scholar in the Saudi Arabian religious establishment. It is likely that 
Yusuf had come in contact with his writings during some of his visits to the Kingdom. 
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Porta, 1995; Gunning, 2009; Wiktorowicz 2004). The reality is that ideology either as a religious 
tradition or as cultural imperative does not necessarily entail collective actions, especially 
violence. There are multiple Salafi networks around the world, in conflictual relationships with the 
host communities as well as other networks with different ideologies which favours violence; yet 
such organisations have remained “non-violent” (Gunning, 2009).  
Even a cursory review of the history of other Salafist groups that have operated within the Izala 
and Ahlus Sunna in Nigeria (Falola, 1998), reveals that there is no evidence that this link (Salafism 
and violence) is inevitable, and thus it needs more investigation. In the past, actors have engaged 
with the Nigerian state since the formation of the Izala and have been profoundly radical; yet they 
have remained non-violent (Falola, 1998). Certainly, Salafi-jihadist trends could through a 
repertoire of ideas encourage a resort to a more violent activism, but that cannot prove that Salafi-
jihadism is inherently violent. At most, this demonstrates as Wiktorowicz (2004:94) rightly points 
out “the tactical ability of such religious ideologies to be used to frame violence in Islamic terms, 
which is possible thanks to a gradual erosion of critical constraints.” The evolution of SOMOs 
who use violence and their justification of such activism often include other sociological elements 
(mobilisation of resources for examples), which are not just based on the interaction of ideological 
elements of such movements. Without identifying such elements, it is difficult to have a clear 
understanding of how violence is used and sustained within such groups.  
Secondly, ideological explanations do not carry nuanced categories for understanding and 
explaining how such strategies escalate after they have evolved. Fundamentalism particularly does 
not carry much socio-political meaning, other than a mono-causal broad description, for explaining 
why violence appeals to activists within “fundamentalist groups”. Such explanations not only over-
emphasise the significance of religious beliefs, they also downplay other diverse angles involved 
in the evolution of such strategies in SOMOs. In the light of this inadequacy, social movement 
scholars have found the evolution of such groups and the development of violence within them to 
be connected to debates and discussions between the movement actors, their fluid interests and 
more broadly, the contexts such movement organisations identify with. The development of 
Hamas in Palestine, for example, has been found to be a product of long standing debates within 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and the violent rivalry with the Nationalist movement over 
the utility of violent resistance, in response to an increasing desperate economic and security 
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situation in the Palestine occupied territories and the opening of political opportunities within the 
other Middle East states (Gunning, 2007; 2009); not necessarily an Islamic response to the 
Palestinian situation.  
Similarly, the provisional violence within the Algerian Islamic Army has also among other things 
been analysed to have emerged from drawn out contestations between the original non-violent 
Bouyali Group and the Military-backed Algerian government, as well as a response to the social 
and political situations that existed within the Algerian society as at the time the group evolved 
(Hafez, 2004:37-60). It was these structures within these societies that provided the political 
opportunity for activists to justify and began to use violence. Hence, it is difficult to come to a 
satisfactory explanation of these kinds of activism by explaining only the religious beliefs and 
practices within such religious traditions upon which such groups evolve. Of course, there can be 
situations where violent actions could be motivated by ideological beliefs of activists, but this does 
not mean that there is automatic mechanism that can be identified whereby fundamentalism or 
exclusivist Salafi ideology entails violence. Such causal explanations and justifications of violence 
are inadequate and would exclude the other social, economic and political dynamics that are 
involved in the use of violence in SOMO.  
 
2.2.2 Violence as Dependent on the Environment and Other Socio-Political Factors 
Other than ideological or religious explanations, other studies have privileged external factors as 
elements responsible for the evolution and development of violence within SOMOs (Ansari, 1984; 
Comolli, 2015; Ibrahim, 1980; 1996; Walker, 2016; Williams & Guttschuss, 2012). Within this 
perspective, research concentrated on the socio-economic and psychological dispositions of 
activists within religious groups (Ansari, 1984; Ibrahim, 1980; 1996). In studying the rise of 
“militant Islamist organisations” in Egypt, for example, Hamied Ansari (1984) analysed the 
relevance of socio-economic background of activists. His underlying assumption was that the 
socio-economic and biographical roots of individuals tell us something about the religious 
disposition of activists who become part of such groups. In his assumptions, the activists within 
these organisations had high levels of education and had recently migrated to urban areas from 
rural areas in search of greener pastures. Because they were cut off from their rural roots and family 
backgrounds, they suffered a sense of social alienation and lack of the usual social or ethical 
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standards, which make them vulnerable to the religious message and susceptible to accept 
violence. Living in a new urban environment with different values, ushered in a sense of alienation 
and isolation, which was only satisfied because activists become active within religious 
organisations. Hence, motivation for violence did not emanate from religious ideology within such 
groups, but from the interaction of the psychological disposition of the activists and the other socio-
environmental elements at play before the activists joined the movement organisations. 
The main merit of this kind of explanation is that it recognises the importance of the socio-political 
contexts in the understanding of how disposition for violence evolves amongst activists in such 
movement organisations. By looking at the interaction of the psychological disposition of activists 
and the socio-political environment such analysis of violence provides answers to how socio-
economic roots of individuals tell us something about grievances, and why such grievances could 
draw activists to religious violent groups. Being part of a violent activism in this sense becomes 
among other things, a platform upon which such activists enjoy a sense of belonging and express 
their grievances about their socio-political environment. 
However, as significant as this kind of analysis is, it has in the last decades been met with severe 
criticisms. One apparent criticism is that socio-economic roots of violent activists do not 
necessarily tell us much about violence or the patterns of violence. Several empirical researches 
confirm that violent activists within Salafism, or other religious traditions seem to share similar 
levels of exposure including, education and economic affluence (Roy, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2004; 
Gunning and Baron, 2013). In some cases, violent activists from SOMOs tend to be well educated, 
and this is a factor that seem to be common in social movement groups around the world, whether 
violent or not (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004:65). There is no causal or procedural relationship 
that shows that one can predict a would-be radical violent SOMO, or how their path to 
radicalisation and use of violence could be known from just the biographical and socio-economic 
backgrounds of its activists.  
In the wake of this criticism, many scholars have thus put aside socio-economic profiling of 
individuals to focus on how individuals in privileged/elite positions within SOMOs and 
communities ‘use’ religion to facilitate the evolution of violence within such groups (Comolli, 
2015; De Juan, 2015; Toft et. al., 2011; Toft, 2007; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012). For such 
scholars, it is not religious ideology or grievances of activists themselves that bred violence; rather 
34 
 
it is how such ideologies and grievances are manipulated by opportunist and power-thirsty 
(religious or political) leaders who adopt religious languages and phrases for their own personal 
gains (Toft, 2007; De Juan, 2015).  
Alexander De Juan’s (2015) analysis of the role of elites in group and intra-state conflicts makes 
a very good example of such cases. Using case studies from Thailand, Iraq and the Philippines; 
the American German-based scholar argues that “competing religious elites try to mobilise their 
followers against their rivals in order to establish their predominance within their religious 
community” (De Juan, 2015:765). Besides providing the “quotidian norm setting in their religious 
communities”, he argues, religious elites “communicate specific narratives, which shape the 
political self-perception of the believers” (De Juan, 2015:764), in a way that is crucial to the 
‘constitution of radical conflict interpretations’. For him, religious differences rarely directly lead 
to violence. Rather, the apparent religious dimensions of many violent conflicts are more of a 
consequence of successful religious framings by religious or political leaders. In the societal 
competition “for material and dogmatic supremacy”, religious and political actors become inclined 
to promote violence, by offering religious interpretations that are designed to legitimise the use of 
force and to mobilise believers to violent action (De Juan, 2015:762). Such framing processes 
easily become successful, depending inter alia on the coherence and appropriateness of the frames 
on the existence of persuasive master frames and on the availability of communication 
infrastructures that allow for effective dissemination of religious frames and mobilisation. 
Implicitly, religion here is not the cause of the conflict, instead the mobilisation power lies in the 
ability of these elites to aggregate and mobilise activists within such groups towards the desired 
violent behaviours. It is these political elites that provide such religious groups with the appropriate 
motivational structure with which to shape conflictual interactions that involves violence.  
It is in this sense that many scholars with expertise in Indian and Pakistani sub-continent (Bhatt, 
2001; Mayall & Srinivasan, 2009; Talbot, 2007; Waseem, 2010) have used similar analysis to 
argue for more nuanced interpretations of the ever present inter and intra-state “religious violence” 
among religious communities within India and Pakistan. Here, taking into account the role of 
competitions between ethnic, religious and political leaders, political realities within the countries, 
the staggering state of the countries’ economic situations, the historical legacy (from both during 
and before the colonial era) of the countries’ nationalist projects, and the interactions between 
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these groups and state institutions, these scholars exonerate religion as the cause of violent activism 
existing in the communities in the borders of the two countries. Instead, they argue that these 
factors interact with one another to influence the development of the morality that sanctions 
violence in these countries. Thus, under such conditions, religion is not the cause of violence, but 
rather a product of these multiple factors at play within the socio-political environment within 
which the groups operate.  
As much as I acknowledge the significance of the role of political elites and these other multiple 
factors in understanding the evolution of violence, I would point out that the separation of these 
factors from religion is quite problematic. Firstly, it is impossible to separate what is ‘religious’ 
from what is ‘economical’ and ‘political’, in such a way that religious ideas are innocent of 
violence. How could one, for example, separate religion from politics in Islam, when Islam itself 
makes no such distinctions? Secondly, it is difficult to clearly separate people’s actions from their 
religious beliefs, when religion is implicated in their actions. How do we absolve Islam of 
responsibility in the action of a Muslim activist for example, when clearly Islam is not primarily a 
set of doctrines, but lived historical experience embodied and shaped by the empirically observable 
actions of both religious traditions? Given certain conditions, Islam, or other faith traditions can, 
and do contribute to violence (Cavanaugh, 2007; 2009). The idea of separating economic, political 
from religious factors, as elements which motivate violence in groups is not only problematic and 
incoherent it is also unsustainable under the recent use and development of violence within 
SOMOs. In most cases, religions do intertwine with political, socio-economic, and even 
psychological conditions, to affect how activists within religious-oriented groups adopt and 
develop the zeal for violence (Amaechi, 2016; Juergensmeyer, 2003; 2008; Gunning, 2009).  
In the light of this criticism, several recent scholars from a variety of disciplines (Asad, 2007; 
Canetti et. al., 2010; Juergensmeyer, 2003; 2008; Piazza, 2009; 2011) agree that religion gets 
intertwined with other factors when it comes to motivation of violence. Analysing how such well-
known groups around the world developed the use of political violence, Mark Juergensmeyer 
(2003), for example, argued that although religion is not the embodiment of the entire picture, it 
cannot be separated from the other factors at play. Rather than make such separation, the American 
scholar saw violence within such groups as arising from a combination of a deep-seated 
cosmological, political, cultural, and symbolic traditions within the religious traditions upon which 
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such groups identify, as they navigate their socio-political environments. For him, the September 
11th 2001 US attack and other similar Al-Qaeda alleged attacks around the world, the Baruch 
Goldstein attacks at the tomb of the Patriarchs and the assassination of the former Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin, the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Beant Singhin Sikhism in India, and the 
subway gas attacks of the Aum Shinrinkyo’s group in Japan by the different groups who 
perpetrated them, were all direct culminations of the culture of violence and the historical 
narratives that emanate from the several different religions in which the perpetrators of these acts 
of violence identify.  
Obviously, religion within these traditions are crucial for the development of these kinds of 
actions, in the sense that “it gives the moral justification for the killings and provides images of 
cosmic war that allow activists” (Juergensmeyer, 2003: xi); however, they do not provide a 
comprehensive picture of why these elements evolve, as these kinds of violence can, and do as 
well happen outside religious contexts. To understand these incidents, one must collectively look 
at the history, the culture of violence, and the economic and political contexts in which these 
organisations operate. Such acts of violence are the functions of not one factor (religious or non-
religious), but the history and the culture of violence, as well as the social interaction between the 
groups in question and the society where such groups operate. By tapping into these narratives, 
religious movement organisations such as BH appropriate cosmological paradigms and political 
identities within which they justify such violent activism within their groups.  
Asad (2007) also echoes a similar thought when he critiqued the legitimacy of the traditional 
academic discourse surrounding “suicide violence”, (an idea he believes has been coloured by 
previous religious and non-religious categorisations, emanating from the Western ideas in 
international politics). Rather than ask what motivates such violence in SOMOs, the Saudi 
Arabian-born scholar rhetorically queries if there is “a crucial difference between someone who 
kills in order to die, and someone who dies in order to kill.” “If there is”, Asad (2007:40) continues, 
“what makes its motivations religious or not?” Hence, the scholar sees no difference between the 
two: that is, the one who kills to die (a Salafi suicide violent activist for example), or the one who 
dies to kill (a soldier who gives his life in a secular war). For him, both are violent activists. There 
is no fundamental difference in terms of goal between them. Whether as a form of self-sacrifice 
by soldiers in war or as martyr activists in a SOMO, this kind of violent activism (like every other 
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violent activism within such organisations) is simply the same. They differ only in terms of scale, 
made possible because of the state’s capability and a combination of cruelty and compassion that 
sophisticated social institutions enable and encourage (Asad, 2007:3). 
Following Asad’s reasoning therefore, activists within a SOMO, which use violence, could be 
likened to modern Western traditional armed combatants, who are committed to violent activism, 
probably in defence of their political community. Whether within an Islamic activist organisation 
or in a battlefield during an international conflict, such activists are affected by similar goals and 
conditions that happen around the group or political community upon which such organisations or 
the individuals belong. Much like self-sacrifice in “legitimate” warfare situations, actors who 
engage in such violence within SOMOs are better understood as activists whose choices and 
strategic decisions are influenced and embedded in the political communities where they identify. 
Thus, there is nothing unique about SOMO’s use of violence that cannot be located along a 
continuum of violence that includes actions and interactions of the organisation around the society 
where they operate.  
Many recent studies of the evolution of violence in BH have analysed how the interaction of socio-
economic and causal factors within the Northern Nigeria underlie the overall emergence of violent 
insurgency in the group (Comolli, 2015; Mohammed, 2015; Pérouse de Montclos, 2015; Onuoha, 
2015; Serrano & Pieri, 2015; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012). Here, scholars have discussed 
factors such as the Nigerian military crack-down on previous similar groups and the brutal 
suppression of the organisation at the early stage of their emergence (Comolli 2015; Serrano and 
Pieri, 2015; Walker 2012); a mixture of poverty, grievance, marginalization, corruption and 
previous inter-communal violence within the region (Harnischfeger 2015: 33-62; Williams and 
Guttschuss, 2012); and demographic pressures, the residual effects of colonialism, the Nigerian 
government’s violent repression; as well as the historical interpretation of Islam in the region 
(Comolli 2015:45-152).  
Virginia Comolli (2015:158-192) particularly combines an analysis of the complexity of the 
group’s international identification with other Salafi networks and that of historical sense of 
grievance and marginalisation that arose after the Nigerian government has embarked on excessive 
brutal repression against the group. Writing from the experience of her fieldwork in the region, the 
scholar explained how these factors led the group’s adoption of violence in 2009 and has continued 
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to be the major source of motivation for violence in the group in its current form. Comolli believes 
that the group continued to develop more sophisticated forms of violence, mainly because of the 
Nigerian government’s inability to build legitimacy, to deliver public goods, to strengthen 
moderate Islam, or implement robust programmes that could counter the ideological support for 
extremism and violent activism. Hence, BH has remained resilient, and has continued to draw 
strength from these factors to recruit and radicalise young activists in the region, for violent 
activism against the Nigerian state.  
No doubt these kinds of analysis of the use of violence in such groups maximises the significance 
of socio-political factors in influencing the evolution of violence within movement organisations. 
However, the over-emphasis on such factors can diminish the importance of many other aspects, 
particularly the organisational and individual relational dimensions, which give a clearer 
understanding of how such groups evolves, and how the individuals within such groups accept 
violent activism as a strategy for the group’s goal attainment. Many social movement and 
organisation-focussed studies on similar groups have shown that often the use of violence is often 
not just about the influence of socio-political factors within the area where the group operates. It 
can also be inspired by the social movement dynamism surrounding both the individual actors 
within the group and the social movement organisations in general (Hafez, 2004: 37-60; Gunning, 
2007; 2009; Gunning & Baron, 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Often, the disposition to violence may 
or may not exist prior to experience of activism, and group participation of the individual actors. 
Instead, such strategies develop as an outcome of dynamic social processes. It is a result of the 
interactions of many evolving repertoires of social movement dynamics involving the individuals 
and the different group dynamics within the group. Even in cases when violent activism is  carried 
out by individuals outside the groups, they are also not simply a result of a cultural or cosmological 
imperative that emanates from the individual’s interaction with the political environment but the 
product of social debates within the movements, and the functional power struggles that is 
motivated and encouraged by different access to resources and competing interactions of 
members’ interests and identities, Without an inclusion of such organisational aspects, it is possible 
to miss very significant aspects of how violent activisms evolve.  
Furthermore, most previous research (Comolli, 2015; Mohammed, 2015; Pérouse de Montclos, 
2015; Onuoha, 2015; Serrano & Pieri, 2015; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012) on the use of violence 
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in BH in general, has not been able to connect the different levels of analysis; the macro 
(environment), the meso (group) and the micro (individual). As a result, they have not been able 
to adequately explain the fluidity that characterises the emergence and proliferation of this element 
as strategy for goal attainment within the organisation. While certain elements (be it socio-
political, organisational, or ideological) may represent constituent categories, which motivate the 
general intense conditions for such organisation to adopt violent strategy, an analysis of one, or a 
combination of such factors in themselves alone does not adequately explain the decision and the 
timing to adopt such strategy. Socio-political factors for example could explain the systemic 
imbalance (Harnischfeger, 2015; Williams & Guttschuss, 2012; Walker, 2012), which as some of 
previous study rightly explain can contribute to frustrations and inclinations towards radical 
activism; but this hardly tells us much how such frustrations could be articulated as collective 
activism. A macro functionalist explanation which focuses on the Northern Nigerian and social-
political structures may similarly explain why an organisation like BH may want to decide to use 
armed violence against the Nigerian state; yet, such explanations can hardly give insight into why 
such elements could provide the justifications for the organisation to move from lower risk violent 
activism to higher-risk activism such as suicide bombing. Why would a BH activists choose to 
adopt this form of violence (suicide bombing), when there are other less-riskier ones? What leads 
to shifts in repertoires of such violent contentions, so that these forms of violent strategies become 
an accepted instrument of collective action within the SOMO? Without an additional inter-related 
analysis on the organisational and individual levels, it is impossible to explain these developments 
in such an individual in such an organisation.  
It is also difficult to explain how such elements could trigger violence in one SOMO and not in 
another within the same socio-political context. Assuming we accept that the evolution of a group 
such as BH to be a response from intense peculiar socio-political factors alone, or a result of an 
ideological imperative within Salafi-jihadist ideology as traditional studies often portray, how do 
we explain the ‘timing’ of the different forms of violent activism in the group? How come the 
different forms of violent activism in the group did not evolve at the initial stages when the group 
first emerged in the Northern Nigerian society, where they first operated? To accept that the 
Nigerian SOMO would be inherently violent because they possess violent-jihadi ideologies, or 
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that they are violent because of general socio-political factors for example, obscures multiple other 
environmental and social movement dynamics that inform the development of such strategies.  
For a clearer understanding of this element, an analysis of the evolution of this group, and how 
violence is used and sustained within it, we need to include a discussion of how the motivations 
from religious ideology and socio-political situations are influenced by changes in organisational 
dynamics and the psychological experiences within the individual activists. Thus, there are three 
important levels of analysis here: The environmental, the ideological and the organisational levels. 
Actions of individual Salafi activists are not just products of theirs socio-political environment, or 
an ideological imperative that emanates from their religious beliefs, but a rational choice that 
dynamically flow from their psychological dispositions, based on their multiple other previous 
experiences both within and outside their group (Gunning, 2009). The individual is not just a mere 
religio-political activist, but an individual that is dependent on the association he identifies with, 
his or her psychological make-up and the socio-political environment he operates in. I believe that 
it is only by accommodating these different levels of explanation in structuring movement and 
individual choices, can an analysis adequately explain the evolution of the group and the choice of 
violent activism, both in terms of fluidity and the temporality of such strategy, and in terms of how 
it is influenced, and how it emerges from, and metamorphoses into other sophisticated forms 
within the organisation.  
One way to do this is to employ social movement theory (SMT) paradigms. SMT paradigms do 
not just provide a framework for integrating the three levels of explanations, it also offers a 
platform within which we can investigate the impact these three different levels have on each other, 
in the development of violence. In its most comprehensive form, SMT paradigms can 
conceptualise the evolution of all dynamics within movement organisations, including violent 
strategies, as “fluid and responsive” to individual and contextual changes within the movements 
and the environments in which such movements identify. In this sense, rather than investigate how 
one element (ideology, environment or socio-psychologic) can motivate the evolution of violence 
within a SOMO, an SMT inspired research could encourage an adoption of a more resolutely 
empirical analysis that sees these conditions as “socially inter-related”, in influencing the 
development of such groups and the different violent strategies that evolve as the group navigates 
its socio-political environment. Also, rather than investigate, for example, why Salafi-jihadist 
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ideology influenced the development of violence, such analysis could look at what stage a group 
like BH began to adopt violent activism as a strategy for goal attainment. It could also investigate 
under “what conditions” such groups started to use different jihadist ideology to justify its violent 
activism. Even though such groups may have from the time it evolved become disposed to violent 
activism, how do the interactions of the socio-political, environmental, individual and 
organisational dynamics influence the group to begin to see the Nigerian state as a legitimate target 
for such activism? And how do these interactions influence the group to move from one less radical 
violent activism such as threats, to the next more radical one, such as suicide violence? Within 
such discussions, it becomes necessary to understand how the group first evolved, the contexts in 
which it did so and the different forms of socio-political structures that influenced this evolution. 
Such trajectories are also manifest in the evolution of the different forms of activism that the group 
adopts (including violence). 
These kinds of investigations have several implications. First, it restores fluidity to the idea of what 
motivates violence, both in terms of how it is influenced and how it emerges from and 
metamorphoses into other sophisticated forms within the organisation (Gunning, 2009:161). 
Second, it helps to relocate Salafist political ideology and other resources in their broader social 
contexts, as part of what forms the contentions within and around the wider movement organisation 
to adopt violent strategy. Finally, it also enables an investigation into the choice to adopt violence 
as dynamic - an element that is often affected by the experience of activism and the impact of 
participation in the movement organisation’s structures- rather than simply as a static, individual 
disposition prior to movement participation.  
In the literature, Thurston’s (2016) study seem to be one of the best studies that came closest to 
advocating for an integrated approach; by combining a focus on the interaction of the so called 
Salafi-jihadism within the global Salafi discourse, the specific Northern Nigerian socio-cultural 
structures and an ’analysis of the group’s interactions with other main Salafi establishments in the 
region. But even these approaches still lack the detailed social movement (resource availability, 
political opportunity and conditioned based) multi-level explanation that characterises the 
evolution of such strategy. Without such detailed additional approach that focusses on how socio-
political factors are affected by the availability of violent resources from these similar networks, 
the peculiar dynamisms within the movement, and the psychological dispositions of the individuals 
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in question, it is impossible to explain why justification and legitimation- that arises due to 
repression from the Nigerian security forces approach, or due to the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the 
group, could trigger certain violent activism in one case or how they can make activists in this 
group, move from one form of this strategy to another, while the presence of the same elements 
would not do so in another group with relatively same ideology in the same area. 
 
2.3 Social Movement Theories: An Overview 
SMT is not a theory in a strict sense of the phrase. It is a set of inter-disciplinary models within 
the social sciences (especially Sociology), with a broad set of analytical frameworks for explaining 
collective mobilisations in mostly non-violent movement organisations. These models explain 
why such mobilisations occur, the forms such mobilisations follow and the potential social, 
cultural and political consequences of such mobilisation in movement organisations. Some of the 
most popular models here include relative deprivation, resource mobilisation, political process and 
framing process.  
2.3.1 Relative Deprivation 
The relative deprivation model first became popular in the 1960s as one of the major sociological 
explanations for analysing the evolution of social movement organisations (Furseth, 1999:41; 
Wiktorowicz, 2004:6-9). The main argument within this model is that people experience 
deprivations through meeting obstacles and economic deprivations; and as such search for 
alternative goals in social movements as compensations (Glock and Stack, 1965; Smelser, 1962). 
The starting point of this model is that ‘equilibrium’ in social systems is a natural societal 
condition. Human societies organically generate institutional infrastructures which regulate the 
balance between inputs and outputs in the political systems to keep them in place (Wiktorowicz, 
2004:6). Social movement organisations according to the proponents of this model only arise when 
there is an imbalance between these inputs and outputs (‘diss-equilibruims’). This is often because 
of lack of socio-economic needs. These economic needs often produce grievances and feelings of 
socio-psychological deprivations, which erode societal and institutional capacities. When these 
societal and institutional capacities can no longer accommodate these newly mobilised demands 
within the society, the result is social frustrations that lead to the formation of social movements. 
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Ted Gurr (1970) was one of the first social movement scholars to apply this model to the study of 
the evolution of “violent movement organisations”. In analysing the wave of political violence in 
rebellious movement organisations in mainly post-colonial Africa and South-East Asian countries, 
the American scholar proposes that the primary source for the human capacity for violence is the 
frustration-aggression mechanism. According to him, the evolution of such is driven not by any 
other element, but by frustration, which evolved from systemic inequalities. This is not to be 
misunderstood to mean that all frustrations lead to rebellious movement organisations. For social 
discontent to transform into violent movement activism Gurr quickly clarifies, the people involved 
must “feel that they deserve, or have a right to more”, be it resources, power or status, than they 
already had. And often, they must also conclude that they would not attain their satisfactions 
through other conventional methods (Gurr, 1970:24). Thus, the only viable option left would be 
“collective violent activism”, by which such activists believe they can bring about systemic 
change. Implicitly, the choice for violence is not dependent on just the structural lack of resources 
within the society, but on the psychological mechanism that produces aggression and violence. In 
other words, frustration eventually would lead to violence, especially when there is a discrepancy 
between what people think they deserve and what they get. In the face of such tense situations, 
people would become aggressive and eventually form groups that engage in collective violent 
behaviours.  
This line of thought dominated much of SMT-inspired scholarship about “religious-oriented 
groups who used adopted violence in the 1970s and 1980s, (especially those within Islamic 
traditions). On movement organisations in the Middle East particularly, scholars here were often 
quick to point-out that the “frustrations and feelings of deserving more” that emanated from 
structural changes within those societies were the result of both the evolution of such groups and 
the appeal for the adoption of violent contentions that evolved within the groups. The assumption 
was that the fundamental motivation for violent movement activist groups was the psychological 
feelings of deprivations that were produced by the failure of secular modernisation projects 
(Dekmejian, 1995; Faksh, 1997; Haddad, 1992; Hoffman, 1995; Waltz, 1986). At the pinnacle of 
modernisation, the political elites in these communities had adopted Western models with the hope 
that it would promote economic development. However, when such policies did not generate the 
expected wealth among the citizens, it created a deep-seated sense of alienation and deprivation 
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among the people that made it possible for the rise and formation of radical Islamic movement 
organisations.  
This was particularly Haddad’s (1992), argument to be the case in Palestine where the ruling and 
educated elites adopted the western-modelled development project, including a preference of 
English language over the local Arabic language. Again, the economic policies from both Israeli 
government and the local Palestinian government themselves concentrated wealth among only the 
Westernised elite, state bourgeoisie and corrupt state officials, leading to cluster and mass 
migration of people from the rural to the urban Gaza areas. Thus, as these policies did not create 
the much for hoped economic development, the lack of adequate municipal infrastructure could 
not accommodate the influx of these rural-urban migrants seeking employment. This served as 
catalyst for societal introspection, and in time mobilisation for the evolution of violent Islamist 
activist groups (Haddad 1992). 
Many other scholars like L. J. Esposito (1998) and N. R. Keddie (1994), whose analyses do not 
conform exactly to this conceptualisation did favour political-deprivation explanations. In 
discussing the evolution of movement groups in the Islamic world, Keddie (1994) particularly 
believes that in authoritarian regimes, the masses’ lack of formal political access to state 
institutions deepens the adverse effects of modernisation projects. According to him, the situation 
is often made worse in the face of security service repression and administrative processes that 
attempted to de-politicise civil societies. With few open channels for political recourse under such 
circumstances, the result becomes societal frustration and a sense of alienation that leads to violent 
contention, under religious guise. Under such situations, Islamist violent activism becomes a 
natural medium for the deprived individuals to articulate their frustrations and feelings of 
deprivations.  
As interesting as these kinds of analyses are, the model has in the last decades been met with a lot 
of criticisms, especially by social movement scholars themselves. Besides not capturing the 
relevance of organisational dynamics in the understanding of the evolution of violence within 
movement organisations, recent SMT scholars have pointed out that grievances or the feeling of 
“deserving more”, do not necessarily lead to movement organisations, or violent activism with 
religious organisations (Gunning, 2009; Gunning and Baron, 2013). If engaging in movement 
activisms means death or severe punishment for example, potential activists would often think 
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twice before engaging in such, especially if the desired result is not guaranteed. Further, if 
opposition groups are regularly suppressed, constrained or co-opted, as Gunning and Baron 
(2013:12) rightly put it, “it is difficult to build a protest momentum, let alone a protest narrative 
that identifies the problem, classifies it as remediable injustice and proposes an action plan”, as it 
is often the case in SOMOs. Under an unfavourable organisational situation, there is more 
likelihood that actors would accept the oppressive regimes and its claims to legitimacy, however 
grudgingly. Hence, for feelings of “deserving more” to produce violent activism, it needs to be 
interpreted as a ‘lack’, and there also need to be resources available to galvanise and facilitate the 
success of such activisms (Wiktorowicz, 2004:10). 
The above-mentioned point would be the starting point for the more recent social movement 
models: resource mobilisation, political opportunity and framing process. Through these later 
models, SMT scholars now look at how resources such as finance, cooperation with other 
organised network groups, political alliances etc, interact with the political structures within 
political environment, to influence activists to interpret strains as unjust, and mobilise violent 
activism and other dynamics that evolves within religious-oriented movement organisations.  
 
2.3.2 Resource Mobilisation  
The main assumption of this model is that although grievances and discontentment are ubiquitous, 
movement organisations or activities (including violence) within such organisations are not. 
Grievance and discontentment may be behind most, or even all social movement’s dynamics, yet 
these grievances and discontentment do not necessarily transform into collective actions 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:10). For grievance and discontentment to lead to collective action either in 
the form of violent contention or other forms of contention within movement organisations, there 
must be intermediary variables (resources and mobilising structures), which transform these 
elements into organised contention. These intermediaries are needed to collectivise what would 
otherwise remain individual frustrations. Thus, rather than view movement activists as 
psychologically deprived irrational individuals, who are compelled to join movement 
organisations or adopt dynamics within their organisations because of economic deprivation, 
resource mobilisation scolars re-conceptualise movement activist groups as comprising of rational 
actors, who get mobilised when resources and creative mobilisatory structures are available. Ipso 
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facto, the different dynamics that evolve within such movement organisations are a result of access 
to these resources, (which could be: finance, moral support, dense social networks, political elite 
support, ideology), innovations and mobilisatory movement tactics (Gunning, 2009; Oberschal, 
1993; Scott, 1990). These resources also determine both the form and the intensity of any strategy 
that evolves within the movement organisations.  
Following this kind of conceptualisation, the value of resources and the organisational 
characteristics of movement organisations have become very significant. To adopt strategies 
movement organisation leaders, use different resources available to them to create crucibles for 
mobilisation. The availability of certain resources entails ability to adopt certain strategies which 
such resources incorporate (Della Porta, 2009). For example, to adopt violent strategy against a 
state opposition, resources such as skills on how to use ammunitions (training), money, political 
sponsorships, alliances may be needed to mobilise and embolden activists (incentives), to gather 
intelligence, to plan, to coordinate and to carry out significant forms of this strategy. Availability 
of such strategies impacts on both the willingness and the ability of activists to mobilise strategies 
with which they can maximise impacts and efficaciousness of their groups’ goals (Oberschall, 
1993; Amaechi 2013, Gunning & Baron 2013). Thus, sharply contrasting the psychological-
deprivation conceptualisation of activists from the earlier models, the ability to adopt such strategy 
in this sense depends no longer on the structural strain or psychological characteristics of activists, 
but on the availability of such resources, and how such resources are influenced by the internal 
debates within the group.  
A typical example of this is depicted in Jeroen Gunning’s (2007) analysis of the evolution of 
sophisticated military-style attacks and suicide bombings that evolved in Hamas in the early 2000. 
Here, the social movement scholar first explained how the Israeli government’s military brutality 
had pushed activists within Palestine into the justification of violent activism against the Israeli 
state. Further, he explained how in the face of this continued militarisation and brutal repression, 
the Palestinian activists were further forced to seek for assistance from both the Syrian and Iranian 
regimes. With these alliances, these regimes became Hamas’ main financial sponsors. As such, 
they were able to mobilise more sophisticated forms of violent strategies such as military guerrilla 
attacks and suicide violence. Tactical decisions for the use of these sophisticated forms of violent 
strategy within the group were much influenced by the financial, intelligent and military resources 
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made available to the group through its association with those regimes. Neither religious ideology, 
nor the political environment within the constituencies in the Palestinian occupied territories (from 
which Hamas derives its power and legitimacy) according to him, had much influence in the 
development of these forms of violence. Having these institutional ties and sponsorships meant 
that the internal debates about what kind of strategy to be used in the Hamas were affected by the 
relationship with those regimes. Given this relationship, the decision for the adoption of the 
different forms of violence to be use included the option for the use of the types of violent strategies 
present in both the para-military wings of the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Having these kinds of 
military techniques available in those regimes, meant that it was only natural that these forms of 
violence soon become part of the strategy used by the group against their Israeli targets. Access to 
such resources meant enablement and opening-up of opportunity for the organisation’s internal 
debate for the use of such improved forms of violence.  
This kind of analysis is particularly significant for an underground SOMO such as BH. Although 
the group is not known to have ties and connections to regimes like Iran and Syria, it is known to 
have connections to similar well-known international networks such as al-Qaeda, AQIM, al-
Shabaab and IS (Kassim, 2018; Zenn, 2018). The analyses of these ties would provide more 
information why the different forms of violence such as suicide bombing, kidnappings, or guerrilla 
warfare developed and escalated within the group. First, the groups are ideologically similar to BH 
(Amaechi, 2017; Brigaglia 2015). Also, the kinds of armed violence used within them are also 
similar with those used by BH. These would make cooperation between them and BH more likely. 
Aligning with such groups would mean that faced with similar situation in Nigeria, the 
organisation could tap into the technical know-how, the material support and the experience from 
these similar groups to adopt, carry-out and sustain these more advanced forms of violence, 
without exposing themselves to much external danger. Here, possession of military skills, training 
and material resources from such alliances could become a very useful asset (resource) that 
influences the development of these kinds of violent activisms.  
This was clearly the case in the Italian Red Brigades that operated in the 1970s (although the 
organisation here is not a SOMO, the analysis is applicable), as was analysed by Della Porta (1995; 
2009). Here, as the Italian social movement scholar rightly explained, the possession of military 
skills was a big resource which moulded the adoption of certain kinds of violence when the 
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organisation went underground (Della Porta, 1995; 2009). At this stage of the group’s existence, 
the group through some of their activists’ possession of certain military skills was able to conduct 
bank robberies, kidnappings, hostage takings and a series of similar violent activities against the 
state opposition because of its underground existence. Within its situation, having such military 
experience and skills was a very significant asset (resource) which influenced the group’s decision 
to adopt those kinds of violent activities. These kinds of violent activism technically arose from 
the experience of those activists who had most skills in the use of sophisticated violence and 
military skills (Della Porta, 2009:14). Accessibility of such violent skills produces a specific 
dynamic of violent contention which the group used to achieve the kind of goals their underground 
status entailed at that time. Thus, in the face of accessibility to certain resources, such social 
movement organisations are empowered and emboldened to mobilise themselves to adopt the 
kinds of violent activism that such resources enabled. The adoption of violence and its escalation 
into different forms is not just about the willingness, it is also dependent on what kind of resources 
that is available. The kind of resources available to the group helps shape conversation within such 
group about what strategies to adopt. Without such analysis, it could be difficult for movement 
organisations to mobilise or adopt violence as a strategy, even amid violent ideology. Or in a face 
of excessive repression that favours retaliatory violence. While the need and justification for 
violence may arise due to frustrations and deprivations, the availability of these resources 
facilitates and structures movement conversation and proclivity to accept certain strategies that the 
organisations adopt.  
 
2.3.3 Political Process 
Other than resources, social movement scholars have also used the concept of “political 
opportunity structures” within the political process model to analyse both the evolution of 
movement organisations and the use of different forms of violence within them. Political process 
model concurs with the resource mobilisation’s critique of relative deprivation theory (structural 
and socio-psychological explanations of movement organisations), as well as its emphasis on the 
importance of resources, as the main elements that capture the myriad conditions for the gradual 
evolution of different contentions in movement organisations. However, more than resources, the 
political process also emphasises the importance of the changing exogenous factors within both 
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organisations and environment they identify (Gunning, 2009; Gunning and Baron, 2013; 
Wiktorowicz, 2004). The main assumption here is that “social movements do not operate in 
vacuum: they belong to a broader social milieu and context that is characterised by shifting and 
fluid configurations of capacity and constraints that structure the movement dynamics” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:13). Hence, social movement organisations, as well as their different forms 
of contentions are not just a manifestation of resources, but also a function of pre-existing 
networks, which develop in interaction with the existing political system, state practices towards 
groups, political alliances, and prevailing socio-political conditions (Gunning, 2009:158). In other 
words, regardless of the level of grievances or resource availability, contentions within movement 
organisations are empowered by contextual exogenous factors, which often define movement’s 
viability and the menu of tactics, actions and choices within the movements. These political 
opportunity structures create the appropriate opportunities or constraints, which make it possible 
for movement actors to acquire and develop strategies for the mobilisation of the different modes 
of contention in their movement organisations. 
Political process scholars do not necessarily share a common delineation of what constitutes the 
most important political opportunity structure, as these structures could be anything (ranging from 
political conditions, socio-political changes, or even religious ideology). What most scholarship 
here focus on, is how these elements or conditions create the ‘opening’ and closing of political 
space and opportunity for different strategies to evolve and develop, for goal attainment (Della 
Porta, 1995; 2009; Iwara et. al., 2018; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Gunning, 2007). Some of the 
most analysed elements include the nature of state repression (Amaechi, 2016; Della Porta, 2009; 
Hafez, 2004; Gunning and Baron, 2013; Tilly,1978; 2003; 2004), the level of group’s formal and 
informal access to institutionalised political institutions and decision-making institutions (Gunning 
& Baron 2013; Wiktorowicz 2004) and the availability of similar elite networks (Tarrow, 1994). 
The understanding here is that these elements do dynamically impact social movement 
organisations by either closing or opening up “political opportunities” for movement activists to 
establish their groups or adopt certain appropriate types of activisms they deem necessary for the 
achievement of goals within their organisations. 
Mohammed Hafez’s (2004) analysis of the evolution of the SOMO, Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) 
that used violence against the Algerian state theoretically represents this kind of analysis. In 
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Algeria during the 1990s, the GIA was responsible for a series of civilian massacres. In the middle 
of the night on several occasions, members of the GIA ambushed villagers, killing indiscriminately 
(children, women, the elderly and the sick), using mainly machetes. They also maimed and burned 
peoples’ houses. To explain how this happened, the social movement scholar showed how the 
adoption of such a violent strategy was unlikely to occur without the opening of political 
opportunity for violent contention created by the Algerian state’s excessive repression of the 
group, and the group’s access to significant resources. Violence emerged in the group when the 
political environment where the group operated became characterised by excessive repression. 
This, according to Hafez (2004: 41-42), created a political environment of “bifurcation and 
brutality” (opportunity), which enhanced a sense of injustice. Given that the movement had at this 
time developed organisational resources and mobilisation capacity through its long years of 
operation, this repression forced the group into clandestine organisation that become increasingly 
isolated from the rest of the society. This in time legitimised calls to arms and the need to carry 
out radical violent attacks on state institutions, or on civilian population that had sympathy for the 
state (Hafez, 2004:31-60). SOMOs are very likely to adopt and justify the use of violence when 
material resources are available. The interaction of this state’s excessive violent approach with the 
availability of resources provided the group’s activists with the ‘appropriate’ political opportunity 
to justify violence in the group. In face of excessive government repression, the group’s leadership 
were able to mobilise a corresponding retaliatory violent activism against the state. Without these 
conditions, such unconventional means of activism may not appear desirable or obtainable even 
in the face of heightened repression from the state.  
In another similar study, Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) also arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Analysing the evolution of violence in the Gama’a Islamiyya (GI) in Egypt in the 1990s, the two 
social movement scholars argue that the group’s use of violent strategy against the government 
and later on the civilian population, did not emerge (except one particular incident in the city of 
Luxor in 1997) until later, in the face of political opportunity that came with the Egyptian 
government’s violent approach on the group. Like in the Algerian group, the government 
repression had a similar effect: a political opportunity that gave credibility for a call to arms within 
the group. However, in addition to this, Hafez and Wiktorowicz contend for a more specific 
understanding of this kind of repression that breaks it down into relevant dimensions. They argue 
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that repression here likely engendered a violent response because movements were excluded from 
institutional politics, and because the activists suffered indiscriminate and reactive state repression 
(as opposed to selective, pre-emptive repression)20. Political exclusion is likely to provide 
credibility for those in SOMO’s leadership to argue for the use of violence because it limits the 
number of reasonable tactical options, especially those related to system reform. In this case, given 
that the regime’s repression was indiscriminate and targeted non-activists, including GI’s families 
and supportive bystanders, it lent credence to the justification within the group that the system 
could only be changed through violent activism, even if it entailed civilian deaths. Having the 
appropriate resources, the existence of such political opportunity made it easier for movements to 
mobilise its activists around such activism. 
Notably, the fact that this model focuses on ways in which structural conditions shape social 
movement dynamics does not imply that there is a fundamental ontological disagreement between 
it and the previous resource mobilisation model. Despite the micro differences, both models share 
an underlying assumption that social movement contention derives from rationality rather than 
psychological deviance. Rather than ontological difference, the political process model only 
reflects differences in emphasis, and represents an additive piece to the overall understanding of 
the relevance of organisational dynamics in the understanding of strategies such as violence within 
movement organisations. Movement entrepreneurs here (as much as in resource mobilisation 
model), also participate in activism within movement organisations not because of irrationality, 
but because of variety of incentives (resources) and goals, whether for individual preferences or 
for movement goals. Once in the movement organisations, activists respond both on the personal 
level and on the group level, to the available opportunities and threats within their political 
environment to maximise their goals. 
 
                                                            
20 Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004:67-71) make the distinction between pre-emptive/selective targeting and 
reactive/indiscriminate targeting. Repression is considered as pre-emptive and selective when it is applied before the 
opposition movement has gathered momentum and is targeted at the certain individuals within the group. In contrast, 
it is reactive and indiscriminate when it is applied in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle –that is after the activists 
have gained organisational momentum. Here, the targeting is random and not selective.  
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2.3.4 Framing Process 
This model represents another additive piece to the relevance of organisational dynamics in the 
understanding of the evolution and the use of violence within movement organisations, particularly 
in terms of its different forms and patterns of development.  
Initially social movement scholars had kept the focus of analysis of activism in movement 
organisations on micro-mobilisation and environmental political opportunities. However, because 
of the “cultural turn” that ‘engulfed’ the social sciences in the 1970s, emphasis shifted on how 
these elements are impacted by ideologies and cultures (Benford & Snow, 2000; Bosi, 2007; 
Wikham, 2004). The idea here is not to see ideologies and cultures as the carriers of the imperative 
for violence as most traditional studies do, but on how these elements interact with the political 
environment and resources to be re-interpreted, bridged and amplified to confer identity on 
activists, and thus mobilise the kind of violent action repertoires that movement organisations 
adopt. The assumption here is that the need for violence and the further development of violent 
strategies that evolve within movement organisations constantly change as the groups navigate 
their political environment. This is to say, to be able to mobilise such strategies, movement 
organisation leaders constantly frame their activism in such a way that it resonates with current 
situations of activists, and the potential activists the movement organisation targets.  
One important dimension of the framing process for the mobilisation of activism within movement 
organisation is the “frame resonance” (Benford and Snow, 2000; Wickham, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 
2004). For framing process scholars, a movement organisation’s ability to transform a mobilisation 
potential into an actual mobilisation of a movement behaviour is contingent upon the capacity of 
the movement to frame the activism; the group’s goals, the interaction between the group and the 
political environment, in such a way that it resonates with the culture and the identity around 
movement participants (Wiktorowicz, 2004:16). Hence, a specific type of violent activism is more 
likely to reverberate with constituents, and enhance mobilisation if a movement organisation’s 
leaderships, frames and draw upon indigenous cultural symbols, languages and historical 
narratives that relate with individual activist’s identities (Benford and Snow, 2000:619-622). Such 
reverberations permeate along the personal salience of the frame for potential participants, the 
consistency of the frame, and the frame’s practical credibility in real life of the activists. Once a 
narrative is developed, it can sustain the movement very effectively. This is exemplified in the 
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case of ISIL as found by D. W. Lee (2016). While the genesis of ISIL is uniquely rooted in the 
Iraqi-Sunni and Shite politics, its information operations have adopted the narrative of the far 
enemy and vilification of the West to justify why foreigners should do whatever it takes to join the 
Caliphate and mobilise themselves to commit lone-wolf attacks on civilian targets in the West.  
Carrie R Wickham (2004) also made a good example of this when she analysed how violent 
activisms evolved and were used by the Islamic groups that operated in the Cairo Suburbs during 
the 1990s, among the urban educated youths. In this Egyptian case, the social movement scholar 
argued that the success of mobilisation for suicidal violence did not depend on just the resources 
or political opportunities from the political environment, but rather, on how this strategy was 
framed to resonate with the activist’s life experience, ideology and the culture, which has already 
been impacted by the experience within the groups. What she termed as “its close fit with the life 
experience and beliefs of those graduates targeted for recruitment” (Wickham, 2004:232). 
Ideology impacted movement behaviours indirectly, through the constraints and opportunities that 
the group’s interaction with the Egyptian state imposed on the activists. The excessive state 
repression on the activists, she contends, meant that the group had to be cut off from their support 
base. This, in time, encouraged the development of a closed inward looking and an exclusive 
resentment-filled ideology. Such an ideology would help justify the kind of corresponding violent 
strategy that the group needed in order to defend itself in such an extremely hostile environment. 
Implicitly, the development of the exclusivist ideology, within which violent activism was evolved 
not necessarily from an innate composition of Islamist ideas, but from the experiences of violence 
from the socio-political contexts. Thus, repressive political contexts not only increase the need and 
proclivity for enhanced violence, it also provides the opportunity upon which such exclusivist 
ideologies make sense within activist groups. 
About suicide violence particularly, Wickham, however, contends that this was not enough. Even 
though the need for more advanced form of violence was enhanced by the experiences around the 
group she argues, the educated activists in the Egyptian case needed more, to progress to the 
eventual riskier, more overtly spiritual and political form of Islamic activism. To make this 
progression, the group leadership had to frame the group’s activism as “a sort of moral obligation 
that demanded self-sacrifice and unflinching support to the cause of religious transformation” 
(Wickham, 2004: 232). Among Egyptian educated activists with the knowledge of the country’s 
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culture and long history of Islamic religious activism that does not distinguish religion from 
politics, such framings resonated perfectly. The “framing success helped set the groundwork for 
riskier political contention” (Wickham 2004:232). It encouraged the activists to view their 
participations in such political activism as a form of religious duty. Under such condition, higher-
risk activism became necessary no matter the cost. 
The fact that ideas and ideology cannot totally be separated from either their carriers, or from the 
social setting upon which they are disseminated gives this kind of analysis more credibility. Often 
ideologies are construed upon histories and realities within the environments in which actors 
operate. Social movement actors often interpret these ideologies through changing set of frames: 
“from injustice frames, to diagnosis and protest frames; to prognosis, action and motivational 
frames” (McAdam et. al., 2001:28). Through mechanisms such as attribution of opportunities, 
social appropriations and framings of the interactions in the political environment, movement 
actors seek to mobilise strategies available to the movements, in such a way that they satisfy the 
goals within the groups. And when they are developed, they are also spread through the networks 
that make up the movement organisations.  
Following this, it can be argued that more than other elements, it could be the experience at this 
level (inside organisations) that further shapes an activist’s dispositions and participation in the 
different forms of violence (including violence) that a movement organisation adopts. The activism 
experience of activists and how the organisation’s leadership frame their activisms has much larger 
influence on whether actors would participate in higher-risk activism (such as suicide violence) 
than religious ideology. This is why organisations such as Tamil Tigers and the Japanese Aum 
Shinrikyo (Juergensmeyer, 2003) which have very little religious orientation, activists had all used 
suicide bombing as a strategy for goal attainment. In these organisations, religious ideology had 
little or no role in the motivation of activists to sacrifice themselves for the organisation’s cause. 
In SOMOs, the main transformations in individual motivations could begin with the activists’ 
Salafi ideology. However, this disposition is further re-negotiated and re-enforced within the 
individuals through experience and participation in the social movement organisations’ activism. 
What Della Porta (2009:15) describes in her analysis of the Italian case as “affective focusing and 
cognitive closures.” Through participation in the group and interactions with their political 
environment, activists are conferred with certain kinds of identity and activism that correspond 
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with the group’s goals. By participating in the movement’s activisms, activists are also likely going 
to have investments in terms of their own identity and in terms of their emotions that tend to create 
very strong connection with the goals of the group and the individuals within the group. Hence, 
they acquire certain values and lose others, thereby forming certain identities that are consistent 
with other individuals and goals within the group. Over long periods of participation in this 
network, these linkages, political commitments and this sort of “comradisation” with the 
individuals and goals of the group would likely grow and overlap. Within such situations, the goal 
of the group and that of the individual could become much narrowed over time, making it possible 
for framing of the activism to resonate and to be easily justified by the individuals within the group. 
In this sense, the disposition to this strategy does not exist prior to experience of activism and 
group participation. Instead, they are affected by the experience of activism and the phase of 
violent circle, within which such activism takes place within such groups.  
 
2.4 Theorising the Use and Development of Violence in Salafi-oriented Movement 
Organisations: A Synthesized Social Movement Theory Approach 
In the light of the above discussions, this study will be analysing the use of violence by BH along 
the following three main hypotheses. These hypotheses are based on the three main research 
questions: (a) Under what conditions did BH evolve in the Northern-Nigeria? (b) at what stage, 
and under what conditions did the group begin to use violence as a strategy for goal attainment? 
(c) what specific forms of violence does the group use; and how are such forms of violence 
sustained in the group?  
2.4.1 The Evolution of BH in Northern Nigeria 
Following the above discussions and the study’s theoretical foundation, the first step towards 
understanding the use violence by BH is to understand its background. Namely, the specific 
religious and socio-political context the SOMO evolved in Northern-Nigeria. Following the 
literature and the discussions from the social movement theory it seems that the evolution of such 
a group would be better understood when considered against specific environmental, socio-
political and ideological structures within the region (Northern Nigeria). My assumption is that 
despite its Salafist orientation, BH is like every other social movement organisation. As such, it 
does not evolve in a vacuum; its birth and success are sensitive to the specific political opportunity 
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structures in the environment within which the group operates/identifies. It is these unique socio-
political opportunity structures that provide activists with the window of opportunity and the 
conducive atmosphere to establish the organisation at the time it was established. It is also the 
backgrounds upon which the organisation was established that set the contexts for the kinds of 
activism that developed in it.   
 
2.4.2 The Evolution of Violence  
My assumption about the adoption of violence in the organisation flows from various movement 
dynamics and internal debate within the movement. Like other movement behaviours, this strategy 
involves organisational structuring and normative framing that requires the mobilisation of 
resources (such as: money, military skills, and possibly a compelling framing of Salafi ideology 
from the group’s leadership). Cognitive processes to adopt this activism mediate between these 
resources and experiences of the activists inside both the movement organisations, and around the 
political environments they identify. In other words, how movement actors’ structure and re-
structure their organisation’s behaviour depends on the availability of resources and the level of 
opportunities and constraints within the organisation’s peculiar political environments.  
I agree that repression and frustrations may motivate grievance. However, these do not necessarily 
transform to violent contentions in the form of collective action. For such to happen, there must 
be the existence of other resources in the form of intermediary variables (money, mobilisation 
networks, political support from either within or outside the movement organisation and the 
existence of dense network in the form of similar associations), which influence the internal debate 
within the movement to encourage the transformation of these individualised discontents into 
collective contention. Without these elements, it is impossible to transform grievances and 
frustrations into violent contention  
Contrary to the popular perception that individuals within groups are irrational, crazy and 
religiously myopic, activists within religious-oriented movement organisations are as rational as 
activists within broad-based social movement organisations. SOMOs’ activists, just like their 
social movement counter-parts are individuals who under political opportunities and constraints 
seek to acquire and allocate resources to maximise the goals within their movement organisations. 
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The opportunities and constraints made possible by the presence of resources both within the group 
and within the political environment enter the rational calculus of these movement actors and help 
shape intra-movement debates over the efficacy of different strategies, including violence. Within 
such dynamics, violent activism becomes easily appropriated and framed as an appropriate tool by 
the social movement actors to achieve certain specific goals within the group.  
 
2.4.3 Further Development of Violent Strategy 
Violence having evolved, how do we explain its development into different forms? Why would a 
SOMO like BH higher-risk form of violence such as suicide bombing for example, rather than 
other seemingly lower-risk ones like hit and run guerrilla? How do such groups justify and sustain 
such forms of higher-risk forms of violence? Answers to these questions are rooted strongly, I 
believe, in the availability and mobilisation of resources. Here, I will look at the ideas within the 
social movement theories. Much like in the case of the development of violence in general, I 
believe that such developments do not appear out of nowhere. They dynamically emerge as a 
movement navigates through the available resources and political opportunities within the 
environment where they operate. Usually, there is a history of contestation that interacts with 
increasing political opportunity and the availability of resources to make these forms of violent 
activism become an option for the group, before such an activism becomes the norm. To mobilise 
activists to embrace such activisms (practically moving from lower-risk to higher-risk), social 
movement activists leaders often draw on the organisations existing ideologies; from individual’s 
experiences within the movement, and from the culture and the practical interaction between 
organisation and political environment, to construe activism to resonate with social movement 
activists. Thus, in contrast to popular perceptions, this choice and the decision for such activism is 
often influenced by the experience of participation inside the movement organisations, rather than 
by static or ideological dispositions that exist prior to participation in such organisations. I believe 
that a mono-causal, or similarly limited causal explanations for the evolution of violence within 
such a SOMO as often construed by traditional research are inadequate. Certain rational interests, 
political structures and ideologies within the environment where they operate may tell us 
something about evolution of such elements, but none of these elements alone can explain violent 
activism’s relative weight shift over time. At best these elements may explain why movements or 
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individuals would employ violent activism, since it provides several tactical benefits; but such 
explanations cannot explain why the group or activists here would move from a low to high risk 
aspects of this element without increase in benefits. To understand this, there is a need to look at 
how these activisms are framed, to resonate with the realities around the individuals within the 
movement organisations.  
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented a conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. It started by 
presenting some of the significant literature in the topic; discussing them in terms of the main 
research gaps and how these have not been adequately dealt with in the previous literature. Further, 
it introduced and presented a detailed theoretical discussion of social movement theories, 
particularly resource mobilisation, political opportunity process and framing process models as 
more suitable for answering some of the questions raised. It argued that although paradigms within 
these models were initially developed for understanding dynamics within non-violent and non-
religious movement organisations, they are as much suitable to provide the appropriate analytic 
framework for addressing some of the gaps within the previous literature, as well as the issues 
raised in the study. Even though the orientation of movements or the kind of activism within them 
may differ, SOMOs exhibit similar tendencies and characteristics. Like their social counterparts, 
SOMOs who use violence are heavily dependent on resources, prevailing political systems, state 
practices, socio-economic changes and compelling ideological justifications within which the 
many strategies (including violence) which develop within them evolve. It concluded by providing 
three main hypotheses along which the study’s research questions would be addressed.  
  
59 
 
CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the methodology employed for the study. It provides detailed information 
on the specific steps taken in conducting the study. Some of these steps include sampling 
techniques used in collection of the data; the data collection procedures; the identification of the 
population of the study; the ethical considerations involved; and the description of the methods 
used in the analysis of the data.  
3.2 Research Approach (Philosophy of the Research) 
This study has mainly employed a qualitative case study approach. Qualitative approach in general 
is a process of research which explores in-depth understanding of social phenomena within their 
natural setting (Cresswell, 1998). The approach seeks to understand a wide array of realities on a 
particular subject of enquiry; its peculiarities and nuances within the contexts within which such 
realities exist. Rather than by logical and statistical procedures (as most quantitative researchers 
do), qualitative researchers often use multiple systems of inquiry for the study of human 
phenomena including biography, case study, historical analysis, discourse analysis, ethnography, 
grounded theory and phenomenology. The common assumption is that knowledge is subjective 
rather than objective, and that the researcher learns from the participants in order to grasp the social 
phenomenon he/she seeks to unravel.  
Given that the study seeks to explore the use of violence by the Nigerian SOMO, I find this 
approach most appropriate for the research. Three main features of the qualitative method guided 
the enquiry;  
• an acceptance of an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research, 
whereby the former is generated out of the latter;  
• an assumption of an interpretive epistemological position, which stresses the understanding 
of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its 
participants; 
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 finally, an adoption of the constructivist position, which sees social properties as outcomes 
of the interactions between individuals, rather than phenomena “out there”, separate from 
those involved in its construction (Bryman, 2010:366). 
 
In general, these features also constitute the basic theoretical, epistemological and the ontological 
assumptions of what qualitative researchers (Bryman, 2010; Silverman, 2013) consider acceptable 
knowledge in most social science enquiry.  
 
3.2.1 Inductive View on the Relationship between Theory and Research 
Inductive view refers to an analytic approach which aims at the generation or improvement of 
theories from data, rather than just testing of previous theories. My assumption is that research 
processes should not stop at testing theories or concepts but should also provide new or improved 
old theories. Gathering ideas from existing theories and literature, the qualitative researcher is 
always encouraged to improve on the theories and possibly build new ones in relation to the data 
collected.  
Thus, in analysing the emergence of BH and the use of violence by the organisation, I have taken 
an approach that tended to be more inductive than deductive: the theory was for me something that 
should evolve from the collection and analysis of the data, and not vice versa. The initial adoption 
of SMT was a sort of aid to gather analytic tools for the data. From the SMT and the reviewed 
literature on the topic, I was able to assemble themes, ideas and concepts about the subject. From 
here, I proceeded to the data collection. As I collected the data, I have generated more themes and 
concepts, which helped me subject the data to a critical rational scrutiny. These themes were then 
fed back into the stock of the research questions and findings, to generate and build a possible new 
empirical based SMT theory on the research problem.  
 
3.2.2 Epistemological Position 
Epistemologically, I have adopted an interpretive approach. Different from positivism 
(quantifiable observable data that leads to statistical analysis), interpretivism is a term that denotes 
an alternative approach to the positivist orthodoxy that held influence in academia for decades. 
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This position holds that true knowledge is generated through focusing on the way people “interpret 
and make sense of their experiences” in their social world (Bryman, 2010:15). On the contrary, 
positivists (and by extension, quantitative-oriented researchers) believe that the attainment of 
knowledge should be done in a way that is value free (objective). For them, even though 
phenomena and knowledge, which can be intellectually confirmed, can genuinely be warranted as 
knowledge, they have to be arrived at only through gathering of facts that provide the basis for 
laws (Bryman, 2010:15). The purpose is to generate theories or hypotheses which can allow 
explanations of laws to be assessed. Other than this, knowledge ascertained may not be regarded 
as “authentic scientific knowledge”. Interpretivist researchers also aim to generate theories; 
however, the fundamental difference lies in the method used to arrive at the knowledge.  
One of the first main intellectual traditions that influenced interpretivism was phenomenology, a 
word that was etymologically derived from the Greek word phainómenon (that which appears) and 
lógos (study). As a philosophical movement, phenomenology was founded in the early years of 
the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, and was later developed upon by a circle of his followers at 
the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany (Bryman, 2010). It then spread to France, 
the United States, and other parts of the world, often in contexts far removed from Husserl’s early 
work. But before this, the initial application of phenomenological ideas to the social sciences was 
in the work of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), whose work did not come to light for English-speaking 
social scientists until the translation of his major works to German in the 1960s, twenty years after 
they had been written. Schutz’s interpretivist position is well captured in his famous quote: 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientists does not mean anything to 
molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observation field of the social scientists - 
social reality - has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the being living, 
acting and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs, they have pre-
selected and pre-interpreted this world, which they experience as the reality of their 
daily lives. It is these thought objects which determine their behaviour by motivating 
it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientists, in order to grasp this social 
reality has to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common sense 
thinking of men (and women), living their daily life within the social world (Schutz, 
1962:59).  
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Schutz’s point is that there is a fundamental difference between the subject matter of natural 
sciences and that of the social sciences. He also meant that a different epistemological strategy 
required to grasp this social reality, must reflect and capitalise on this difference. In fact, social 
realities have meaning to human beings, and they (human beings) relate to these realities based on 
their own interpretations and that of others around them. Having this kind of understanding, the 
researcher (particularly a philosopher) can ‘bracket-out’ the preconceptions in experiences, while 
making sense of the world around the individuals or phenomenon being studied.  
In the last decades this kind of understanding has formed epistemological backgrounds for many 
social scientists who would subscribe to the interpretivist view. Having this assumption, scholars 
now affirm that the subject matter of the social sciences (that is, people and their social world) 
does differ from the subject matter of the natural sciences (Bryman, 2010:16). The object of 
analysis of the natural sciences; social sciences (atoms, molecules, gasses, chemicals, metals etc.) 
cannot attribute meaning to events and to their environments, but people can. Taking an 
interpretivist stance, therefore, the social scientist can view human activities, in terms of how 
people interpret their world, to give meaning to the activities they are involved in. The social reality 
is interpreted from the perspective of people being studied, rather than the subject being studied. 
These subjects are not capable of their own reflections, but people do.  
In studying the emergence of BH in Northern Nigeria, the use and escalation the use of violence 
by the organisation, the study incorporated the epistemological approach that reflected BH’s 
activisms (violent or non-violent) as activities of people. That is to say, these activities have greater 
meaning, within the interpretations of the actors around which the activities took place. In order to 
grasp the meaning of the activities, I adopted an outlook that saw these activities from the point of 
view of the people related to the social realities (the BH activists themselves or people around 
which the activism campaigns were carried out). I tried to “participate in the mind of the people 
around which the activities took place” (in sociological terms, take the role of the other), to acquire 
knowledge on the social reality (Lofland and Lofland, 1995:16). It is my assumption that these 
individuals give ‘meaning’ to the subject of enquiry.  
This interpretivist understanding of social reality is for me the key to attaining scientific 
knowledge. Given that the subject matter of the social sciences (people and their institutions) are 
fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences (Bryman 2010:16), I believe that the 
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study of the social world requires a different logic of research procedure that reflects the 
distinctiveness of humans, as against the natural scientific objects. Emphasis was placed on 
understanding the use of violence by BH, in the examination of the interpretation of the world by 
the people around which these forms of activisms evolved. The use of violence by BH members 
must be interpreted from the perspective of people within which the social reality occurred. I 
believe that the meaning of these social activities cannot be adequately grasped without looking at 
them from the eyes of the people involved. It is through the understanding and interpretations of 
the experiences of such individuals that one can understand how the group emerged and why the 
activists at a time began to conceive violent activism as an appropriate strategy to achieve their 
purpose in Northern Nigeria, where they operate/identify. 
 
3.2.3 Ontological Orientation  
The issue of ontology goes back to the question of: 
 whether social phenomenon can and should be considered objective entities that have 
reality external to social actors (objectivism); or  
  whether they can and should be considered as social constructions that are built up from 
the perceptions and actions of social actors (constructivism) (Bryman 2010:18).  
Ontologically, my position is constructionist. This position is closely connected to the 
interpretivism. The basic assumption is that social phenomena and their meanings are continually 
constructed by social actors. Their meanings are not just “out there”, separate from those involved 
in their constructions. Instead, they are dependent on constant reflections and experiences of the 
actors and the actors’ interactions with others (Bryman, 2010:366). In other words, their meanings 
are developed in coordination with others, through constant interaction.  
Transposing this understanding to the use of violence in an organisation like BH, I have not 
conceptualised the use of violence as an external independent reality that has meaning, outside the 
interpretation of the people around which the violence was used. My assumption is that such 
knowledge has to be accessed through a thorough scientific interpretation of individuals’ 
experiences, within which violence was used: How the individuals within and around the group 
see it, interpret it, and justify it, provide meaning to the social phenomenon. This means, I take the 
64 
 
use of violence by BH to be an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and re-
construction within the group. The understanding of such social reality is continuously re-defined 
and re-constructed in accordance to the experiences and dispositions of individuals within the 
organisation. The order and pattern it follow in the organisation must be product of agreed upon 
patterns of action either in the minds of the individual group’s leadership or with other activists 
who sanctions such activisms within the group. 
All these theoretical, epistemological and ontological assumptions and commitments were applied 
while addressing the research question. The questions have been formulated in such a way that the 
instability of the organisation and the different forms of activism within the organisation, as less-
objective categories are emphasised. Hence, emphasis is on the active involvement of activists in 
the understanding of social reality, and in seeing the role of these participants in the construction 
of the social reality.  
 
3.3 The Study’s Population 
In this study, population refers to “the collection of well-defined individuals or objects known to 
have similar characteristics” (Bryman, 2010:168). From the general population/unit the researcher 
can select a ‘sample’ from which he/she investigates the identified problem (Bryman, 2010:168). 
The term ‘units’ is purposefully used; here it is not necessarily people who are being sampled. All 
kinds of phenomena can be sampled and researched for research purposes: building design, 
documents, music lyrics or TV advertisements (Silverman, 2013:146). Using these sets of units 
(often in the form of actual specified group of variables), the researcher draws a set of data to 
investigate the research problem. These units give the researcher the opportunity to generate data 
needed to investigate the research problem.  
In investigating the use of violence in SOMOs, I have used individuals with in-depth knowledge 
about both the inner functions of the organisation, as well as the socio-political basis upon which 
BH operates in the region. These individuals include: 
 security personnel working within the area (members of the recently formed Multi-
National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), members of the Nigerian Joint Task Force, and 
ordinary policemen and women working in the area), 
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  politicians, particularly those within the three main north-eastern states of Nigeria,  
 religious clerics from the Izala and Ahlus Sunna, and   
 victims of Boko Haram violence.   
The restriction of the study’s sample to this sample size was not predetermined before the 
commencement of the study. Initially, I had included self-proclaimed active or former members 
of the group, who were (as of 2015) incarcerated in different Nigerian prisons as possible 
participants for the study. The idea was that such set of individuals would give the study access to 
unique primary data about the emergence of the group, development and use of violence within 
the organisation. None of the previous researchers (as of 2017) have been able to interview such 
actors or studied the group from the activists’ point of view. The two scholars that have closely 
attempted such interviews were Victoria Comolli (2015) and Mike Smith (2015). While Comolli 
(2015) spoke to some of the suspected BH activists during a court hearing, and Mike Smith (2015) 
was able to speak to a self-identified former BH activist in a hotel room in Maiduguri in 2014. 
However, none of these interviews were sufficient to provide these scholars with an in-depth data 
to analyse the activities of the group from the activist’s point of view. As enumerated previously, 
it was necessary to draw from the experience of such individuals to analyse the organisation’s 
decision to adopt and use violence. 
Firstly, I had (through an academic colleague of mine, from a Nigerian University) contacted the 
Governor of a Nigerian maximum-security prison, where some of the suspected members were 
believed to be held. Understandably (for security concern and the sensitivity of the case), the 
Governor had initially refused, but upon realising that my enquiry was for research purposes; he 
explained to me that I had to officially write an “application letter” to the General Commander of 
Nigerian JTF. However, the application letter would have to go through the Police Unit 
commander (UC) in my state of origin, who would forward it to the Squadron Commander (SC), 
and then to the Area Commander (AC). The AC would then forward it to my state’s Commissioner 
of Police (CP) and finally to the Zonal Commander (ZC), who would then decide if my application 
would be forwarded to the JTF or not. This was the only way I could be granted access to the BH 
inmates. Even though I found this unnecessarily rigorous and discouraging, I had to write the letter. 
By early 2016, I had subsequently submitted the letter to Unit commander. For eight months I 
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waited to get feedback on my application. After a series of calls to the prison Governor’s office 
and to Unit Commander, it soon became clear that I would not be getting the clearance for the 
interview. The UC finally told me on the phone that the JTF is not willing to grant access to 
outsiders (researchers) like me to members of BH, due to the sensitivity and the security situation 
surrounding the organisation in the country, at that period. Although disappointed at first, I 
understood the situation. He explained to me that access to BH inmates remains very difficult, 
even for most ‘connected’ people within the Nigerian security forces. Only those on top of JTF 
and working directly with the organisation had access to the suspected BH members. So, I was not 
able to get the security clearance for the interviews. 
Thus, my participants were limited. Although the latter participants are not members of the group, 
they all had personal contacts with the group. Hence, they have significant information about the 
origin of the group, the kinds of activisms that had developed within the group, when the activisms 
developed and how they evolved. They also know factors within and outside the group, which 
enhanced the developments of different forms of such violent activisms and at the time they 
evolved. From their personal experiences with the members of the group, they had a meaningful 
understanding of how the organisation operates in the region. These were what I needed to make 
a meaningful construction of the use of violence in BH. 
 
3.4 The Study Samples 
A “sample” is simply a subset of the population (Bryman, 2010). Having identified the study 
population, the researcher would have to further decide on the number of people to be used from 
the population. From the set of population, he/she has to select (sample) a smaller set of the 
population. 
In my case, I have intentionally used purposive and snowball sampling technique to select 
participants from the afore-mentioned individuals. Using these sampling techniques, I was able to 
identify, and make initial contacts with some of the first group of participants. Such participants 
would further refer me to other participants for the study.  
Below is demographic representation of the participants  
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  Table 1: General demographic representation of interview participants 
  
    
  
1 Total number of participants 
   
43 
  
    
  
2 Category of participants 
   
  
  
(a) Politicians 
   
4 
  
(b) Religious clerics 
   
4 
  
(c) Security personnel 
   
24 
  
(d) Victims of BH’s violence 
  
13 
  
    
  
3 Gender 
   
  
  Female 
   
16 
  Male 
   
24 
  
    
  
4 Ethnicity 
   
  
  Hausa 
   
14 
  Fulani 
   
2 
  Kanuri 
   
22 
  Shuwa 
   
3 
  Igbo 
   
2 
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The issue of these samples not being ‘representative’ of the population is not a critical issue, since 
they can be theoretically categorised as part of the study’s population. Within the idea of theoretical 
sampling, samples do not necessarily need to be members of the population group themselves 
(Bryman, 2010; Glasser and Strauss, 1967; Silverman, 2013). What is important is that the selected 
samples are theoretically representative of the population upon which this study is based; and they 
thus possess appropriate in-dept knowledge about the research problem. The participants do not 
necessarily have to be BH members. What is important is that they have the right information 
about both the evolution of BH and the use of violence within them. 
A total of forty-three individuals were interviewed: four Salafi clerics, including one who had 
worked as an Imam in one of the Salafi mosques in Maiduguri when BH first emerged; four 
politicians representing some of the affected areas within the region; twenty four members from 
three segments of the Nigerian security operatives; ten members of the Nigerian Joint Task Force 
 
5 Religious affiliations of participants 
  
  
  Izala 
   
6 
  Ahlus Sunna 
   
3 
  Sunni 
   
20 
  Christianity 
   
14 
  
    
  
6 Level of formal education 
   
  
  Attended university 
   
12 
  Attended secondary school 
   
40 
  Attended primary school 
   
41 
  Did not attend any form of formal education   2 
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(JTF); ten members of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (of which three were women) 
and four members of the Nigerian Police. The last thirteen (women) were victims of BH violence. 
While the religious leaders and the two politicians interviewed still work in some part of the area 
where BH has its stronghold, only one among all the security personnel interviewed still works in 
the area. The rest now work in other parts of the country. 
 
3.5 Methods of Data Collection 
Since understanding the use of violence in BH entailed understanding the nuances and peculiarities 
upon which the social phenomenon evolved, two main methods were used to collect primary data, 
semi-structure one-on-one interviews and focus group interviews were employed. In addition to 
this, the study also used other primary sources such as videos, audio records, court transcripts and 
letters between BH members and those of AQIM to support the analysis of the primary data 
collected from the interviews.  
 
3.5.1 One-on-One Semi-Structured Interviews 
In general, this method of data collection (like other forms of interviews) entails an administration 
of a series of questions to the participants, in a form of interaction. However, unlike most other 
forms of interview, the researcher has the possibility “to vary the sequence of questions” (Bryman, 
2010:196) to probe for specific answers. In some cases, this method is also referred as open-ended, 
because the questioning is formulated in such a way that the respondent is able to respond freely 
and ask follow-up questions. This makes it easier for the researcher to access the “real perceptions” 
of respondents on a given topic. 
 
Below is a demographic representation of participants of all the semi-structured interviews 
  Table 2: Politicians from north easthern Nigeria      
  
   
  
1 Total number of participants 
  
4 
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2 Age range 
  
  
  40-50 years 
  
1 
  50-60 years 
  
2 
  60-70 years 
  
1 
  
   
  
3 Religious affiliations 
  
  
  Izala 
  
0 
  Ahlus Sunna 
  
0 
  Sunni 
  
4 
  Christianity 
  
0 
  
   
  
4 Level of formal education 
  
  
  Attended university 
  
4 
  Attended secondary school 
  
4 
  Attended primary school 
  
4 
  Did not attend any form of formal education 
 
0 
  
   
  
5 Number of years in the public service 
  
  
  4-8 years 
  
1 
  8-12 years 
  
1 
  More than 12 years 
  
2 
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6 Level of political representation 
  
  
  Federal government level 
  
3 
  State government level 
  
1 
  Local government level       0 
 
  Table 3: Religious Clerics   
  
    
  
1 Total number of participants 
   
4 
  
    
  
2 Age range 
   
  
  40-50 years 
   
1 
  50-60 years 
   
3 
  60-70 years 
   
0 
  
    
  
3 Religious affiliations 
   
  
  Izala 
   
2 
  Ahlus Sunna 
   
2 
  
    
  
4 Level of formal education 
   
  
  Attended university 
   
2 
  Attended secondary school 
   
4 
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  Attended primary school 
   
4 
  Did not attend any form of formal education 
 
0 
  
    
  
5 Number of years in religious service 
  
  
  More than 15 years 
   
3 
  10-15 years 
   
1 
  
    
  
6 State of origin 
   
  
  Yobe 
   
1 
  Kano 
   
2 
  Borno           1 
 
  Table 4: Security Personnel   
  
    
  
1 Total number of participants 
   
24 
  
    
  
2 Age range 
   
  
  30-40 years 
   
8 
  40-50 years 
   
10 
  50-60 years 
   
6 
  
    
  
3 Level of contact with BH activists 
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  Face to face contact 
   
18 
  Telephone contact 
   
2 
  No contact 
   
4 
  
    
  
4 Religious affiliations 
   
  
  Izala 
   
0 
  Ahlus Sunna 
   
0 
  Sunni 
   
17 
  Christianity 
   
7 
  
    
  
5 Level of formal education 
   
  
  Attended university 
   
10 
  Attended secondary school 
   
24 
  Attended primary school 
   
24 
  Did not attend any form of formal education 
 
0 
  
    
  
6 Number of years in the security service 
  
  
  Less than 8 years 
   
9 
  More than 8 years 
   
13 
  
    
  
7 State of origin 
   
3 
  Yobe 
   
4 
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  Kano Borno 
   
6 
  Kaduna 
   
1 
  Adamawa 
   
8 
  Other           2 
 
 
3.5.2 Focus Group Interviews  
This method of data collection was mainly used to collect data from victims of BH violence. I 
opted for this method here because I was interested in understanding the people as a group 
interpreted the violent activisms of BH. I wanted to understand their interpretation of the dynamics 
of evolution of violence in the group over the years, and not only as individuals. Analysing 
interviews from the initial participants, I felt that there was a need to understand the group’s 
conceptualisation of the dynamics that necessitated the use of violent activism within the group. I 
wanted to see how these individuals respond to each other’s view and refine their ideas out of the 
interactions that take place within themselves. My understanding is that meanings are not only 
formed on the individual level, but also collectively. When individuals interpret their common 
experiences in the midst of fellow victims, there is always an unconscious effort to relate these 
experiences to that of victims within the same group (Bryman, 2010:473). Such interpretations are 
not necessarily “correct or incorrect”, in terms of how it relates to the facts, but they help broaden 
the researcher’s analytic themes for the research problem. Through the several arguments and the 
challenges with each other, people are forced to reflect more critically and revise their views on 
different experiences.  
Below is a demographic representation of participants of focus group interviews 
   Table 5: Victims of BH violence   
   
    
  
1  Total number of participants 
   
13
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2  Gender 
    
  
   Female 
    
13
   Male 
    
0 
   
    
  
3  Religious affiliations 
    
  
   Christianity 
    
6 
   Islam 
    
7 
  
  
 
    
  
4  Age range 
    
  
   20-30 years 
    
7 
   30-40 years 
    
5 
   40-50 years 
    
1 
  
 
 
    
  
5  Level of formal education 
   
  
   Attended university 
    
0 
   Attended secondary school 
   
8 
   Attended primary school 
   
10
   Did not attend any form of formal education 
 
2 
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6  State of origin 
    
  
   Yobe 
    
3 
   Adamawa 
    
3 
   Borno 
    
5 
   Other           2 
 
 
3.5.3 Secondary Sources 
In addition to the use of one-on-one semi-structured and focus group interviews, I have also used 
other secondary sources, such as the second edition of Yusuf’s (2008/2009) Manifesto, Hadhihi 
‘Aqidatuna wa-Manhaj Da’watina (This Is Our Creed and the Method of Our Preaching), recorded 
videos and audios of his sermons from mostly the YouTube, court transcripts and internal letters21 
between some of the leading figures in BH and in the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 
These sources reveal not only the internal functions of BH, but also the organisational continuity 
among Boko Haram’s leaders from 2002 to the present. Most of the translations for these videos 
were done by my anonymous research assistant. 
The letters in particular provide information about motivations and justifications for fighters, such 
as Mohammed Shekau (who took over the group’s leadership after the first founder died in 2009); 
Mamman Nur (the acclaimed master mind of BH’s suicide operations); Khalid al-Barnawi 
(another leading figure in BH, who broke away from Shekau to form a new group, Jama’at Ansar 
al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan in 2011, after consulting with AQIM), Tariq ibn Ziyad brigade (the 
Nigerian co-ordinator of AQIM’s activities in the group). The fact that these letters were initially 
intended for internal consumption between the groups makes them more credible than other 
primary sources such as government statements, propaganda messages and videos often released 
                                                            
21 I have relied mostly on English translations of these letters from my anonymous research assistant and from a newly 
edited Boko Haram Reader by Abdulbasit Kassim and Michael Nwankpa (2018). 
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by the group, or the biographies and histories of fighters often seen in similar groups’ propaganda 
magazines. 
 
3.6 Preparing for the Data Collection 
The preparations for the field started way back in August 2015, when the research proposal was 
approved by the University of South Africa (Unisa). Following this approval, I had to apply for an 
ethical clearance, from the Unisa Ethical Committee (a basic minimum requirement for a Unisa 
PhD thesis), through the University’s College of Human Sciences. The research was approved in 
August 2016. 
Next, I began the process of identifying and finding the participants. I knew that finding the would-
be participants for the study was not going to be easy. This is mainly because BH remains a very 
security sensitive subject. As such, it was unlikely that people would be willing to discuss their 
experiences and encounter with the group. In the past, the group had targeted and successfully 
killed people whom they suspected to have talked to journalists or security personnel (Comolli, 
2015). Also, I needed to figure out how to navigate the Northern Nigerian environment (which I 
assumed would be hostile, because of my Southern-Nigerian background). Even though I am a 
Nigerian and have lived in the region sometime in the past, I was not sure I would get a very good 
reception, because of my origin (Igbo). Chiefly, because of the Nigerian-Biafran war that still 
creates some sort of tension between people from the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria, 
particularly when conducting a sensitive topic like this. I was not going to ignore that. In addition 
to this, I have been away from the region for a very long time. The last time I visited the region 
was in 2004. So, I did not feel that I would understand all the little intra-regional political intrigues 
that bedevil the region’s political environment. I needed someone - some sort of a guide/research 
assistant. Such a guide should know the environment very well and should be able to help me get 
access to my proposed interview participants. 
I got in contact with a suitable guide, a police officer who worked as member of the Nigerian JTF 
from 2009 until 2015. My ‘guide’ is very fluent in both Hausa and Kanuri languages (the two most 
common languages spoken in the north-eastern part of the region). He is also from Adamawa state 
(one of three main states with a huge BH presence). By the time I was introduced to him, he was 
having two years “study leave” to finish his post-graduate diploma studies in the University of 
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Abuja. Through his contacts, we were able to arrange two interviews with two politicians within 
the region, as well as three high profile members of the JTF. Like in most snowball cases, I was 
convinced that these few initial respondents would be a gateway for me to get to other necessary 
participants for the study. This would turn out to be the case eventually.   
However, some of the respondents (especially victims of BH violence) were women and not fluent 
in English, hence, we used the services of an interpreter (a female from the Kanuri ethnic group). 
I also made arrangements through my research assistant to have one more interpreter, to help me 
throughout the interviews. I recruited the services of one post-graduate student from the same 
University of Abuja, as my research assistant. I specifically wanted a female assistant from the 
Kanuri ethnic group because of the social-cultural and religious sensitivity of the tribe and gender 
in the region. In a region, where animosity among different ethnic groups abounds, and separation 
of gender in public places is still very rampant because of the implementation of Shari’a. Gender 
and ethnic differences between the translators and respondents could have affected the interview 
responses. I also wanted the participants to feel very comfortable or less pressured to discuss some 
of the issues because of reasons related to ethnic and gender orientations. 
Within a few days, I recruited the female assistant. I was able to speak to her on the phone before 
I arrived in Nigeria, just to make sure she was the right person for the job. She never disappointed. 
She was not only fluent in Kanuri; she was very familiar with qualitative research and the topic in 
general. She proved to be a good addition to my team, which created a less tense atmosphere, 
where interviewees participated freely. 
 
3.7 Arriving in Nigeria for the Interviews (Data Collection) 
On January 8th, 2017, I left South Africa for Nigeria. I stayed for about four months (January 2017 
- April 2017), collecting data for the research. Firstly, I stayed briefly in Asaba (a city in the 
Southern part of the country). From there, I travelled to Abuja and the Northern part of the country 
for the interviews. I started with two politicians whose interviews were arranged before I arrived 
in Nigeria. Through their assistance, I was able to arrange two more interviews with other two 
politicians who still represented some of the geopolitical zones in the north-eastern part of the 
region, where BH first emerged. All these interviews were held in Abuja. From these interviews, 
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I wanted to understand from their own reflections how they interpreted the emergence of the group 
and the development of different types of violent activism at the time they evolved.  
Other interviews were conducted in the different cities and other parts of the region. At some point, 
I had to go and stay for one month in Kaduna, one of the major cities in the north. This was in one 
of the Christian dominated neighbourhoods in the city. The city of Kaduna is virtually divided into 
two parts: the Christian and Muslim neighbourhoods. My assistant had strongly recommended that 
I stay around the Christian areas. From there, I was able to go to some of my interview 
appointments, especially with members of the Nigerian security forces. Three of the interviews 
were held in the office of one of the police officers at Kaduna Police College. Others were held at 
the houses of some of the participants. Contrary to my initial expectations, the participants were 
very willing to share their experiences, including self-criticism of how specific approaches of the 
Nigerian security forces catalysed BH’s decision to adopt violence in 2009. The interviews were 
also informative to me, realising how these respondents reflected on the social processes that 
facilitated the emergence of different forms of violent strategy that are used in the group.  
The interviews with the Salafi religious clerics were held in Kano (the biggest city in the region), 
in one of the main Salafi institutions. Through the help of one of the JTF respondents, who had a 
personal relationship with one of the clerics, I was able to arrange for these interviews. The 
respondents were able to shed more light on the Salafi theological bases of BH activism, especially 
at the early stage of the group’s activism as well as how and why the group saw the Nigerian state 
and its state security apparatus as a legitimate target for political violence. The clerics also referred 
me to some of important audio documents involving Yusuf and some of the previous leadership 
members of the Ahlus Sunna.  
My last interviews were with the victims and eye witnesses of BH violence. This set of participants 
were significant because they helped me understand how they conceptualised and made sense of 
their experiences of BH violent activism, as well as how they interpreted the activist behaviours 
during the attacks. As witnesses, they were able to reflect on the behaviours of BH activists during 
the attacks. Although at times it felt that their thoughts were clearly coloured by their religious 
affiliations, they still proved to be an important part of the research.  
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What turned out to be my biggest challenge was arranging the interviews. Initially, I wanted to 
interview people living in the camp of BH’s Internally Displaced People (IDP) in two cities in the 
region. Unfortunately, I could not get access to both camps. This was because our interview 
schedule coincided with a suicide bombing attack at one IDP camp, by two women who were 
disguised as victims of BH violence (10th February 2017). As a result, the camp’s Director 
justifiably cancelled the interview. Consequently, I and my team were informed that the camp 
could not continue with our previous arrangement for the interviews. I understood the situation; 
yet was very disappointed. The next step, therefore, was to follow up the interview with the second 
camp. With the help of a staff member of Nurture My Future (a Christian non-profit organisation 
dedicated to giving hope to the dream of children from displaced homes), we were able set a date 
for the interviews in the second camp, on the 27 and 28th of March.  
The interviews went quite well. I was able to have two focus group interviews, involving 10 
Christian women participants in one group, and another group with eight Muslim women 
participants. While I introduced the discussion points in Nigerian Pidgin English22, my assistants 
translated this to the respondents in Kanuri and Hausa and related their discussions back to me in 
English. All the participants had witnessed BH’s violent activism first hand. They had lived and 
witnessed the emergence of BH in the region. Most of them had virtually lost everything, including 
family members (husbands and children), and possessions, due to the escalations of violence 
between the BH and the Nigerian security. Initially, some of them were reluctant to participate in 
the conversations, but as time went on, they felt relaxed and started speaking freely. They all 
wanted their stories to be heard. They had a slightly different expectation from me. I was impressed 
with how they related their different encounters with BH, how they interpreted the emergence of 
the group and the violent activism that emerged and how, different factors including Islam 
(Salafism) shaped the violent disputes in the group. As an observer, I was also able to dissect how 
presuppositions from the participants’ religious affiliations influence their interpretations of how 
the different forms of violence in BH evolved.  
                                                            
22 Pidgin English is an English-based Pidgin and Creole language spoken as lingua franca across Nigeria. It is also 
commonly referred to as Broken-English. It is a combination of English and other local Nigerian languages, 
distinguished from other Creole languages. Almost everybody in Nigeria understands and speaks Pidgin English, 
although with little semantic variations.    
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The arrangement for the IDP camp interviews were done by the director of the camp and his 
assistants, because of the security and adverse emotional/psychological effects or reactions such 
interviews could have on the respondents. Any form of publicity of such interviews could be 
misinterpreted and may attract future reprisal attacks from BH. The staff members know those 
living in the camp, and as such were in good position to know who among them were emotionally 
and psychologically inclined to share their experiences. At the camp there were police and security 
personnel who guarded the camp on a daily basis. I intentionally avoided including any additional 
security personnel, to avoid attracting unnecessary attention. The interviews were secretly held in 
the office of the camp’s director reported. Only those who participated were informed of the 
interviews, where only the director, one of his assistants, my two research assistants and myself 
were present. 
3.8 My Role (and My Assistant’s) During the Interviews 
My role and that of my assistants were defined throughout the interviews, especially in focus group 
interviews. While my assistants were mostly translators, the researcher was more of a moderator. 
Throughout the interviews, I avoided being too intrusive or too structured. I believe that it was 
important that the participants spoke and conversed freely on the subject, without thinking that 
their views were influenced by my opinions, or that of my assistants on the subject. This meant I 
was very careful not to ‘tele-guide’ the participants’ views, such that in most cases, I used few 
general questions to guide the sessions, but they were merely to introduce the topics.  
I also did the same during the semi-structured one-on-one interviews. The research assistants 
(translators) were excellent throughout the interviews. From the beginning, I had made sure that 
they maintained a level of professionalism. Their roles were explained to them before the research 
from time to time. To avoid situations whereby they could take a more active part in the interview, 
or become too intrusive during the interviews, I made it a rule to properly brief them on what their 
roles were, before embarking on the interviews. These practices were also repeated occasionally 
during the interviews in the presence of the respondents.  
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3.9 Trustworthiness and Authenticity of the Data 
Bearing in mind the significance of ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’ in evaluating the quality 
of data and ensuring credibility in qualitative research, there were a few practices that I have 
maintained throughout the research. The first practice was corroboration of information from my 
sources. To ensure the credibility from the respondents’ responses, I made it a practice to 
corroborate my respondents’ “stories” with responses from others. On their descriptions of violent 
attacks by either BH or the Nigerian security forces particularly, I have not accepted my 
respondents’ accounts at face value23. Instead, I have corroborated the claims by either comparing 
them with other eyewitnesses’ accounts from the interviews, or by assessing the activities of BH 
at specific periods of time referred to be the respondents. 
The second important practice was “respondent validation”. Respondent validation also called 
“member validation” is a process whereby a researcher gives participants an account of his/her 
findings (Bryman, 2010:377). Often the goal is to seek confirmation that the researcher’s account 
and impressions are congruent with the views of those among whom the research was conducted 
and seek out areas in which there is lack of correspondence and the reasons behind it. I have 
maintained this practice throughout the research. I have transcribed and sent back the transcriptions 
to my respondents, at most two weeks after each of the interviews, to make sure that I have not 
misrepresented their thoughts during the interviews.  
Finally, I have also made sure that the research was carried-out in accordance with the canons of 
good practice that kept my own biasness towards BH and the Nigerian security forces to its barest 
minimum. I have maintained a decent level of actions that shows that I have not overtly allowed 
personal values or theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct and findings from the data. For 
example, I have provided a comprehensive description that provides a good basis for making 
judgments, about possible transferability of the research findings to other milieus. This auditing 
approach details a complete account of all phases of the research processes, which make the data 
and research more credible.  
                                                            
23 Activists’ groups such as BH often release propaganda materials and make attack claims that are of themselves not 
necessarily accurate. The same can also be said about the Nigerian government. Often, they connect BH with violent 
attacks that were not necessarily carried out by the group, just to justify their use of certain forms of violence against 
the group. So, it was important to corroborate such attacks. 
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I use the terms trustworthiness and authenticity in place of validity and reliability, because I do not 
believe that qualitative research should be evaluated with the same criteria as quantitative research. 
My view is reinforced by the fact that quantitative reliability and validity standards presuppose 
that a single absolute account of social reality is feasible in social research (Bryman, 2010:377). 
This has not been my position throughout the study. I believe that there can be more than one, and 
possible several accounts, of one social reality, and it is the task of the social scientists to show the 
accounts. 
 
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
Discussions about ethical considerations in social research revolve around three main questions:  
 How should a researcher conduct himself / herself throughout the research? 
 How should he/she treat the people with whom he/she conducts the research? 
 Are there activities in which he/she should or should not engage in his/her relations with 
them? 
In dealing with these questions, I will break down the ethical considerations in conducting this 
research into three main areas: 
 Avoidance of harm to participants, 
 Informed consent, 
 Avoidance of deception and invasion of privacy.  
 
3.10.1 Avoidance of Harm to Participants  
One of the ways I evaded attracting harm (both physically and psychologically) to the participants 
was the protection of the anonymity of all the participants. As a rule, I made sure that I maintained 
the anonymity and confidentiality of both my respondents and my research assistants. I gave them 
a letter about participating in the study as well as repeating its contents before the commencement 
of every interview. I had figured that this was particularly important due to the security sensitivity 
of the research. Divulging sensitive information about the group, especially sensitive information 
that the group perceives to be negative, could put respondents in a very risky and dangerous 
position. So, I had to avoid putting the respondents in such positions.  
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In transcribing the interviews, I have used pseudonyms in presenting the participants’ responses. I 
also converted the responses into digital formats, storing them in a computer, with an encrypted 
password. To be more cautious, I did not save these responses and the participants’ contact 
information in the same domain. I had also intentionally altered or avoided mentioning specific 
details that could identify the participants’, such as the specific addresses, where the interviews 
were conducted, or other details such as offices or institutions to which the participants referred. 
However, these alterations have not changed the meaning of the participants’ responses.  
I have also protected the information about my assistants. I kept their identity anonymous 
throughout the write-up of research report. I also made sure that they understood the sensitivity 
and security implications of the interviews with the respondents before the interviews. I made them 
sign a binding document that prohibits them from divulging any part or aspects of the interviews.  
 
3.10.2 Informed Consent 
I acquired informed consent for the research from the participants and maintained it throughout 
the research. This is important from two main fronts. First, it gave the participants the opportunity 
to be fully informed of both the nature and the implications of their participation from the outset. 
Second, it protected me (the researcher) from any subsequent legal issues that may be raised by 
the participants or others, regarding the research.  
So, from the onset, I had drafted an informed consent letter/form. This form among other things 
 provided honest information about the purposes of the research and its background;  
 explained the study in a language that the participants understood;  
 made the respondents understand that participation in the study was completely voluntary 
(the participants could withdraw their participation or their data at any stage of the 
interview, even after the interviews); 
 explained that the interview would be recorded (other than the issue of consent, the 
necessity of recording the interview was to help me revisit, understand and represent the 
ideas of the respondents in a reliable manner); 
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 provided an estimated amount of time for the interview. 
At the beginning of every interview, I requested the participants sign this document. I also made 
sure that the respondents understood the purpose for which the informed consent was necessary. 
In some cases, I went as far as explaining that no one except me or my supervisors may listen to 
the recorded interviews, unless if some of the interview excerpts would be used for other study 
purposes, and in such cases, additional consent or permission would be sought.  
 
3.10.3 Avoidance of Deception and Invasion of Privacy 
This is very much linked to the informed consent. The degree to which a participants’ consent is 
given is based on their understanding of what his/her participation or involvement entails. 
Providing informed consent entails that he/she properly understands his/her involvement and yet 
agrees to be part of the study. If otherwise, the participant had not given an informed consent even 
if he/she signs an informed consent form. 
In addition to this, I have also always believed that the right to privacy and to know the truth is a 
tenet that most of us hold dear. Hence, transgression of these rights even in the name of research 
should not be accepted. Under no circumstances should the right to privacy or to the truth about 
the research be jeopardised in the research.  
In line with this conviction, I have maintained this value throughout the research. As a rule, I made 
sure that I did not hide anything related to the research, to acquire certain information from the 
participants. Before the interviews, I had given letters to the participants explaining the purpose 
and objectives of the research. I also made sure that I took time to repeat this in a language my 
participants understood before the commencement of the interviews.  
 
3.11 Data Analysis 
In analysing the data, I have employed a thematic analysis model that is built on grounded theory24. 
Thematic analysis is simply the process of identifying important and significant patterns in a 
                                                            
24 Grounded theory was originally developed by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). These sociologists were critical of the way in which existing theories dominated sociological 
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qualitative data (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). Here, the goal is not just to arrange the data in themes 
and patterns, but rather to use them to address the identified research problems (Braun & Clarke 
2006; Clarke & Braun, 2013). This is not the same as simply summarising the data. A good 
thematic analysis should also interpret and make sense of the data. 
The analysis has partly followed the six-phase25 thematic analysis model first enumerated by Braun 
& Clarkes (2006). However, instead of the six steps, I have modified the steps in this study into 
four main steps to suit my grounded theory’s epistemological and ontological assumptions. These 
steps include: 
 familiarisation with the data and generation of initial codes,  
 organisation of codes into themes  
 review of themes and  
 write-up. 
I did not follow these steps linearly. In most cases, I moved back and forth between the steps, in 
more of an iterative and recursive way. Such back and forth is often normal, when one is dealing 
with a lot of complex data (Bryman, 2010; Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). For me, what was 
important was that the analysis and interpretations depicted a true representation of the data-set.  
 
                                                            
research. They argued that researchers needed a method that would allow them to move from data to theory, so 
that new theories could be deduced. Such theories would be specific to the context in which they had been 
developed (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That is to say, they had to be ‘grounded’ in the data from which they had 
emerged rather than on analytical constructs, categories or variables from the pre‐existing ones.  
In grounded theory, the researcher acts more like a witness, who makes sense of the data (Bryman, 2010). The 
main aim is often to develop theories that do not go beyond the data. His/her role is to use his/her analytic skills to 
represent the data in both systematic and accessible fashion; as such that it represents a clear picture of what 
“happened”. He/she must be careful not to import his/her own assumptions and expectations into the analysis. It 
is the researcher’s skills and abilities to collect and analyse the data that determines the outcome of the research.  
 
25 Braun & Clarke (2006) provide six main steps for thematic analysis. These include: Step (1) Become familiar with 
the data; Step (2) Generate initial codes; Step (3) Search for themes; Step (4) Review themes; Step (5) Define 
themes; Step 6: Write‐up. 
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3.11.1 Familiarisation with the Data and Generation of Initial Codes 
I began by familiarising myself with the data corpus, first with the secondary materials (videos 
and letters between BH and AQIM leadership) that I had first collected over the course of 
reviewing previous literature on BH. Here, I did a thorough reading, and re-reading of the letters 
from the organisation’s leaders. I repeatedly watched the video materials of the different BH 
leaders, particularly those I felt were significant for the research problem. In examining these 
materials, I carefully made notes26 of some of the important quotes and materials that spoke to me 
about the research problem. Such important materials included quotes explaining how the different 
BH leaders (particularly, Yusuf and Shekau) had framed the group’s activism and use of violence 
against the Nigerian state. I tried to find connections between such quotes and the ideas from the 
theory (resource mobilisation, political process and framing process. I also kept notes on some of 
the different elements (material resources) that influenced BH’s use of violence. All these elements 
I kept as initial codes27. From here, I collated these codes into an initial theme which I called 
“political opportunity structures”. I developed and modified these codes as I worked through the 
coding process. By the time I wanted to start the conduction of the interviews, I had a clear picture 
of what more I was looking for, from the study participants – (a) the socio-political foundations 
upon which BH evolved in the Northern Nigeria and (b) the different forms of resources propitious 
for the development and further sustenance of violence in the Northern Nigerian-based SOMO.  
Next was the primary data. With the first one-on-one interviews and focus group interviews 
conducted and transcribed, I began the process of familiarising myself with the data. Like in the 
case of the secondary data, I also repeatedly listened to the tapes and re-read the transcripts, to 
make sure that I have a very good understanding of my participants’ perceptions and understanding 
                                                            
26 I have also used this note throughout the research process. Keeping such notes as a sort of memo was one important 
element that helped keep me in check throughout the analytic process. With the notes, I was also able to jot down 
some important observations, crystalise my ideas and not lose track of my thinking on the various topics. In general, 
it also served as reminder and building blocks for a certain amount of reflection, both during the interviews and in the 
whole analysis process. 
27 It is important to note that the understanding of “initial codes” here for me is different from coding in quantitative 
research. While in most quantitative research (where codes are often thought as fixed) codes are often seen squarely 
as a way of managing data; for me, and indeed in most approaches to qualitative data analysis, initial codes are part 
of the “important first steps to the generation of theories” (Bryman, 2010:542). They are also as Charmaz (1983:186) 
puts it, “shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data”. They were the potential indicators of 
concepts, which are constantly compared to each other to see their significance to building theories for the research 
problem. Thus, it is one of the most important processes in building or modifying theories in a research such as this. 
Using it, the researcher is able to review and give labels (names or themes) to components that seem to be theoretically 
significant and appear to be particularly salient within the social worlds of those being studied. 
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of the subject under investigation. I repeatedly looked through the interview data to see how the 
participants’ views connected with the previously examined secondary data. From here, I 
highlighted and jotted-down some of the important elements and quotes that jumped-out as either 
the socio-political foundations upon which the organisation evolved in the Northern Nigeria, or 
the forms of resources that influenced the development and further sustenance of violence in the 
Northern Nigerian-based SOMO. Both elements were coded as “socio-political conditions”. All 
these were done by hand, working through hard copies of the transcripts with pens and 
highlighters. Given that I already knew what I was looking for from the data, I did not code every 
piece of the text from the data. I only coded those segments of the data that were relevant or 
captured something significant for what I was looking for. In other words, this was a theoretical 
coding, rather than an inductive one.  
It is important to point-out that I did not wait until the last interviews before I began the coding 
process. In fact, the generation of initial codes started with the first interviews. The generation of 
these initial codes served as the basics and guide for subsequent interviews. Identifying elements 
like the Northern Nigerian colonial legacy and culture of religio-political activism as parts of 
“socio-political conditions”, for example, suggested and pointed to a new line of who and what 
more to look for when conducting subsequent interviews. This helped save me a lot of time and 
resources.  
 
3.11.2 Organising the Codes into Themes 
With all the data coded, I began the process of searching and organising the codes into themes. In 
general, there are no hard and fast rules about what makes a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A 
theme in simple terms is a pattern that captures something significant or interesting about the data 
and/or research question. It is characterised by its significance to the research problems. In most 
qualitative analysis, the researcher allocates themes based on its significance to the research 
problems. 
With this in mind, I have allocated themes to the codes in line with the research questions. I 
organised the codes in such a way that they fit together into themes that addressed the three main 
research questions in the thesis. For example, I separated those codes that are related to the socio-
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political foundations upon which BH evolved in Northern Nigeria, from those that explain the 
resources and conditions upon which the use of violence was developed and sustained within the 
organisation. While the former I named “political opportunity structures for the evoloution of BH”, 
the latter I named “conditions for violence” and “resources for use and sustenance of violence” 
respectively. From here, I generated sub-themes such as “culture of Islamic activism”, “colonial 
legacy”, “perceptions of marginalisation”, “Nigerian return to democracy in 1999”, “al-Shari’a 
activism”, “Salafi in-fighting” and “material resources”. These particular sub-themes were 
considered most relevant to the question of the emergence of the group in the region. Some of 
them, I also later modified to fit into more precise names that fit properly into the analytic narrative 
I have employed for the thesis.  
For the second and third research questions, I similarly developed sub-themes such as 
“involvement in institutionalised political system”, “method of policing”, “mobilisatory 
resources”; and “exclusivist ideology”, “collaborations with similar organisations”, “intra-
factional competitions, from the themes “conditions for violence” and “resources for use and 
sustenance of violence” respectively. Essentially, these sub-themes were the product of recurring 
motifs and codes from both the interview transcripts and the documentary data. Separating them 
into the specific sub-themes helped organise the data into chunks of meaning, for analysis. At the 
end of this step, the codes had been organised into broader themes that seemed to say something 
specific about the different research questions. 
 
3.11.3 Reviewing the Themes 
After the identification of the different themes and sub-themes in step 3, the next important step 
was to review and modify the themes into descriptive categories for the analysis. I began by 
gathering together all sub-themes that are relevant to each of the themes. I captured them into a 
simple Microsoft Word document and simply used the “cut and paste” function, to organise them 
in their different columns, using the themes as the headings. I colour-coded each of the themes; 
the idea was to make them easier for me to identify in the different columns.  
Further, I read the data associated with each theme and considered whether they really did support 
the themes and sub-themes. I also reflected around questions such as: do the themes make sense 
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in the context of the entire data-set (the one-on-one interviews, focus group interviews and the 
secondary data)? Did I try to fit-in too much into a particular theme? Do the themes overlap, and 
if they do, are they really separate themes? Are there other themes within the data? I also looked 
whether the codes did support the themes? These questions are also very useful for not only the 
analysis, but also for the validity and credibility of the data. For example, I felt that the preliminary 
theme, “political opportunity structures” was too broad for the entire codes about both the 
evolution of BH and the use violence in the group. Despite being SMT specific, I felt that it did 
not represent the different resources and conditions under which the organisation evolved. Thus, I 
modified it and designated it for only describing the socio-political conditions upon which the 
organisations evolved. I also removed the sub-theme “Nigerian return to democracy in 1999”. 
Examining the data, I felt that there was not enough data to support this. Besides, it also overlapped 
with the sub-theme, “al-Shari’a activism”. Hence, it was not necessary holding unto it. All these 
changes helped improve the final result.  
From these new refinements, I again re-examined the themes and sub-themes. I further in the words 
of Braun & Clarke (2006: 92), “identified the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about.” I reflected 
on what the themes and the sub-themes were saying in terms of the research questions. I also tried 
to understand how the sub-themes interacted and related to each other and to the main themes. For 
example, how do the different listed socio-political sub-themes connect to the evolution of the 
organisation in the region? Also, how do the mutual relationships and interactions with similar 
networks such AQIM and al-Shabaab’s influence on the development of more sophisticated forms 
of violence in BH?  
Both the study participants and the secondary data (particularly the letters between BH leaders and 
AQIM) were clear and consistent about how these elements connect. In these cases, it was 
therefore interesting to see that the participants’ experiences and descriptions of these different 
elements are connected to the evolution of BH in the Northern Nigeria. The themes seemed to 
align with each other. Also, the inextricable link between the different sub-themes became a key 
stimulus and focus for my conceptualisation of the evolution of the group and the development of 
how the different forms of activism evolved within BH. From these, I was able to form opinion on 
both how the group evolved in Northern Nigeria and how they have been able to use and develop 
the different forms of sophisticated violence in the SOMO.  
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3.11.4 Writing-up 
This step was the last part of the analysis, which bore the  report. To make a good sense of the 
data, I have presented the analysis in narrative and semi-chronological pattern in chapters 4, 5 and 
6, according the three research questions. In some cases, there were constant references to events 
in previous chapters to illustrate significant points about both the research questions and the 
generation of theories. Relationships between the different themes were also explored in such a 
way that hypotheses about connections between them emerged in the chapters.  
In general, I have not generated a separate discussion as regards the findings for this thesis. Instead, 
I have included the discussions as part of the presentation and interpretations of the data. In most 
cases, I have started the discussions with what is already known about the subject in discussion, 
blending them with information from the data. Here, I have also used the findings from previous 
literature to support some of my conclusions about the different research questions.  
 
3.12 Summary  
This chapter has discussed both the method and the data used in the study. In discussing these, it 
explained that the research was based on a qualitative method that was largely oriented in an 
inductive, interpretive and constructive approach. It detailed that the study has used primary 
documentary sources such as videos of activities of different leaders of the group; Yusuf’s 
recorded sermons and manifesto, as well as recently released letters between leaders of BH and 
AQIM. It also explained that the study in addition has drawn from individuals with knowledge 
about the origin and the inner functions of the group before and after the group began to use 
violence. The main methods of extracting data from these sources were through secondary analysis 
and interview methods (semi-structured face to face and focus-group interviews) respectively. The 
chapter also explained the specific steps taken both for collecting these data and in ensuring 
trustworthiness of these data. In conclusion, the chapter presented a discussion of the specific steps 
(thematic analysis) used in the analysis of the data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONTEXTUALISING THE EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM IN 
NORTHERN-NIGERIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the first data analysis chapter. The chapter contextualises the emergence of BH in Northern 
Nigeria. It will provide the socio-political and ideological background of the group when it first 
evolved and operated in the region. It will do this through an analysis of six main political 
structures: The Northern Nigerian culture of Islamic activism; the Northern Nigerian colonial 
legacy; the emergence of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC); the Nigerian return to democracy 
in 1999; the intra-ideological dispute between the two main Salafi-networks (Izala and Ahlus 
Sunna); and finally, the mobilisation of resources from co-operation with al-Qaeda. The data 
shows that these “political opportunity structures” created the appropriate window of opportunities 
for the evolution and formation of BH, at the time it emerged in the region.  
 
4.2 The Northern Nigerian Culture of Islamic Activism 
The use of violence as a means for goal attainment in Northern Nigeria did not start with BH. In 
fact, Muslim tradition itself in the region arguably was partly founded on violent activism. Islam 
came into the region in two phases. First, through trade relations in the twelfth century, when 
Muslim scholars and North African trade merchants made in-roads in the trade routes of the Sahara 
Desert (Comolli, 2015:13; Smith, 2015:31). By the 16th Century when the majority of the region’s 
population practiced some sort of African traditional religion, the religion had become a 
prerogative for the Hausa rulers and the political elites, who controlled the trade routes. Given 
Islam’s influence, the Hausa political elite were able to cement trade and diplomatic alliances with 
the North African trade merchants, as well as the Arab traders that flocked into the region (Insoll, 
2003; Robinson, 2004). The second phase, and perhaps more relevant for our study, came in the 
19th Century when Shaikh, Usman dan-Fodio, a famous Fulani28 preacher propagated what is still 
regarded in the region as a “great jihad against infidels” (Comolli, 2015; Smith, 2015) in the region. 
                                                            
28 Fulani or Fula is believed to be one of the largest ethnic groups dispersed in the Sahel and West Africa, especially 
in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea. The group is known mostly for their political sagacity 
and nomadic lifestyle. The biggest population of the Fulanis now live in Northern Nigeria and Senegal. Any reference? 
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Built on removal of the original Habe leaderships of the Hausa states29, this ‘jihad’ would establish 
Islam as the main dominant religious tradition across communities in Northern Nigeria. A brief 
recap of this great jihad is necessary here to help contextualise Islam’s role in socio-political 
activism in the region.  
Prior to the jihad, dan Fodio himself was simply a Muslim preacher from the Sunni tradition. Born 
in 1754 in Gobir (the most prominent of the seven Hausa states in the region), the Toronkowa30 
Sheikhh was right from his childhood devoted to Islamic religious life. As early as 9, he was 
exposed to the teachings of one of the key preachers of the eighteenth century, El Hadj Jibril B. 
Umar31, in the Arab world. The Fulani scholar’s encounter with this famous Sunni cleric would 
also later in his life expose the young Sheikh to the legal system of Shari’a within the Maliki school 
(Comolli 2015:13). Growing up under the wing of Umar, he also become much influenced by 
Wahhabi teachings (Comolli, 2015), while remaining within the Sunni Maliki school of 
Jurisprudence. Through this philosophical and religious school of thought, he established his 
profile as a respected theologian and scholar in the region.  
By the time dan Fodio was twenty, the cleric had started touring and preaching in the different 
Hausa states, subtly advocating for a change in the way people saw Islamic faith in the Kingdoms. 
By the early 1780s, he had gained so much trust that he was occasionally invited to the Gobir court. 
There he had the opportunity to question King Bawa (the traditional ruler of Gobir) about his 
                                                            
29 The Hausa city states represent a group of neighbouring pre‐colonial autonomous states that dominated the 
present‐day northern Nigeria. They laid above the confluence of the rivers Niger and Benue (in the present‐day 
Northern Nigeria), between the Songhai empire in the west and that of the Kanem‐Bornu, or Bornu, in the east. 
Among the most prominent state here were; Biram, Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Rano, and Zaria. Prior to the jihad 
of Usman dan Fodio and subsequent domination of Islam, these city states had lived side by side and were 
interconnected in the mid‐14th century by loose alliances. It was until the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio that some of 
these states were united under one Caliphate known as the ‘Sokoto Caliphate’. For more on the history of the 
seven Hausa states see T.C. McCaskie and John D. Fage, Western Africa: The early kingdoms and empires of the 
western Sudan in the Encyclopedia Britanica at: https://www.britannica.com/place/western‐Africa. 
 
30 Toronkowa is a clan of the Fulani nomadic ethnic group believed to have moved to the Hausa states from the 
present-day Senegal in the 1740s. Once in contact with Islamic education and culture in Northern Nigeria, the 
Toronkowas quickly assimilated Islam, and were among the first ethnic groups to reach influential positions in the 
courts of local Hausa Kings (Comoli, 2015; Loimeier, 2012).   
 
31 El Hadj Jibril B. Umar was a North African Muslim scholar who gave his apprentice a broader perspective of 
Muslim reformist ideas in other parts of the Muslim world. He was known as an uncompromising opponent of corrupt 
practices and a staunch proponent of Jihad (Comolli, 2015:14; Insoll, 2003). 
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treatment of Muslims, and his administration of taxes on his Islamic subjects. Throughout the 
King’s reign and that of his immediate successor Yunfa, dan Fodio continued his condemnation 
of the court’s laxity and pushed for a reduction in taxation. He argued that it did not follow the 
Islamic Shari’a system (Comolli 2015:14). Within a few years, he managed to obtain a reduction 
in taxation and the freedom to preach to people of all ethnic groups (Comolli, 2015:14). As a result, 
dan Fodio established himself, not only as a legitimate advocate for social justice, but also as a 
genuine fighter for the religion in the kingdom.  
More opportunity for dan Fodio to grow his influence in the kingdom came when the new king of 
Gobir, King Yunfa, who had been a pupil of the Fulani cleric increased restrictions and taxations 
on the people in 1801. The people mostly affected by this were dan Fodio’s ethnic group, the 
Fulanis. Hence, dan Fodio came into conflict with the royalty and his consequent criticism of the 
court’s practices took a turn for the worse. Later, he refined his criticisms to include condemnation 
of the king’s new taxation policy, as well as what he conceived the “excessive immoral attitude at 
the Gobir court” (Smith, 2015:15). This brought him more popularity.  
In response, King Yunfa tried in several ways to undermine dan Fodio, including an attempted 
assassination on his life. This led dan Fodio and his followers to flee and set up their first 
ethnic/religious home in Gudu, in the present-day Nigerian Sokoto state (still in the Northern 
Nigeria), near the eastern border of Gobir. The community attracted a lot of new members 
including non-Fulanis, who came to represent a real opposition to King Yunfa. It was at this time, 
that dan-Fodio was officially elected as Amir al-Muminin (the commander of the faithful) (Insoll, 
2003). He could now raise an army and become its commander, with which he could declare and 
pursue a jihad against the Hausa kings. However, the army was largely composed of the Fulanis, 
who already held a powerful military advantage because of their cavalry culture (Insoll, 2003). He 
was also widely supported by the Hausa peasantry, who felt over-taxed and oppressed by their 
rulers. Using his new raised army, dan Fodio was able to engage in an armed struggle against the 
Hausa Kings. Within a few years, the Sheikh was able to raise an army that used jihad against the 
Hausa kings in the different Hausa city states. In a series of well-calculated strikes, he and his 
Islamic army were able to sweep all the Hausa tribal local rulers off their thrones in the cities 
across the entire region (Comolli, 2015:15). Due to this victory, he was also able to bring all the 
Hausa communities together as a united Islamic-based Sokoto Caliphate, based on Islamic 
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theocratic al-Shari’a system. He would become the Caliphate’s first Sultan. The Caliphate 
extended not just to the present-day Northern Nigeria but to other areas now in the present-day 
Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad. The only serious check to dan Fodio’s conquest in the region 
was in Bornu (areas that form part of the present day Borno and Yobe State, still in Northern 
Nigeria), where the caliphate army’s repeated efforts to access these communities were not 
successful32. However, this did not derail dan Fodio’s mission in the other areas of the Caliphate. 
By 1820, the Caliphate had become very much established within the region. In the different areas 
of the Caliphate, administratively he set-up many Emirs. He and his group of Emirs bestowed on 
the Caliphate an Islamic identity, customs and cultures that tried to connect it with the early umma 
established by Prophet Mohammed in Medina. They also propagated Islamic structures that 
preserved what is still regarded in the region as the “purity of Islam” and a universal dominance 
of Islam. By the late 19th century, life in the region had very much become influenced by Islam 
and the enforcement of Shari’a, especially in the urban areas. Islam had become the official 
religion of the region33.  
It is important to note that one major factor that contributed to dan Fodio’s success was his ability 
to use Islam to frame his socio-political activism against the Hausa Kings. Capitalising on the 
growing resentment among the population, the cleric was able to frame opposition against the 
Hausa kings as a sort of ‘jihad’, within which participation was a sort of moral and religious duty 
incumbent on all Muslims within the newly founded Islamic community. The Hausa rulers, 
particularly Yunfa, according to dan Fodio, were simply “apostates”, who had moved away from 
the principles of Islam. Hence, they are legitimate targets for jihad. Amidst such shared frustrations 
and grievances, this framing of religious zeal and socio-political criticism against such apostate 
rulers would prove effective and would result in a wide range of support among many Islamic 
adherents within both the Fulani nomadic communities and beyond.  
                                                            
32 One main resistance against dan Fodio’s jihad came from the old Kanem-Bornu Empire. The communities within 
this empire had their own clerical class and tradition. In the later days of the Caliphate, there arose King Muhammed 
al-Kanemi, the leader of the communities, who asserted that the Fulani clerics did not have a unique right to interpret 
Muslim law for the government of humanity. He was able to inspire a spirited national resistance, which by 1811 had 
turned the tide against the Fulani. Outside the region, dan Fodio also witnessed another significant setback at the hands 
of the Ibadan warlords in the West, when the Sheikh tried to extend his caliphate to other parts of the region. Ibadan 
is in the present-day Ibadan state, in the South Western part of Nigeria (Lapidus, 2014:469-472). 
33 For his role in the Islamic activism and the subsequent establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, dan Fodio is still 
regarded as the father of Islamic religion in the region. He is revered even among different Islamic religious orders in 
the region, including Shiites (who would come into the region much later).  
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One main effect of dan Fodio’s jihad and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the region 
is the ‘concretisation’ of the role of Islam as a mobilisatory resource upon which opposition 
political activism is galvanised. By framing his activism around Islam, dan Fodio subtly introduced 
Islam as a tool to frame or mobilise forms of political activism against state opposition. His use of 
Islamic concept of ‘jihad’, as a tool to justify socio-political activism against the despotic Hausa 
Kings, subtly legitimised violent contention and activism against state authorities. A formation of 
sound organisation built upon Islamic theological concepts would consequently become an 
important way to engage with the state.  
The fact that the religious tradition itself has a similar jihadi history further exacerbates this 
phenomenon. The understanding of politics, along religious lines is nothing new within the Islamic 
tradition. Prophet Mohammed himself, the founder of the religion, was both a political and 
religious leader during his life time. Following the early opposition in Mecca, the Prophet had 
around July of 622 migrated to Medina (a flight known as hijra). At Medina, Prophet Mohammed 
became the political head of the umma, creating a system that not only combined religious and 
political power in one figure, but also the first Islamic community (umma) under a constitution 
(Shari’a). The members of this community were bound to demonstrate their religious commitment 
through waging religious/political ‘jihad’ when necessary (Falola, 1998).  Using this kind of 
framing, the Prophet and his immediate successors were able to establish Islam in both Mecca and 
beyond. Dan Fodio’s jihad and establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate seems like a replication of 
Prophet Mohammed’s ‘religio-political’ activism. By relocating to Gudu (a replication of the 
Prophet’s hijra) and by evoking the kind of similar religious framing for his socio-political 
activism in the region, the Fulani respected cleric was able to indirectly bequeath a religious quality 
to what today could be termed a socio-political affair. This not only helped popularise his activism 
but also explains why political activities in this region are often seen and cast in religious terms.  
A discussion with several of my respondents corroborates this notion. In fact, most of the 
respondents, particularly the religious scholars and politicians representing some of the 
constituencies in the region argue that it is Islam that gives political activism in the region its 
meaning. According to one of the politicians, “Islam teaches the people to stand up for their 
rights.... Starting from the days of our fathers, we have learnt to stand-up for what we believe in, 
with our religion as our guiding principle. Without the religion, people would not see the need to 
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speak up against the evils of the state politicians. This is our history”34. Another politician also 
puts up a similar argument. According to him “our religion is our guide; it is part of our history. It 
is there to guide us”35. From a Salafi perspective, an Ahlus Sunna cleric respondent similarly 
argues:  
How can you remove religion from politics? (he rhetorically asks) “Islam help us 
articulate our thoughts, actions and political positions.... Following the teachings of 
the Holy Qu’ran, the Hadith and the consensus of the approved scholarship; every 
Muslim would be able to live an authentic Islamic life style, like the early Muslims 
during the Holy prophet’s Mohammed’s time (peace be upon him), and during 
memorable days of the Sokoto Caliphate.  
Why would we not follow in these footsteps, preach as they did, do what they did, 
and change our societies as they did? This will always be our mission. It is the beauty 
of our religion. I don’t subscribe to that Western nonsense of separating politics from 
religion. These two things are inseparable. We need our religion to guide our every 
action. I am sure you get it. 
Even though this logic may not quite apply in other contexts, it is clear that the inclusivity of Islam 
and politics from its history makes the religion susceptible to political mobilisation, especially in 
Northern Nigeria where such understanding had obviously been concretised by Usman dan Fodio’s 
jihad. Once the fusion of Islam with socio-political activism was concretised, Islam had become a 
tool to mobilise people around a socio-political agenda, especially against state opposition. It 
becomes a viable force to unite activists around a collective social or political activism, against 
what they could perceive as enemies of the religion. Therefore, many of the internal revolts and 
insurgencies that resulted in the deposition of one Fulani despot by another in the pre-colonial 
period after the death of dan Fodio were framed along religious lines (Comolli, 2015; Last, 1967; 
Schacht, J. 1958).  
  
                                                            
34 Interview by the author with a politician representing one of the political zones in the Northern Nigeria in Abuja 
(February 2017). 
35 Interview by the author with a politician representing one of the political zones in the Northern Nigeria in Abuja 
(February 2017). 
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4.3 The Northern Nigerian Colonial Legacy  
Other than the region’s history of Islamic activism, another important political opportunity 
structure that concretised the use of Islam as a potent tool for socio-political mobilisation against 
state opposition, and subsequent evolution of a group like BH, later in Northern-Nigeria, was 
colonialism. The arrival of the British and the subsequent colonisation36 of the region in the late 
19th century did change the social and political landscape of the region. In the beginning, the 
colonialists’ relationships with people in the region were mostly trade-related; revolving around 
the expansion of the Royal Niger Company37, which controlled trade and British interests in 
Southern Nigeria.  
The British was not much of a direct threat to the Sokoto Caliphate or the other minor states in the 
region until in the late 19th century when Frederick Lugard, the military administrator and the last 
governor of Southern Nigerian Protectorate, decided to unite the Northern region with the rest of 
the Royal Niger Company (British Colony). By 1914, he had succeeded in amalgamating the two 
regions into one single colony of Britain, and consequently dismantled dan Fodio’s Sokoto 
Caliphate. From the dismantling of the Sokoto Caliphate, change was inevitable, and this was 
when some of the main problems began.  
The first change was on the socio-political level, where the region’s al-Shari’a system of the 
Sokoto Caliphate had to be substituted for a Western-based colonial system. This inter alia meant 
introduction of a new political system and a new social value system that was incompatible with 
those of the Sokoto Caliphate. At the dawn of colonialism, the British had “inherited” quite a 
distinctively “conservative and close community.” Different from the reality in the southern part 
of the country (where diverse ethnic autonomous communities lived side by side), the British found 
a region that was remarkably ‘closed’ from the liberal influences that existed outside the region, 
                                                            
36 British Colonisation, by the way, was achieved through conquest and subjugation. During this dark era in the 
region’s history, states and semi-independent communities around the Caliphate were forcefully conscripted into part 
of the British state. The Emirates of Kabba, Kotogora and Illorin were the first to be conquered by the British. This 
was followed by Kano in February 1903, and the rest of other emirates within the Caliphate. The Sokoto caliphate 
itself finally fell on March 13th, 1903, when the Grand Shura of the Caliphate finally conceded and surrendered to 
Frederick Lugard’s army. 
37 The Royal Niger Company was a mercantile company chartered by the British government in the nineteenth century. 
The company existed for a comparatively short time (1879–1900) and was instrumental in helping the British in the 
colonial days to take control over the area of the lower river Niger against the German competition. In 1900, the 
company-controlled territories became the Southern region Protectorate, which was in turn united with the Northern 
Nigerian Protectorate to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. 
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particularly in the Southern Nigeria and in the Western world (Comolli 2015:14). Very few signs 
of “modernity” or Western lifestyle existed. The region had more relations with people from the 
Arab world than people from these areas. Such people were generally despised and were 
considered as mostly belonging to another world (Comolli 2015: 14). This was a very big problem 
for the British38. 
Another significant change came in the education system. Before the arrival of the British, the 
most popular form of education was the traditional Islamic education, known as Tsangaya school 
system39. This system of education was mostly influenced by contacts with the Arab world. It dates 
back to the 13th Century, when Islam first arrived in the region. The system basically entailed 
intensive study of the Qur’an, whereby a teacher (al-aramma) pitches a camp, often in a place in 
the outskirts of a town, draw students (almajirai). The system is often divided into four different 
stages, with each of these stages forming the basis for progress into the next stages. The last of 
these stages is often the enrolment in more advanced theological schools (madrasahs), where 
students were meant to study Islamic Jurisprudence, Theology, History, Philosophy, Arabic 
Grammar and the Sciences (Umar, 2013). In each of these stages, the students were expected to 
studiously follow the teachings of the teacher. They are also supposed to replicate the al-muhajirun 
(‘migrants’ in Arabic) often referred to in many places in the Qur’an40, as people who had given 
up their earthly possessions and families, in fellowship with the Prophet during his Hij’ra from 
Mecca to Medina41.  
Up until the arrival of the British, this system was clearly the preferred form of education for the 
majority of people within the region. In fact, when Lugard took over as the Governor of Northern 
                                                            
38 The only positive thing the British appreciated from the pre-existence of the Sokoto Caliphate was its already 
existing administrative structures, which made the region slightly easier to manage politically. While enthroning the 
colonial system, the British had retained the region’s pre-existing administrative structures. However, the 
incompatibility of the deeply entrenched Islamic cultural values within the region would still make governing the 
region very challenging. 
39 Studying the Qur’an under the Tsangaya school system, they are supposed to share in the same characteristics with 
the al-mahajirun of Medina. The students are expected to have left their homes and families and should have no other 
means of livelihood. However, on study free days (mostly Thursdays), they could engage in menial jobs normally 
assigned to them by their teachers. With these, the students are able to economically sustain themselves. The teacher 
himself does not necessarily reside in one particular place or town. Often, he is expected to be engaged in full-time 
studying and learning of the Qur’an and other Islamic sciences. He also does not receive any form of official payment 
from the students. His sustenance most of the time also comes from alms generated by his students or from his host 
community.  Any literature that discusses this schooling system? 
40 The Qu’ran 2:270; 274; 3:92; 3:134) 
41 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala cleric in Kano (March 2017). 
100 
 
Nigeria in 1914, he found over 25,000 such Qurʾanic schools, with a total enrolment of 218,618 
pupils (Fafunwa, 1991:207). At first, Lugard maintained the Qur’anic school system. He not only 
acknowledged their existence, but also accorded them official status by paying monthly stipends 
to the teachers (Fafunwa, 1991:208). However, he soon realised how culturally and socially 
challenging allowing such a system was for the new united country. Besides the obvious 
incompatibility with the Western values in the colonial system, it was pragmatically unsustainable 
with the unification of the region with the South, who had already been introduced to the Western 
style education by the Irish and Portuguese missionaries. Thus, Lugard’s administration would 
stop funding the Qur’anic schools. He would also introduce Western colonial education in the 
region; not only to align the region with its Southern counterpart, but also to make it less 
challenging for administrative purposes. This system of education, among other things, entails: (a) 
an abandonment of the Arabic language, which was the main language of instruction in the Islamic 
schools, (b) imposition of English as the main language of instruction, (c) No inclusion of the 
Qur’an in the academic curriculum, (d) and introduction of different Western subjects such as 
geography, biology, chemistry, English, and Christian religious knowledge, which were initially 
not part of the Islamic education (Salisu and Abdullahi, 2013). Even though Lugard would allow 
the Islamic system to continue to exist alongside this newly introduced colonial system (Imam, 
2012; Garba, 2012), this practically devalued the traditional Islamic system in the region. It also 
seriously challenged the hegemonic position of Islamic authorities in the region, and soon created 
the opportunity for resentment towards the colonial state. In more practical terms, certification 
from the newly established colonial schools would become a pre-requisite for getting any 
assistance from the colonial government. To get anything from the colonial state, including 
employment (civil service), people were expected to attain a certain level of scholarship, or have 
certificates (degrees) from these newly established colonial schools. Both the students and the 
teachers who studied or taught in the traditional Islamic schools were either disregarded (seen as 
‘illiterates’) or forced to change to the new system. All these were never easily accepted by many 
in the region.  
In discussing this with my respondents, I was not surprised to learn how people in the region 
construed the effects of these changes, as the cause of deep-seated resentment against the colonial 
state. Beginning with Lugard’s decision to stop funding the Qur’anic schools, some of my 
respondents argued that such actions were purely discriminatory and was simply unforgivable. In 
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their estimations, the colonial state’s lack of funding to the traditional Qur’anic schools, left the 
schools completely on their own. Therefore, the schools now rely on the support from parents 
which most of the time was very minimal. As a result, the Qur’anic school teachers had to resort 
to sending their pupils to beg for food and money. This further tarnished the image of the schools 
and undermined the integrity of the teachers as well as their pupils until today.  
Other respondents, who did not go this far in interpreting the effects of colonialism, restricted their 
thoughts on how much effect the substitution of the Qur’anic system with the Western style 
education has had on the grievance and the subsequent mobilisation of political activism against 
the colonial government. One of my most eloquent respondents, who had claimed to have 
conducted research himself on the “negative impact of colonialism on the region’s Traditional 
Qur’anic system of education”, argues that “this (referring to colonialism) was the most single 
element that made our people begin to revolt against the colonial state”. Looking at me intensely 
with an eye above his white glasses, he continued: “the British, by trying to force us to change our 
system, made mockery of our traditional values. ...and sometimes, when you make people feel that 
their traditions are valueless, they are forced to prove you wrong”42. Another respondent who had 
a similar position also said:  
“I cannot say that the colonial system is bad ... but what I know is that it was never 
compatible with our values. Its introduction as a replacement for our traditional 
system was not in our best interest. If the British wanted a system that suits the region, 
they would have balanced what we already had, with some things from their own 
system, and not bring something totally different”.43  
These kinds of sentiments are reminiscent of Alao’s (2013) observation in his analyses of the role 
of colonialism in “Islamic Radicalisation” in Northern Nigeria. In this study, the British-based 
Nigerian scholar explained that many Muslims in the region were frustrated by the way the colonial 
government devalued the traditional Islamic schools. According to him, the lack of recognition of 
the traditional schools by the colonial government was so bad, that the Muslim population were 
practically forced to attend the “Christian schools”, where they were almost forcefully converted 
                                                            
42 Interview by the author with an Izala cleric in Kano (March 2017). 
43 Interview by the author with a politician representing one of the political zones in Northern Nigeria in Abuja (March 
2017). 
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to Christianity. Suleiman Baba Ali, a former Commissioner for Health from one of the states in 
the region, recounted how “he felt that there were conscious attempts by the educators of the 
colonial government to subtly convert Muslims to Christianity.” This, in Alao’s assumption felt 
like a promotion of Christianity, and as a result caused a lot of frustration and backlash in the 
region. So, in those instances, most Muslims felt that this was an attack on their religion, leading 
to a resistant religious response.  
The religious neutrality (secular) that guided the colonial state at the executive level of the colonial 
government also did not help matters. Even though the colonial government made some effort to 
accommodate44 the political structures within the Sokoto Caliphate, it had at the centre of the 
government operated with a bureaucratic system that de-emphasised religion and tried to replicate 
the Western modern state. In the form of a separation of the State from religion, it pioneered the 
establishment of different arms of the government (the executives, the legislatures and the 
judiciary), a vibrant civil society and secular civil service system. Within these systems, Christian 
holidays (such as Easter and Christmas), rather than Muslim holidays, became used as state’s 
holidays. Saturdays and Sundays, which in the Sokoto Caliphate were nothing other than ordinary 
days of the week, were also regarded as weekends and weekly work holidays. This was completely 
different with what was applicable in the Sokoto Caliphate. While people grudgingly went along 
with it, they quickly translated it as “foreign and dangerous”45 for the region’s Islamic identity. 
This is how my respondent put it: 
How do you justify the fact that our people have to follow the colonial system which 
was Christianity-inspired. The Gregorian Calendar which was introduced by the 
colonial government is completely a Christian thing, not Muslim. Muslim Calendar 
was ignored as if it did not even exist. We preserve Saturdays and Sundays as 
holidays rather than Thursdays and Fridays, which we used to have from our learning 
days (Tsangaya Qur’anic school). Is Sundays more holy (sic) than Fridays, which is 
                                                            
44 The British had developed a distinctive policy of indirect rule, which made it possible for them to govern the region 
with the consent of the traditional rulers. They retained the administrative system of the Sokoto Caliphate, with Shari’a 
law as the recognised legal system, even to the areas in the region, where the majority of the population were ‘pagans. 
Emirs were allowed to largely exercise their administrative powers as they had done before, as long as they are to 
become accountable to the colonial government. These concessions, however, have been described as made for 
administrative convenience (Falolo, 2009), rather than to accommodate the region’s cultural values.   
45 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala scholar in Knao (March 2017) 
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(sic) the Muslim days of worship? The colonial system in a way forced us to follow 
their ways which are inspired by Judeo/Christian religion, rather than our own 
Islamic ways. We are still suffering because of these things46. 
Two politicians from the region also had a similar opinion. “The Christian-British intentionally 
wanted to favour the Christians”, one remarkably started. In continuation, he argued: 
Their colonial Western system that we still use today completely devalued our 
already exiting Islamic system, present before the British arrived. It completely 
favours our Christian brothers. Look at it this way: To gain affluence, job or good 
social status, we were encouraged to attend western schools, which were often 
administered by Christian ministers. We wear Christian clothes to go to the offices, 
many clothing of those in our in our country’s professional institutions; the judges, 
lawyers, academics, doctors, resemble those worn by Christian clergy and choristers. 
I can tell you; this is no coincidence at all. Colonial system worked hard to destroy 
our Islamic cultural heritage.47    
Even one high-ranking police officer from the region, who himself claimed that religion had no 
role in BH’s activism in the region today argued “My forefathers had to revolt against the colonial 
powers, because that was too much to bear”. “Islam” he continued, “gave them the strength and 
the boldness to say ‘no’ to what was a human evil in our land. What else do they have if not the 
faith? In Islam, they found the resolve to resist, to fight and to say no to evil”48. He concluded. 
Another security personnel member with whom I specifically discussed some of the arguments 
with other respondents replied.  
“Yes, you have to acknowledge the lessons from the history of our religion in the region. 
It was so powerful that it must motivate our people to revolt against the colonial 
government ... Taking lessons from our religious heritage, the people could articulate their 
thoughts of actions and resistance against the colonial masters whose mission was only to 
                                                            
46 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala scholar in Kano (March 2017). 
47 Interview with the author with an anonymous politician representing one of the political zones in Northern Nigeria 
at Abuja (February 2017).  
48 Interview by the author with an anonymous Nigerian police officer in Kaduna (April 2018). 
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destroy ... It didn’t matter if they used violent resistance or not. They just had to fight them-
off (referring to the colonial government).”49  
Although these kinds of sentiments may not have been articulated in such a manner in those days, 
it is easy to see why they could create a conducive avenue for resentment against the colonial state 
in the region. Having rendered previously acquired degrees from the Islamic schools useless in the 
public sphere, and having devalued the people’s traditional values, colonialism created opportunity 
for resistance against the colonial state, either in the form of individual resentment or collective 
resistance. In the context where Islam through its history in the region had been established as the 
most potent weapon to galvanise activism against state opposition, it became easily drawn as a 
tool to galvanise people for socio-political activism. From this, many resistance groups evolved in 
the region against the colonial state, framing their activism along Islamic terms (Schacht, 1958). 
Although such resistances were quickly dismantled by the superior fire power of the colonialists, 
their evolution and the little success they achieved helped further cement and concretise the 
political role of Islam as an instrument for resistance against state opposition. Not being able to 
achieve their goals due to structural changes and repression from the colonial state left most people 
‘bottling-in’ their resentment to wait for the demise of the British at independence. At least within 
an independent state, they could rewrite all the wrongs of the colonial state  or so they thought.  
 
4.4 Northern People’s Congress: The Formation of the Most Popular Islamic-Based Political 
Party in Northern Nigeria 
With the prospect of an independent state, socio-political resistance in the region was quickly 
transformed into the formation of political parties. Activists were no longer dealing with the 
colonial masters, but with people from the other region (particularly people from the Southern Part 
of the country), which now forms part of the political union, Nigeria50. The main political party 
                                                            
49 Interview by the author with an anonymous Nigerian JTF personnel in Kaduna (April 2018). 
50 At independence, the country was patterned in a semi-autonomous tripartite regional structure: The Northern, the 
Eastern and the Western regions. Each of these regions represents the three biggest ethnic groups, the Hausa, Igbo and 
Yoruba. These regions were semi-autonomous from the federal government. They had different indigenous premiers 
that governed and conducted their affairs. While the North had NPC, the two Southern regions had the National 
Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG), with each of the parties formed along the ethnic 
and religious lines within the regions. Ethnically, Nigeria is believed to be comprised of about 270 different ethnic 
groups with over 350 languages. However, the three biggest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos and 
Yorubas. Together, these three groups, make-up 75% of the country’s population. The groups are also split along the 
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that emerged was the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). Founded on the region’s Islamic 
identity, NPC would grow to become the most dominant party in the region (Falolo, 1998:54). The 
manner in which most of the respondents described NPC reflects a political party that was built 
mostly on the fusion of Islam and political activism, rather than a political party with a merely 
socio-political role. Its leader was Ahmadu Bello, a great-grandson of Usman dan-Fodio.  
In establishing the party, this influential Muslim scholar went back to the structure of the Sokoto 
Caliphate to build up a united Northern Nigerian party with Islamic identity. He operated a close 
system that prevented people from the other regions penetrating the Northern region’s politics. For 
him, Islam was not just a tool to win political influence and consolidate power in the region; it was 
also a resource to foster an unbroken continuity and establish Islamic identity in the entire Northern 
Nigeria. Under such a structure, the party was not just meant to win elections, it was also meant to 
help rewrite all the wrongs of the colonial legacy (Falola, 1998:55). Till today, NPC has remained 
the most successful and most popular political party to have operated in the region. 
Consistent with its goals, the party on the Nigerian national stage consciously pushed for an 
enthronement of a-Shari’a system that entailed a unification of political authority and religious 
authority. This, as one of my respondents explained, is not to be confused as a “mass conversion 
of all Nigerians to Islam.” What it means, he argued, “is a situation whereby the country’s political 
and moral compass would be drawn from the Islam, ... and not from the Western secular values”51. 
My respondent also took out time to connect the Muslims’ global al-Shari’a advocacy to the 
genealogy of Islam itself in the seventh century, especially on how the Prophet’s reception of the 
message from Allah led to Islam’s establishment, both at Medina and later in Mecca. For him, 
Shari’a draws from this Islamic history. In his estimation, it is only a body of law that tries to help 
Muslims all over the world to attain that ideal state that existed during the Prophet Muhammad’s 
early days in Medina. Thus, the enthronement of such a system in Nigeria, in his estimation meant 
for NPC “a step towards freedom from colonialism, Western subjugation, emancipation and 
everything that is related to colonialism for every Muslim.”52 In this light, they (NPC) believed 
that they could through Shari’a, actually rewrite the wrongs of colonialism.  
                                                            
country’s geographical lines, with the majority of the Hausa-Fulani living mainly in the Northern region; the Igbos in 
the South-Eastern and the Yorubas in the South-Western regions.  
51 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala cleric at Kano (March 2017). 
52 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala cleric at Kano (March 2017). 
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The NPC could not stay in power long enough53 to implement its full Islamic agenda. With the 
country’s first military coup in 1966, both Ahmadu Bello and his NPC’s second in command, 
Abubakar Tafawa Belewa,54 were assassinated. The coup was orchestrated by a group of young 
Igbo military officers, namely Kaduna Nzogwu, Tim Onwuatuegwu, Emmanual Ifeajuna, 
Nwobosi and Oguchi, who capitalised on the country’s perceived economic decline and high level 
of corruption in both the regional and federal governments. The Premier of the Western region, 
Ladoke Akintola, was also killed in the coup. Only Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the Eastern 
Nigerian based National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), who also happened to be the 
Nigerian ceremonial President, and the Dr Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern region 
escaped the coup plot (Amaechi, 2013). After the coup, Nwafor Orizu, an Igbo politician and the 
then Senate President, was pressured to take over as the interim president just to fill up the power 
vacuum. He later handed over power to the military supreme council that was chaired by major-
general Aguiyi Ironsi (another Igbo military man, from the Eastern region) (Amaechi, 2013).  
Even though the coup was seen by many in the Nigerian public (Falola, 1998:55) as influenced by 
patriotic reasons, Ironsi’s failure to prosecute the coup plotters, and the fact that both Azikiwe and 
Dr Okpara, the two Igbo politicians occupying key political offices in the first republic, did not 
meet the same fate as their Northern and Western counterparts, would make people from the 
Northern Nigeria construe the coup as a “political injustice”. In other words, it was interpreted in 
the North as a systematic plot by the Igbo military officers to prevent people from other ethnic 
groups, particularly the Northern Nigeria, from national leadership. In the preceding months, 
officers from the Northern Nigeria carried out a counter coup, killing Ironsi and some of the 
officers who had conducted the first coup. Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Northern 
                                                            
53 NPC had earlier won more seats in the first national election at independence than both parties from the Eastern 
and Western regions combine. With this, it formed a coalition government with the NCNC. The AG became the 
opposition party. However, in 1964, this alliance crumbled. A 1962 and 1963 attempt by the federal government to 
conduct a national census was interpreted across the Southern region as an attempt by the NPC to fix the figures 
in the Northern region’s favour, so as to strengthen their hold on power in the federal government. As a result, the 
NPC lost the much‐needed support from the NCNC. This notwithstanding, NPC still dominated the Nigerian 
National politics.  
54 Despite being the party’s leader, Ahmadu Bello chose to become the Premier of the Northern region. Instead, he 
supported Abubakar Tafawa Belewa’s (his second in command) candidacy to become the Nigerian Prime Minister 
(the Head of the Government). 
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Nigerian military officer from the minority tribe in the region (the Kanuri) was installed as the 
country’s Head of State (1966). However, Gowon’s installation as the Head of State clearly 
ignored the military’s principle of seniority - at the time of his coronation, he was a junior to many 
military officers from both the Western and Eastern region in the military hierarchy. This created 
a lot of tension. Within the next three months, more animosity and hatred between the Igbos and 
the northerners developed, culminating finally in the thirty months Nigerian/Biafran civil war 
between the Igbos in the South-eastern part of the country on one side, and the rest of Nigeria on 
another side. Both sides framed the war as a religious battle between Christian Biafra and Muslim 
Nigeria. The war ended in January 1970 when the Biafran troops surrendered and were absorbed 
back to the Nigerian State. To diffuse the ethnic/religious politics and tensions that contributed to 
the civil war, Gowon disbanded the regional system that existed since the end of colonial reign. In 
place of this system, he created a twelve-state structure, six in each from the old Southern and 
Northern regions. He would stay in power until 1975.  
However, despite Gowon’s actions and the successive Nigerian military and civilian Presidents55 
that came after the civil war (1970-1980), political activism had continued to be couched in 
religious terms in the region. The lack of representation on the NPC ideology at federal or local 
state governments at the end of the civil war has often led to political revolts, along religious lines, 
leading to the formation of many religious activist movement organisations in the region. Some of 
such movements include the Maitatsine movement, the Muslim Brothers and the Izala. A summary 
of the story of the Maitatsine Movement particularly is worth recounting here, because it 
                                                            
55 Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), who was himself from one of the minority ethnic groups was succeeded by Murtala 
Muhammed (1975). This was through a bloodless coup. His tenure lasted for only a few months as he was himself 
over-thrown by military officers believed to be from the minority ethnic groups from the Northern region. The 
perpetrators of the coup were later arrested and executed. As the highest-ranking military officer, Olusegun Obasanjo 
(1975-1979), a Yoruba from the South-western part of the country, took office. He successfully handed over power 
back to a Northern civilian elected government of Shehu Shagari for the Second Republic in 1979. The Second 
Republic only lasted for four years (1983), when the military forcefully took overpower through another coup. First 
was Muhammed Buhari (1983-1985), and then by Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), who promised to hand over power 
to a democratically elected civilian government. But when it became apparent that Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a southern 
Yoruba business tycoon was going to win what is still considered as the most free and fair election in Nigeria, which 
he himself Babangida organised, he halted the polling mid-course and nullified the election. This received wide range 
criticism across the country. In the coming days protests ensured in different Southern parts of the country. Probably, 
sensing grave danger, Babangida handed over power not to Abiola, but to a weak interim civilian government of 
Ernest Shenekon, who lasted in office for only 3 months. He was quickly removed by Sani Abacha, who ruled until 
1998. Abacha’s tenure ended when he abruptly died, allegedly of a heart attack. He was succeeded by Abdulsalam 
Abubakar, who handed over power to a military retired Obasanjo civilian government. A reference will be helpful. 
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concretises how lack of representation at the Federal government was able to create the conducive 
socio-political environment for the birth of a religious activist movement organisation.  
The Maitatsine movement arose around 1978 (during the reign of Olusegun Obasanjo, a military 
dictator from the South) in Kano, the most populated city in Northern Nigeria. Maitatsine was led 
by one Mohammadu Mai Tabsiri (widely known as Marwa), a self-proclaimed Sunni cleric, who 
migrated to Nigeria in the early 1940s. The roots of his birth are not very clear; however, many 
Nigerian scholars (Falola 1998; Alao 2009) believe that he was born in Marwa, a town in the 
northern part of Cameroon. This is probably where he got the name, “Marwa”. By the late 1950s, 
the eloquent   preacher had started his anti-state preaching, but was quickly deported by the 
Nigerian authorities to Cameroon in the 1960s. It is not known how he was able to come back to 
Nigeria. What is known, however, is that he returned to the region around 1972, and by then he 
again started his preaching shortly thereafter (Amaechi, 2013).  
With a religious practice that was based on a mixture of radical interpretations of Sunni theology 
and sorcery, Marwa was able to create a kind of anti-materialistic cultic militancy, which resonated 
among the poor and the marginalised urban classes within the Northern Nigerian society. Later he 
and his group established their own mosques, from where they criticised other established Muslim 
orders and violently attacked government institutions, claiming that they were all agents of the 
infidel government. His popularity grew further in many parts of Northern Nigeria in 1979, after 
he performed the holy pilgrimage to Mecca. Building upon this popularity, he would 
controversially start to claim that he had divine revelations that superseded those of Prophet 
Muhammad. From his base in Kano, Marwa and his group consistently attacked different segments 
of the government. By 1979, their attacks on government had spread to other parts of Northern 
Nigeria, prompting the Nigerian government to declare war on the group. In 1980, the leader of 
the group was killed alongside most of his followers in a brutal security raid that was conducted 
by joint police and Nigerian military forces (Amaechi, 2013). 
Like most activist movement organisations that evolved in the region at this period, the Maitatsine 
movement is better explained because of a mixture of economic decadence and perception of 
political injustice (Muslim marginalisation). It emanated from the region’s perception of injustice 
coming from the region’s lack of political representation at the Nigerian Federal government. The 
Maitatsine movement arose before the Nigerian Second Republic, against a background of serious 
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economic decline, high unemployment and political corruption in the country (Falola, 1998:138). 
Growing up in the region, the self-proclaimed cleric understood that Islam had proved to possess 
a liberatory quality in social and political terms. The religion has the power to bring people together 
under a one united socio-economic and political agenda. Hence, he tapped into this, presenting his 
austere version of Islam as an alternative solution to all the economic problems that had bedeviled 
the region, of which he claimed to have been given a divine mandate to restore (Falola, 1998:138).  
In addition, Marwa had also tapped into the region’s perception of political marginalisation at the 
time. The movement had emerged at the enthronement of Olusegun Mathew Obasanjo, a Southern 
Yoruba Christian military dictator, who became the President at the death of Murtala Muhammed. 
Obasanjo only became the President because he was the highest-ranking military officer at the 
time. His boss, the previous military President Murtala Muhammad was during the days leading 
to his ascension brutally murdered in a military coup. Being the highest-ranking military officer, 
he was required by military tradition to take over office. Before him, all the former Nigerian 
civilian and military Heads of State (except Aguiyi Ironsi, who ruled for only three months in 
1966, before he was brutally murdered in a military coup) have all come from the Northern Nigeria. 
The Federal government had been dominated by politicians from Northern Nigeria. He quickly 
handed over power to a democratically elected civilian President (Shagari) from the North, but not 
before his ascension to the Presidency had begun to be perceived as political injustice from the 
North. 
This perception of “political injustice”, albeit strange in other contexts has to be understood in the 
context of Northern Nigeria as a product of the emergence of the NPC. One main effect of the rise 
and success of the NPC in the region was the concretisation of regional and ethno-religious 
identity, as a marker of identity in the region. Given that this most popular party was built on 
religious and regional backgrounds, it incubated a sharp political status quo, which makes religion 
and ethnicity the pre-eminent marker of identity and political agitation in the region, especially at 
the federal government level, where activists had to compete with political parties from other 
regions. This was further exacerbated by the civil war, which was fought along regional and 
religious lines. Fighting along these different ethnic and religious fronts in the Nigerian Federal 
government, this ethnic and religious identity became entrenched in the social and political 
consciousness of the people.  
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At the dawn of the civil war, most Nigerians would begin to see themselves first as Hausa-Fulanis, 
Igbos and Yorubas, or Muslims and Christians before considering themselves as Nigerians. 
Loyalties to regional ethnicity and religious affiliations often supersede that of the state. Lack of 
representation of one ethnic/regional or religious group at the federal government level became 
easily interpreted as “political injustice”, and as such created negative grievances and political 
opportunities for tensions between the ruling ethnic groups and the ones lacking representation at 
the centre. In such cases in the Northern region, this has led to the formation of opposition of 
activist groups with an agenda, to either depose the government or return the region to its former 
al-Shari’a system, the same message upon which NPC became the most popular party in the 
region. This was the foundation upon which Maitatsine was founded. Many years after Maitatsine, 
this perception of political injustice in the Nigerian Federal government has continued to propel 
the evolution of political activism, including an invigorated al-Shari’a advocacy that laid the 
foundation of BH. In the events of lack of representation at the federal government in Northern 
Nigeria, activists have easily decried political marginalisation, and have often tapped into the 
region’s culture of Islamic activism, to frame their political activism as a call for change.  
 
4.5 The Return to Democracy in 1999: The Resurgence of al-Shari’a Advocacy in Northern 
Nigeria 
The Nigerian return to democracy in 1999 and the subsequent electoral victory of the Christian 
southerner, Olusegun Matthew Obasanjo (under whose military regime, the Maitatsine movement 
previously arose), provided an overwhelming opportunity for al-Shari’a advocacy in the region. 
Obasanjo’s emergence at the helm of the Country’s political affair, meant that the region had to 
wait for four years before it could have a shot at the country’s Presidency. This created a renewed 
feeling of political marginalisation, within the region. Given the new brought-in freedom from the 
new democratic system, activists in the region saw new opportunity to renew the region’s popular 
al-Shari’a advocacy. In the new democratic system, they could at least take their religio-political 
activism to the political arena, without state intervention56.  
                                                            
56This is different from what was obtainable during the military era. On many occasions during such periods, the 
religious/ethnic demography of the country had meant that discussions about al-Shari’a in the Nigerian federal 
government had always evoked ethnic/religious tensions; hence, the discussions had also been met with brute force 
from the state. In 1988, al-Shari’a constitutional proposals for example brought forward in the country’s National 
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Ironically, Obasanjo’s ascension to the Nigerian Presidency is believed to have been orchestrated 
by a mixture of military and civilian cabals who controlled Nigerian politics in the Northern region. 
According to some of my respondents, the former Nigerian Military Head of State was only 
allowed by these Northern ‘cabals’ to become the President for two main reasons. Firstly, it was 
because of his military experience. Given his experience, they believed that Obasanjo was the only 
person, who could cool the growing tension and complaints of “political injustice”, which was at 
that time beginning to rise among many ethnic groups within the Southern region57. Secondly, they 
had thought that Obasanjo was the only trusted Southerner who could hand over power to the 
North after his first tenure in office. This was reasonable, since he successfully handed over to a 
democratically elected Northern President, during his short spell as a military President. One 
politician with more than 15 years of experience in the public service told me that Obasanjo was 
even made to sign a legal document58. In the document, “he swore to the Northern oligarchs, that 
he would hand-over the Presidency to a politician of the Northern choice, after his first tenure”59, 
he recounts. Unfortunately, things did not turn out the way they had thought. Even though, 
Obasanjo quelled the rising militancy from the Southern region within a few years of his reign, his 
other political actions on behalf of the Nigerian federal government would create a lot of tension 
in the region. In the first years of his tenure, Obasanjo dismissed all the high-ranking military 
officers, most of whom were from the Northern region. Some of these were also part of the cabal 
that had helped him become the president. These created a lot of tension and a sense of mistrust 
between the Obasanjo-led federal government and politicians within the region, leading to several 
                                                            
Assembly brought the House to a standstill - so much so that the then new military President, General Ibrahim 
Babangida, had to ban all Shari’a related discussions in the House of Assembly (Falola, 1998:94).  
57 Prior to the general elections, there was a consistent rise of “militant groups” in the country’s Southern region. 
During this period, activities of these groups had affected the production of petroleum products which accounts for 
the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Thus, it is believed that there was desperation from some of the Northern 
cabals, who own most of the oil fields in the region to stop this militancy. Obasanjo was among the only trusted 
southerners, who could quell-down those uprisings, and normalise the situation in the region.  
58 I did not myself see this document. However other scholars including the Nigerian Nobel Peace Laureate have on 
different occasions alluded to the existence of such arrangement. In an interview with The News Africa, he details how 
Obasanjo’s political sponsors had brought him (Obasanjo) the document to sign. He explained that he was not sure if 
Obasanjo signed or not. But it was no doubt that there was such an arrangement. This interview is still available online 
from: http://saharareporters.com/2012/02/06/interview-wole-soyinka-next-phase-boko-haram-terrorism-thenews. 
Given the complexity of the Nigerian politics and the mistrust between the Northern and Southern Politicians in 
Nigerian, it is not impossible to surmise that these cabals had gone this extent to protect their ‘interests. It is more 
unlikely that they would trust Obasanjo, without committing him to some sort of binding agreement.    
59 Interview by the author with anonymous politician representing a geo-political zone in one of the states in Northern 
Nigeria at Abuja (March 2018). 
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calls and verbal attacks from many politicians within the region, for a dethronement of the 
Obasanjo led government.  
Things became worse in 2001, when Obasanjo began to actively campaign for a second tenure, 
against the wish of his Northern Nigerian political godfathers again. Attempts by these elite to 
make Obasanjo change his mind fell on deaf ears. This was perceived within the region as political 
injustice. It was at this stage that many politicians in the region began openly to call for a change 
of government, and the deposition of Obasanjo. In the succeeding months, al-Shari’a advocacy 
intensified among different activists in the region. In the light of this opportunity, activists from 
different religious activist groups would also embark on a barrage of consistent campaigns for the 
establishment of Shari’a in the country and regionally. By 2001, all the 12 states within the region 
had introduced Shari’a as their respective states’ legal penal code. People like Yusuf Mohammed, 
the would-be spiritual leader and founder of BH, who had worked with some of the main 
established Salafi-networks in the region in their al-Shari’a advocacy would start to openly call 
for enthronement of al-Shari’a in the Nigerian Federal Government. By 2002, he would encourage 
a group of Salafi-oriented youths to follow one Mohamed Ali to relocate to a camp in Kanama, in 
pursuit of a true Islamic lifestyle that is hoped to enthrone al-Shari’a system in the region and the 
entire Nigeria.  
It is important to emphasise that this was only the political background upon which BH emerged 
in the region. Though such political background provides insight on the timing of the evolution of 
the group, it does not explain the Salafi-orientation and internal dynamics within which the group 
was formed. To understand this, I will now look at the doctrinal dispute between Yusuf and the 
two main Salafi networks (the Yan Izala and the Ahlus Sunna), and how the fall-out from the al-
Shari’a advocacies encouraged the foundation of an al-Qaeda camp in Kanama and then the 
establishment of BH in 2005. I will also examine the material resources upon which the Kanama 
camp was founded. These political structures hence shed more light on the Salafi-ideological 
orientation of the group, as well as the significance of material resources in the formation of the 
group in the region.   
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4.6 The Two Main Salafi Networks in Northern Nigeria: Intra-Ideological Dispute and the 
Formation of Boko Haram 
Two main groups represented the Salafi network in Northern-Nigeria: the Yan Izala and the Ahlus 
Sunna. At the dawn of democracy in 1999, the two groups were at the forefront of al-Shari’a 
advocacy, participating in TV and radio debates, and taking their advocacy in the different parts 
of the region. A quick summary of their formation and the doctrinal disputes among them at the 
dawn of the implementation of the Shari’a is important to contextualise the Salafist roots of BH, 
as well as the organisational aspects involved in the formation of the group.  
 
4.6.1 Izala (Jamā’at ‘Izālat al-Bid’awa-Iqāmat al-Sunna) 
Jamā’at ’Izālat al-Bid’a wa-Iqāmat al-Sunna also known as Yan Izala or simply Izala was the first 
of the two Salafi networks in Northern Nigeria. Unlike other Muslim groups, it is relatively new 
in the region. The network was introduced by students of Abu Bakr Mahmud Gumi, a highly 
respected Sunni cleric, who became famous during the Nigerian First Republic (Loimeier, 
2012:141). Born on the 7th of November 1924, to a family of Muslim preachers and scholars, 
Gumi’s lineage had been traced to an Arab Shaikh who was from the Bedouin nomads; they 
migrated to the Sokoto Caliphate before the 19th century (Falola, 1998:117). Though Gumi never 
identified himself as a Salafi (Brigaglia, 2012b; Thurston, 2011), his thoughts as expressed in his 
popular book, Al-’aqida al-sahiha bi-muwafaqat al-shari’a (The Correct Creed in accordance to 
the Prescriptions of the Shari’a, first published in Arabic in 1972) throughout this period reflect 
Salafi’s core notions and ideological thoughts (Brigaglia, 2012b). Also, his ideas in his numerous 
radio broadcasts and preaching, demonstrates his belief that Muslims all over the world can attain 
correct spiritual belief and practice from the scripture without need for religious intermediaries or 
esoteric insight (Gumi, 1972). Thus, a return to this creed was the only way to restore the region’s 
Islamic heritage. 
Influenced by his father’s example, Shaikh Gumi studied in some of the best schools in Northern 
Nigeria. As an adult, he also studied Arabic at the famous Bukta Al-Ruda Institute in Sudan 
(Thurston, 2011). He was among the most famous Northern Nigeria scholars who had studied at 
Arab Universities and had returned home after their studies, often with a penchant for attacking 
the traditional Sufi orders in the region. Most of them in return, maintained life-long connections 
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with the Saudi Arabian elites, and had consistently worked to foster religious careers of other 
future Northern Nigerian returnees (Brigaglia, 2012a). Gumi’s popularity in the region grew in the 
1960s, when he was made the deputy Grand Qadi (Shari’a Judge) of the Northern Nigerian region, 
at Nigerian independence in 1960. Two years later, he ascended to the position of the Grand Qadi. 
In this position, he advised Ahmadu Bello, the then Premier (of the Northern region) and the leader 
of the NPC, on Islamic matters. After the first major Nigerian military coup that killed the Northern 
Premier and ended the First Republic, Gumi retired from political service, but remained active in 
the public arena. 
Partly as a result of frustration from the lack of implementation of the NPC Islamic policies in the 
government, Gumi in the coming years became a fierce critic and an outspoken opponent of the 
traditional Sufi orders. He accused them of being too close to the Nigerian and the regional secular 
government. Most of his criticisms were through TV and radio shows. Through Radio Kaduna 
(arguably the most popular and one of the first radio stations in the region) he would broadcast his 
tafsir (exegesis) of the Qur’an. He also became a regular contributor to the Northern Nigerian daily 
newspaper Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, where he consistently accused the Sufis of promoting bid’a 
practices, such as marriage bride price, extensive mourning, belief in superstitions and 
supererogatory prayers. These in his estimation are heretical practices that are not rooted in the 
Qu’ran and Sunnah. The practices, according to him were also backward and out of touch with the 
new Sunni religious thought. To be part of this emerging thought, Gumi believed that it was 
important to free the region of these heretical innovations, legitimised by the traditional practices 
of the Sufi orders.  
Others within the Nigerian Sufi orders (particularly those within the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya 
orders) responded by publishing their own pamphlets, using Qur’anic evidence to defend their Sufi 
traditions against Gumi’s literary attacks. Some of the Sufi scholars in the region at this time also 
began to broadcast their own radio programs such as Quranic interpretation (tafsir) and they started 
to write their own newspaper columns (Loimeier, 2012). All these widened the gap between the 
traditional Sufi orders, and this created a new generation of young Sunni adherents who had begun 
to embrace Shaikh Gumi’s version of Sunni Islam. In 1978, this crop of followers (most of who 
had also studied at universities in the Arab world) with financial resources coming from Saudi-
Arabia would form Izala, as a proper reformist organisation to lead the fight against the followers 
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of the Sufi orders (Loimeier 2012:142), as well as to bring about proper political change in the 
region. In identification with Gumi’s message, they called themselves Jamā’at ‘Izālat al-Bid’a 
wa-Iqāmat al-Sunna (Society of Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna). In 
the next few years, this group would become a powerful force for political activism within both 
Northern Nigeria and the other neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad that share 
the region’s socio-political culture.  
The formation of Izala was a huge success. Here, many people within the region, particularly the 
youths, women, urban, western-and newly returned Arab educated scholars, who had shared the 
same frustrations, were able to find an alternative vision of Sunni Islam that appealed to their 
political, economic and social sensitivities in the region. However, with Izala, there was at least 
hope that there could be a pressure on the government to effect change in the region’s political 
system. Under such circumstances therefore, there is no longer any need to wait to be mediated by 
established religious authorities, if people are to attain correct spirituality and the politically 
needed change in the region. This is how one of my respondents put it:  
Becoming an Izala meant change, it meant freedom from the ignorant Sufi 
establishment.... It also meant breaking with established traditional religious society, 
including parents, and all manifestations of allegedly un-Islamic social customs, such 
as bride price, extensive mourning (bika’), and supererogatory prayers, which is quite 
out-dated and had no place in modern Islamic society.... 
It meant returning the region to its Islamic identity.”  
Another key element that popularised the Izala campaign during this period was its mobile 
preachers, known in the local Hausa language as masu waazi (masters of wa ‘z), my respondents 
told me. In line with Loimeier’s (2012) findings, both my Izala and Salafi respondents explained 
how these preachers were never apologetic in challenging the traditional Sufi thoughts. Again, 
having financial backing from Saudi Arabia, and having learnt some of these innovative 
mobilisation tactics from similar groups in the Kingdom, the Izala preachers were vigorously 
emboldened to challenge the Sufi orders. They had different specialisations. While some 
specialised in themes such as marriage, customs, Shari’a law and religious rituals, others became 
famous for their political polemics and moralistic speeches. In these different areas, they 
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vigorously challenged the ulama’s hegemony of interpretation of Islam in the public sphere, 
sometimes employing violent means, such as the occupation of Sufi mosques and interruption of 
Sufi religious gatherings. Sometimes, they would go as far as mounting loudspeakers and 
preaching in the areas regarded as the heart of Sufi adherents. “We didn’t even care to expound on 
certain intricate details of Salafist thoughts; rather what was more important for us was to 
popularise, and to get our true message across to the people”, my Izala scholar explained. “We 
really advocated for substantial social and institutional reforms”60, he concluded. 
Within the next few years, Izala had become one of the biggest activist political activist 
organisations in the region. Again, with their huge financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and their 
popularity in the region, they had been able to establish branches in virtually all the big cities in 
the region. The group had also gone into establishment of modern Islamic schools, which 
combined a chunk of the Western curriculum and Wahabi Islamic studies in rural areas. From here, 
they had continued to preach their message of religious reform and social change, reaching its peak 
in the late 1980s. However, political collaboration with the main Sufi orders halted Izala’s 
momentum, leading to the establishment of another, new and potentially more vibrant organisation 
that promised to be more committed to the eradication of traditional Sufi religious innovations.  
 
4.6.2 Ahlus Sunna  
Ahlus Sunna wa-l-jama ‘a (the people of the Sunna and the community) often referred to in its 
abridged form as Ahlus Sunna is an offshoot of Izala.  It emerged in the 1990s around a generation 
of younger Izala adherents, most of whom had studied at the Islamic University in Medina (Saudi 
Arabia). This group of Salafists boasted of a more insightful grasp of Wahhabi theology than their 
Izala counterparts, as well as a closer link to the global Salafi network. For them, Izala at this time 
had become too entangled with the Sufi establishments, and hence have become more parochial 
and insufficiently attuned to global Salafi scholarship. So, rather than continue to mend an already 
fractured organisation, there was a need to sever ties with the old group, and establish a new 
                                                            
60 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala at Kano (March 2017). 
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organisation that is “pure, unadulterated, and more committed to the Sunni tradition”61 as one of 
my Salafi cleric respondents put it. 
Two main reasons have been identified as the main cause of Ahlus Sunna’s split from Izala. First, 
the latter’s periodic entanglement with Sufi establishments in the late 1980s, to salvage electoral 
losses from the previous elections. Amid Izala’s activism in the 1980s, the region witnessed a 
sudden upsurge of Pentecostal Christianity (Loimeier, 2012:144-148). Carrying this into the local 
government elections, the Muslim votes were thus split among Izala, the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya 
candidates. Christian candidates on the other hand did not have to share their votes; hence, they 
managed to win a surprising number of local government seats even in Muslim-majority areas. In 
the coming days, this forced the Izala, Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya to shelve their disputes and form 
an alliance of (political) convenience (Loimeier 2012:143). To be in this unconventional union, 
the Izala movement had to stop its attacks against Sufi orders and shift towards more moderate 
positions. This periodic entanglement with the Sufi establishments alienated a young generation 
of Izala adherents. 
The second reason, and perhaps the most important for this study, was internal disputes over 
leadership, authority and regional autonomy that engulfed Izala in the l990s. In almost all the 
different branches of Izala, from Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, the other main branches in the region, 
Izala underwent a leadership crisis. In line with Loimeier’s (2012) findings, my Salafi respondents 
narrated to me how they personally were disturbed by this. Given the reduced spiritual guidance 
of Shaikh Gumi at this time (who had become old at this time and would later die in 1992), 
explained that, many actors within the different branches began to openly question the authority 
of Ismaila Idris, the retired military Imam who became the general leader of Yan Izala. While 
many still accepted the overall spiritual leadership of Abubakar Gumi, many actors rejected the 
authoritarian leadership style of his protegee Ismaila Idris (Amara, 2011). This in time led to 
rebellion in many branches of Izala.  
My respondents also recounted how the rebellions first occurred in Sokoto, where Abubakar Jibrin 
and Shaikh Abubakar Tureta broke away to join the politically radical “Muslim Brothers”62. The 
                                                            
61 Interview by the author with anonymous Ahlus Sunna cleric at Kano (March 2017). 
62 Muslim Brothers was another important activist group that evolved in the region in the early 1980s. Believed to 
have been effectively influenced by the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood and Iran’s successful revolution (Alao, 2009), 
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Muslim Brothers, aside from being in constant doctrinal dispute with the Izala were also the main 
activists’ rival group for the Izala in the region. This is mainly because of their doctrinal 
differences.  However, before they left, my respondents explained, they made sure that they took 
control of Farfaru, the most important Yan Izala mosque in Sokoto. Similar incidents also occurred 
in the city of Sokoto. In this case, Sidi Attahiru Ibrahim, another prominent leadership figure within 
the Izala, would also turn away from the Yan Izala and set up his own organisation, the Ahl al-
Sunna63. Although Ibrahims’s group failed to gain much popularity in Sokoto, their break-away 
further intensified the internal divide between different leaders within the Izala (Loimeier, 2012), 
In Kano, Jos and Kaduna similar incidents also occurred. In Kano particularly, an influential 
businessman, A.K. Daiyyabu, openly challenged the leadership of the organisation under the 
tutelage of Shaikh Sulaiman, believed to be a close ally of Ismaila Idris. He singled out the loyalist 
attitudes of the Yan Izala movement regarding the Nigerian government under General Babangida, 
the young Muslim military dictator, who forcefully came to power on the promise that he would 
restore the Islamic identity of the region64. As a result of this, Daiyyabu was forced out of the 
organisation by the group’s central committee in Jos. However, his expulsion did not put an end 
to the internal disputes.  
In the next two years the group would witness rebellions against the organisation’s different 
regional leaderships. In 1991, Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu (1930–2011), the chairman of the national 
Committee of Patrons, and Rabiu Daura, the chairman of the Council of ulama of the Yan Izala 
for Kaduna State separately accused the Izala leadership of financial mismanagement and 
collusion with the region’s corrupt political elites (Loimeier, 2012). They openly criticised Ismaila 
Idris and questioned the sources of his income. In direct reaction, Ismaila Idris and the Izala’s 
National Steering Committee removed Musa Mai Gandu and his supporters from all official 
functions. As a result, the Musa Mai Gandu Kaduna’s group and the Ismaila Idris Jos’ faction of 
                                                            
the group claims to have arisen to enthrone Islamic leadership in the centre of the Nigerian government. Although the 
group started as a Sunni group, the close association with Iran inevitably led to its infiltration by Shiite doctrine. In 
the late 1990s, the leader, El-Zakzaky would himself become a Shiite (Alao, 2013), leading to rebellion and 
fragmentation in the movement, into the two main networks, that threatened its existence.  
63 This is not to be confused with the Ahlus Sunna under discussion. This Ahl al-Sunna only existed and operated in 
Sokoto. 
64 Both Abubakar Gumi and the Izala leadership in the region were highly supportive of the Babangida government 
(Amaechi, 2013), probably because of his religious portfolio and seemingly conservative foreign policies. By 1986, 
he unapologetically pushed Nigerian status in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), from an observer 
status to full membership (Amaechi, 2013), at the chagrin of his deputy Ebie Ukiwe (Falola, 1998:94). 
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the Yan Izala started a bitter dispute, which continued to divide the Yan Izala movement. This 
dispute continued after Ismaila Idris’ death in 2000, when his successor Muhammad Sani Yahya 
Jingir took over the group. All these created animosity, silent protests and bitter divisions within 
the group’s leadership. It also created a toxic and unhealthy environment, whereby stubborn 
adherence to theological arguments easily led to mutual accusations of unbelief from each group, 
to discredit the other group.  
It was within this context, that the group of young Saudi Arabia returnees founded Ahlus Sunna, 
arguing that the old Izala has now become very much distracted and had departed from its very 
mission of eradication of Sufi traditional innovations. Claiming to have much closer links with the 
global Salafi networks, these group of young activists vowed to renew commitment in the 
eradication of Sufi traditional innovations. Like Izala, the group adopts some of the basic Salafi 
theology such as the struggle against un-Islamic innovations; yet emphasising the need for Muslim 
unity and the necessity for them to take an active part in politics (Brigaglia, 2012a; Thurston, 
2016). With its first base in Kano, the group would soon begin to present themselves as 
independent – ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama ‘a, “the people of the Sunna and the community”, a 
synonym for Sunni Muslims. With this, in my respondents’ words “we wanted people to think of 
us not just as Izala members, but as the representatives of a pure kind of Sunni Islam, with more 
influence in the general advocacy for the eradication of Sufi innovations within the region”65. 
Within ten years of its formation, the Ahlus Sunna would have branches in most of the important 
cities in Northern Nigeria, including Maiduguri where BH emerged.  
 
4.6.3 Yusuf and al-Shari’a Advocacy within the Two Salafi Networks 
Before becoming the spiritual leader of BH, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf was also a well-known and 
charismatic figure within both traditions (Izala and the Ahlus Sunna); rising to the position of the 
leader of the youth wing within the Ndimi mosque66. At the height of the al-Shari’a advocacy in 
1999, he had travelled to different parts of the region, preaching and representing the Ahlus Sunna 
                                                            
65 Interview by the author with an Ahlus Sunna cleric at Kano (March 2017). 
66 Ndimi mosque was a very popular mosque in the city of Maiduguri, partly because of its impressive structure. It 
was adorned with stained glass, marble tilling and two minarets and located in a relatively upscale centre of the city. 
The name Ndimi is derived from one Alhaji Muhammad Ndimi, the influential businessman, who financed the erection 
of the Mosque. 
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in several TV and radio debates. By the early 2000s, he had become a leading protégé of Ja’far 
Adamu67, one of the leadership figures within the Ahlus Sunna. At some point he was known to 
have been considered as one of the most promising upcoming leaders in the Ahnus Sunna circle 
by Adamu (Amaechi, 2017; Brigaglia, 2012a; 2012b). The relationship between the two men had 
grown during their time at the Ndimi mosque. One Ahlus Sunna imam, who had known both men 
from the Ndimi Mosque, confirmed to me that the two had apparently been very close - so much 
so that it was Mohammed Yusuf, who regularly hosted Jaʿfar Mahmoud Adamu in his house, 
during any of the latter’s visits68 to Ndimi mosque. Their relationship had flourished at 
this point. However, everything would change in the early 2000, when both men fell out, due to 
doctrinal differences. In the coming years, this would culminate in heated public verbal disputes 
that probably led Yusuf to order the killing of Adamu in 2007 (Brigaglia, 2012a).   
In recent BH scholarship (Anonymous, 2012; Brigaglia, 2015; Kassim, 2015; Thurston, 2015), 
Yusuf’s doctrinal dispute with Adamu (as well as the Ahlus Sunna) has been identified as a local 
manifestation of the tension existing between the two main trends within the global Salafi 
discourse: the “quietist” and the “jihadist”. While recognising the inadequacy, Wiktorowicz’s 
categorisations expanded by previous scholars (Anonymous, 2012; Kassim, 2015; Thurston, 
2015), Brigaglia (2015) particularly explained that the doctrinal dispute between the two was 
                                                            
67 Jafar Mahmud Adamu was among one of the prominent actors at the forefront of al-Shari’a advocacy at the dawn 
of Nigerian democracy in 1999. He was well-known figure within both the Izala and the Ahlus Sunna, becoming a 
popular voice among the new generation of Salafi/ Wahhabi scholars when he returned from his studies in Saudi Arabia. According 
to previous studies, he first rose to prominence in the region, when he won the Nigerian Qur’an recitation competition in 1988. He 
would later travel to Saudi Arabia in pursuit of his bachelor’s degree studies (Islamic University of Medina). Upon his 
return, he had devoted his life to an extensive preaching of the Wahhabi/Salafi doctrines, becoming both the imam of the Dorayi Friday 
mosque in Kano and the leading representative of the British al- Muntada al-Islami organisation, a Saudi-financed 
NGO that had started to develop a network of modern schools in the region (Brigaglia, 2012a: 6; Loimeier, 2012:147). He 
would also become the director of Usman Bin Affan Institute in Kano, a Salafi-based institution that works to nurture more aggressive 
Salafi thoughts within the region. Within these platforms, Adamu was able to espouse his Salafi thoughts and mobilised enough resources to 
coordinate his al-Shari’a activism during the early 2000. 
 
68 Adamu had first visited Ndimi Mosque at the invitation of Alhaji Muhammad Ndimi. At the peak of Adam’s 
career as a prominent preacher at the Usman bin Affan institute in Kano, this Izala supporter had invited the 
emerging Kano religious scholar to give tafsī r lectures in the mosque attached to his private house. This move was 
very much welcomed by Adam and his Ahlus Sunna colleagues because it provided them with an opportunity to 
extend their influence in the eastern part of the region (the old Bornu), which unlike many parts of the region had been 
previously almost impermeable to the influence of the Salafi mission. Rather than Salafism, the Tijani order had had a 
vast following in the area, including its neighbouring Chad and Cameroon. The beginning of the tafsīr in Maiduguri 
and the opening of a new frontier under the protection of a local sponsor was to be for Shaykh Adamu and Ahlus 
Sunna leadership, an occasion to re-sharpen their attacks against Sufism (see Brigaglia, 2012a for a more detailed 
analysis of this). 
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rooted in the political theology that had in the mid-2000s come to dominate the global Salafi 
landscape. Other than the inclination to political violence thesis, the major divide within the recent 
global Salafi discourse according to him was judgements on things like democracy, acquisition of 
Western education, participating in democratic elections, and support for insurgencies against 
democratic systems. Given that positions of groups or activists within different Salafi often over-
lap about these issues, it has become inadequate to define doctrinal disputes within Salafi trends 
along the ‘quietist’ and ‘jihadi’ divide.  
In the Nigerian context, Yusuf took a more extreme and austere position. While he agreed with the 
Ahlus Sunna on the desirability of a struggle to establish a Muslim form of government, he 
vehemently disagreed with them on the answer how this system should be attained. For him, it is 
“lawful” to change to such a system through violence. He rejected participating in democratic 
elections, employment in the government and acquisition of Western education. All these are for 
him products of democracy, and hence are haram (unlawful/forbidden). As a result, they should 
not be accepted by any true Muslim69.  
On the contrary, the Ahlus Sunna leadership (particularly Adamu), rejected Yusuf’s theological 
positions. For Adamu in particular, these Yusuf’s positions were simply ignorant, stupid, and 
dangerous for the political ambitions of Muslims in Nigeria (Brigaglia, 2012). While he agrees 
with Yusuf on the importance of establishing “true Shari’a” in Nigeria, he however argues that 
such substitution had to go through the already-existing system. So, rather than a radical violent 
path that disregards the existing system, the most effective approach for him was to work within 
the existing Nigerian system, pending the right time when the system would become desirable for 
the state to adopt such a Shari’a system (Brigaglia, 2015:182). As Adamu perceives it, Yusuf’s 
militant approach is simply counter-productive, and would only jeopardise the region’s quest of 
enthroning Islam in the long run. Adamu and the leadership of the Ahlus Sunna also had a subtle 
approach to issues like Western education. Rather than reject it, he believed that Muslims should 
in fact acquire it, if they are to enhance their political influence in a place like Northern Nigeria 
(Harnischfeger 2015:38). Only the conscious adoption of Western and secular boko education 
                                                            
69 A more detailed description of the schism between Yusuf and the Ahlus Sunna would be provided in the next 
chapter, when I discuss the activities of BH post 2005 (chapter 5). Most of Yusuf and Adamu’s disputes escalated 
after 2005. 
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would eventually enable Muslims to effectively fight the Western enemy, he would argue 
(Brigaglia, 2012b). In Adamu’s estimation, it is only with such knowledge, that Muslims can have 
the possibility to implement the kind of change that is needed in a country like Nigeria.70 
This back and forth between Yusuf and the Ahlus Sunna leadership continued for some time, 
particularly with Adamu. In 2002, these obvious contradictions and the incessant clash between 
the two would ultimately lead to Yusuf’s expulsion from the Ndimi Mosque. However, before this, 
Yusuf has won the heart and soul of many youths who had worshiped together with him and had 
studied under him at the Ndimi mosque. Under his doctrinal tutelage, and guidance from one Ali 
Mohammed (more information on Ali’s role would be provided below) most of them would in the 
coming days relocate to Kanama, to start a new organisation, which is devoted to the “ousting of 
the corrupt Nigerian government and western education they saw as antithetical to true al-Shari’a 
system” (Zenn, 2018:118). 
Two main issues made joining the Kanama camp very appealing for the new generation of Salafi 
youths. First, there was the political implication of the Shari’a implementation in the region. In 
working with other Islamic establishments in the implementation of Shari’a law in the region, 
Salafi actors had in what Kassim (2018:14) calls “jihadi revisionists”. They shelved some of their 
Salafi radical tenets, choosing instead to become more “moderate and less critical of the State”. 
This meant amending their ideologies or framing it in such a way that it accommodated the 
possibility of working within a western democratic system (Amaechi, 2017:63; Loimeier, 
2012:147-147). Paradoxically, the Shari’a reforms, which had been championed by activists within 
the main Salafi networks, Izala and Ahlus Sunna) ended up empowering the Sufis, and forced the 
Salafis to accept a doctrinal compromise. This was the very canon they had always wanted to 
correct. For the new younger generation of Salafi actors, this was not acceptable. Hence, they 
became disenchanted with the Salafi leadership, and as such began to find Yusuf’s accusation of 
the Salafi establishments as “colluding with the government in not advancing the cause of Islam” 
as credible (Amaechi, 2017:62). 
Secondly, the implementation of the Shari’a did not necessarily create a secure and corrupt free 
environment, or an economic uhuru, as many Salafi activists, who had been very vocal during the 
                                                            
70 I will elaborate more on these ideological differences between Adamu and Yusuf in the next chapter, as most of 
these disputes took place after the later took over BH’s leadership in 2005.  
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al-Shari’a campaign claimed71. Despite the region’s public show of religious consciousness and 
the Shari’a law implementation, the region remained characterised by political corruption and lack 
of accountability in the public offices. There was also tremendous lack of basic infrastructure, poor 
education systems, lack of basic health care, and youth unemployment. Government public offices 
not only remained platforms to acquire easy wealth; they were still avenues for other lucrative 
criminal enterprises. Instead of the expected dividends of democracy, the citizens remained 
impoverished.  
The story was also the same on the economic front. The social environment that emerged at the 
implementation of al-Shari’a did not lead to the economic boom, the al-Shari’a advocates had 
promised. Rather than this, the situation seemed to have gotten worse. In Williams and Guttschuss’ 
(2012) study about the emergence of BH in the region, the two senior researchers for the 
International Human Rights Watch observed that poverty and economic hardship were at this time 
more prevalent in the Northern Nigerian states than in other parts of the country. In comparison to 
its Southern region’s counterpart, the study also found that the country’s “very high level of 
poverty is essentially a Northern Nigerian phenomenon”. About 70% of the populations in the 
Northern Nigeria, especially in the north-east, including Maiduguri, where Boko Haram eventually 
emerged, live on less than a dollar a day, compared to about 50% in the Southern part of the 
country. The region also had the lowest literacy rate in the whole of Nigeria. Less than 23 percent 
of women and 54 percent of men in the Northeast can read, compared to more than 79 percent of 
women and 90 percent of men in the South (Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:27). 
In addition, there was also no clear career path to leadership within either the Izala or the newly 
founded Ahlus Sunna. Finding employment leadership positions for the new vibrant activists 
became quite difficult. The modern Islamic education which had been one of the major 
programmatic features of the Yan Izala’s and Ahlus Sunna advocacy as Brigaglia (2015) rightly 
observed did not necessarily provide jobs. The stress on sound training in Arabic in Yan Izala 
                                                            
71 The adoption of Shari’a by the 12 state governments as their respective states’ binding penal code, by no means did 
not achieve what it was intended to achieve, at least from the Salafist estimation. The introduction of the new penal 
codes had elicited two main popular dreams within the region - what Brigaglia (2015:182) would refer to as ‘Islamist 
and salafist utopia’. The first is a political dream based on the assumption that the implementation of the new Shari’a-
inspired penal codes would lead to the creation of a perfect, united, secure and corruption-free Islamic society. The 
second was a puritanical Salafist religious utopia, based on the assumption that the Shari’a reforms would ultimately 
empower the Salafi movement, providing it with new tools to enforce its creed and to implement ‘correct’ religious 
practices (Brigaglia, 2015:182). None of the two aspirations was fully realised in practice. 
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schools as well as Yan Izala’s sponsored university education in Saudi Arabia also did not provide 
enough career options. Positions within the Yan Izala and the new Ahlus Sunna were still occupied 
by either the first-generation Yan Izala members or people from the new emerging Ahlus Sunna. 
The young generation of Salafi activists thus found their career paths blocked and were 
increasingly prepared to dispute existing claims to leadership. Many of them who had material 
resources established their own schools. Others found careers as teachers, leaders of Islamic 
NGOs, or split from the main Salafi establishments to carve out a position for their own endeavours 
for religious reform (Loimeier, 2012; Umar, 2012). These kinds of conditions were far from what 
the Salafi al-Shari’a advocates had promised.  
It further exacerbated the tensions between the older Salafi leadership and younger generation of 
Salafi activists, and created silent protest among young Salafi actors, who increasingly began to 
perceive the older Salafis as colluding with the government in sabotaging the region’s al-Shari’a 
project. Some of these young zealous Salafi actors in the Kanama camp would provide the answer 
they want: an opportunity to live an authentic Salafi lifestyle, with a prospect of economic 
prosperity and freedom from all the un-Islamic practices of the Nigerian government and the old 
Salafi-establishments. Under the leadership of the Nigerian-born member of the al-Qaeda 
movement, Mohammed Ali, the group took the name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-jihad 
(the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). However, for 
their austere Salafi-motivated lifestyle that mimicked “the Taliban” in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
the Northern Nigerian public would start referring to them as the “Nigerian Taleban (sic)”.  
 
4.7 The al-Qaeda Influence: Connecting Material Resources to the Establishment of Kanama 
Camp 
Before now, it has been very difficult to connect al-Qaeda to the establishment of the Kanama 
camp. In fact, most previous research (Smith, 2016; Walker, 2016), including mine (Amaechi, 
2016; 2017), saw the Kanama camp more as a secluded community that housed mostly youths 
from the Ndimi mosque and other Salafi centres in the region, rather than an al-Qaeda specific 
camp. I have argued elsewhere (Amaechi, 2017: 65) that the Kanama did not quite seem like an 
al-Qaeda specific militant camp. Basing my argument on primary interview data from several 
individuals with members of the Nigerian Joint Task Force, I rather postulated along with other 
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researchers that the camp was more of a secluded community that housed mostly youths from the 
Ndimi mosque and other Salafi centres in the north. I also described the violent outburst that later 
occurred between the initial members of the camp and the security forces, as emerging from a 
simple dispute between members of the group and some of the villagers, regarding fishing rights. 
The violence, as I saw it then, escalated when the police tried to meddle in the peace process 
culminating finally in the Nigerian government’s raid on the camp72. In the aftermath of recent 
research (Kassim and Nwankpa, 2017; Kassim, 2018; Zenn, 2018) and a set of newly released 
letters73, detailing the internal functions and the corporations between BH and al-Qaeda; this 
description of Kanama camp does not seem to portray the whole picture of the reason behind the 
Kanama group’s use of violence. 
In a recent report for Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, United States Military Academy, 
Abdulbasit Kassim (2018:3-32) particularly detailed how the Kanama camp may have been fully 
funded by the al-Qaeda’s top leadership. In the report, the Nigerian US-based scholar explained 
how Mohammed Ali, who worked as the leader of the camp was not just a member of al-Qaeda, 
but a direct coordinator of the Osama bin Laden’s violent intended jihadi activity in Nigeria. 
According to him, Ali had contact both within the main al-Qaeda leadership and its affiliate group, 
Salafi Group for Preaching Combat (GSPC)74. Before returning to Nigeria, he had also studied 
under the late al-Qaeda leader’s teachers in Sudan, from 1991 to 1996 at the International 
University of Africa in Khartoum (Kassim, 2018:9). During this period, he had fought in 
                                                            
72 Brigaglia (2015) on the other hand had presented a different description of the Kanama camp. In his 2015 article, 
The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram, the South African 
based scholar presented Kanama as a sort of “outpost” of the Nigerian main Salafi establishment’s mission and an al-
Qaeda training camp, specifically designed for jihadi training purposes. Yusuf according to him had already been 
appointed by one Malam Hudu Muhammad, then Yobe State’s Commissioner of Religious Affairs, as the 
representative of Jakusko local government for the camp, by the time of the Nigerian security forces raided the camp. 
Brigaglia also dismissed previous reports about arguments over fishing rights as the cause of the Nigerian forces raid 
on the camp. Instead, he hypothesised that the decision to sanction the raid on the camp from the main Salafi 
establishments may have flown among other reasons from the fear that the Kanama camp had become an al-Qaeda 
training camp for jihad in Nigeria, rather in other countries such as the US and Israel, which most main Salafi actors 
including Adamu approved. In the light of new evidence about the inner functions of the group, Brigaglia’s hypothesis 
appears more plausible and accurate than most reports. Although his presumption that Yusuf was already in charge of 
the camp in 2002 may not be exactly accurate, his postulation that Kanama camp may have been an al-Qaeda training 
camp seems quite accurate. 
73 I will elaborate more on these letters in the next chapters. I will provide the contents of some of the letters and how 
they provide evidence of BH and al-Qaeda’s collaboration (and its affiliate, AQIM), from August 2009 to the 
beginning of 2011. 
74 GSPC has since 2007 changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after its alliance with al-Qaeda 
in 2007. 
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Afghanistan with al-Qaeda. Before leaving Sudan, he reportedly met with Osama Bin Laden, 
during which the latter asked him to organise a cell in Nigeria, with a budget of 300 million naira 
(approximately 3 million US $ as at then). It was probably some of this funding that enabled Ali 
to establish the camp when he returned to Nigeria in 2002.  
I find this report very credible. The channelling of funds for setting up an al-Qaeda infrastructure 
in Nigeria was not only consistent with al-Qaeda’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa it is also a 
fulfilment of al-Qaeda’s long-time goal in the Nigeria. During this period, bin Laden never hid his 
interest in Nigeria. In a tape ascribed to him in 2003, he explicitly explained that his group had a 
long-term goal of establishing a jihadi “battlefront in Nigeria”, a situation he believed was needed 
to liberate Muslims in the country75. In a tape he allegedly released in 2003, he also explicitly 
mentioned Nigeria as a country where Muslims needed to be liberated. This plan was also 
corroborated by Abubakr Naji (2004), believed to be a top al-Qaeda insider76. In a book published 
on online, Idārat at-Tawaḥḥušh: Akhṭar marḥalah satamurru bihā l ‘ummah Idarat al-Tawahhush 
(Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Islamic Nation Will Pass), 
the supposed al-Qaeda insider classified Nigeria together with Jordan, Maghreb, Pakistan, and 
Haramayn (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) as some of the countries of priority for al-Qaeda, because 
of the readiness of its people to accept the initiative of jihad. If this is the case, disbursing fund for 
the establishment of such a camp, would seem like a step towards the fulfilment of this long-term 
goal.  
Another interesting piece of evidence that further supports the argument that there could be a real 
signature of al-Qaeda in the formation of the Kanama camp could have been found in the court 
transcripts77 from a trial of an al-Qaeda member, convicted in an Eastern District Court of New 
York (United States of America against Ibrahim Suleiman Adnan Adam Harun) in 2017. 
According to the transcripts, the Pakistan-based leadership of al-Qaeda delegated a Nigerien 
                                                            
75 “Tape Ascribed to Osama bin‐Laden Urging Muslims to Stand with Iraq,” as Cited by Kassim, 2018: 11. Also, see 
Neil MacFarquhar’s article on New York Times, February 12, 2003, “Tape Ascribed to bin‐Laden Urges Muslims to 
Stand with Iraq”available online at:https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/12/world/threats‐responses‐terrorists‐
tape‐ascribed‐bin‐laden‐urges‐muslims‐stand‐with.html. 
 
76 Michael W. S. Ryan (2010), has identified Abubakr Naji as a top al-Qaeda Operative. 
77 These court transcripts became public in March 2017, after the trial. It is available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-nyed-1_12-cr-00134/pdf/USCOURTS-nyed-1_12-cr-00134-1.pdf. 
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Ibrahim Harun to meet with people from the Kanama camp and the GSPC in Nigeria as early as 
2002. The Nigerian was supposed to coordinate with one of Ali Mohammed’s deputies, 
Muhammed Ashafa. The court believes this individual to be a Saudi-born Nigerian, but a member 
of the Ali group. The two individuals were supposed to be sent to Niger Republic for trainings 
with AQIM. Together with AQIM, they were supposed to develop skills to scout more activists to 
help them bomb the U.S. embassy or other U.S. and Israeli interests in Nigeria. The plans were 
halted because Ashafa was arrested in Pakistan. The court transcript also explains how 
communication between Harun and the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan continued back and forth, 
from Nigeria, to Niger and Pakistan, on what to do next after Ashafa was arrested. In 2005, he fled 
to Libya where he was arrested. Later in 2011, he was put on a boat by the Libyan government to 
Italy, where he was re-arrested and extradited to the United States for his role in killing two U.S. 
soldiers in Afghanistan. He was implicated in this by his fingerprints found on a Qu’ran left at the 
scene of the crime. The Eastern District of New York in March 2017 would find him guilty. These 
cordinations means that by the time the Kanama camp was established in 2002, al-Qaeda already 
had a strong presence in Nigeria and had plans to carry out al-Qaeda’ missions in Nigeria. The 
Kanama was probably meant to be the base from which such missions would be coordinated. 
Nobody would have been more qualified than Ali, himself, who was already known within the al-
Qaeda circle. 
There is a gap in the literature on how much collaboration may have existed between Ali and Yusuf 
in the formation of the camp. However, a close reading of the recent released letters between 
AQIM and BH’s leadership after 2009, and interview data from my respondents reveal that it was 
likely Ali, not Yusuf who ran the camp. None of the letters between Shekau and the AQIM 
leadership showed that Yusuf was already known within the al-Qaeda circle. In fact, in Shekau’s 
first letter to AQIM, he specifically made effort to explain to the AQIM leadership who Yusuf 
Mohammed was. He also explained how he (Yusuf) had built and established a centre in Maiduguri 
in 2005. From the letter, it was clear that Yusuf was not known within the AQIM or al-Qaeda 
circle. In their response, al-Qaeda (through AQIM’s leadership) expressed their condolence, but 
also showed complete lack of knowledge of who Yusuf was. If Yusuf was the one who ran the 
camp probably funded by their parent Organisation, there was no way, he would not have been 
known within the AQIM leadership circle. Ali on the contrary was known within the al-Qaeda 
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circle. Having himself fought in Afghanistan and having met with the Osama bin Laden, it is easy 
to surmise that he must have gained the al-Qaeda leadership’s trust. Hence disbursing funds to him 
and trusting him to establish and coordinate the group’s mission in Nigeria seems quite natural 
from the al-Qaeda circle.  
Interview data from some of the Salafi scholars who knew Yusuf from the Ndimi mosque also 
corroborate this narrative. In discussing the role of Yusuf in the actual establishment of the Kanama 
camp, my respondents were quite certain that Yusuf could not have been involved in the actual 
formation and running of the Kanama camp. Two of my Salafi respondents specifically explained 
that Yusuf could not have run the day to day activities of the camp because Kanama camp was 
never really his project. They argued that it was rather, Ali’s project. They explained how when 
Ali returned to Nigeria around 2002, he had travelled to many states of Nigeria trying to propagate 
his new-found extreme jihadi ideology to the religious leaders in the region, including 
themselves78, (the Salafi clerics). According to them, “the only person, who supported that kind of 
message was Yusuf”. However, they were quick to point out that Yusuf also differed with Ali, 
when it came to the question of the appropriate time to start the jihad in Nigeria:  
On the issue of when was the right time to start jihad, Yusuf and Ali never agreed. 
While for Ali, Nigeria as at then was ripe for jihad, Yusuf favoured the idea that they 
should delay the jihad until there is no excuse of “ignorance” by the political leaders 
that they should govern by the only law approved by Allah. …Other than this, Yusuf 
also wanted to wait until when they have more  
popular support in the region79.  
The schism between Ali Mohammed and Yusuf has also been corroborated by recent studies 
(Kassim, 2018:10-11). In discussing the schism between Ali and Yusuf, Kassim explains that both 
men differed on two main positions that other Salafi clerics in the region (especially after 2000) 
commonly accepted. First, the issue of ruling by any source, other than God’s laws. For both men, 
this was a major unbelief and polytheism. In fact, they believed that it should lead to 
excommunication from Islam (Kassim, 2018:13). The second issue was about al-`udhr bi-l-jahl 
                                                            
78 This has also been corroborated in Kassim’s (2018) article. 
79 Interview by the author with an anonymous Salafi cleric in Kano (March 2018) 
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and Iqamat al-dalil/al-Hujja (about declaration of takfir on political rulers). Here both men also 
agree that it is accepted to declare takfir even before tafsil (investigation by Muslim scholars) on 
such rulers who rule by other laws other than al-Shari’a. However, both men disagree on when it 
is appropriate to declare this and thus on the time for jihad. For Ali, it is not obligatory to establish 
the Islamic evidence on the political rulers before declaring jihad against them because none of 
them can claim to be ignorant of God’s command to rule with His laws as opposed to secular laws. 
Yusuf on the other hand believed that before embarking on jihad on such apostate rulers, Islamic 
evidence (Iqamat al-dalil/al-Hujja) should be established against them through proselytism.  
Kassim also cited an interview by Abu Aisha, a former member of Yusuf’s inner circle who was 
interviewed for a documentary on Boko Haram. In the interview, Mr Aisha recounted the dispute 
between Ali Mohammed and Yusuf over the appropriate time to declare jihad. He said:  
We encountered differences of opinion when we started the struggle. Some of us 
understood that it was not yet the appropriate time to declare jihad, while those who 
fought in Kanama during the administration of Obasanjo believed it was the 
appropriate time to declare 'jihad'. Our reason for postponing the declaration of jihad 
at that time is because we reasoned that the people are yet to fully understand the 
religion, and we thought they should be given an excuse since our main goal is the 
elevation of the religion. So, we considered it as a necessity for us to propagate the 
religion and convince the people with evidence from the Shari’a until the time when 
they have no excuse before what should happen happens (Abu Aisha, quoted in 
Kassim, 2018:11). 
Kassim’s point was that Yusuf believed that armed struggle against the Nigerian State should not 
be started until the true message of Islam has been properly preached to the different corners of 
the region. Although like most Salafis, he believed in appropriateness of using armed struggle 
against democratically elected governments; he was convinced that it was not yet time to use this 
strategy against the Nigerian State. In his view such a strategy should be sanctioned only when 
activists had been well indoctrinated on the religion, and they have been well prepared on how to 
use this strategy against the secular rulers. From this conviction, it is unlikely that he (Yusuf) was 
fully involved in the activities of the Kanama camp. In fact, when it became obvious that Yusuf 
was not going to give-in on the issue of starting an arm struggle against the Nigerian state after the 
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Kanama camp has been established, Ali and his group would declare takfir on him. Yusuf 
recounted this takfir in an audio lecture many years later80. It is unlikely that both men had worked 
strictly together in the Kanama project. Kanama was likely Ali’s/al-Qaeda project. With the help 
of al-Qaeda, Ali was able to establish the camp. Having a huge financial resource from Osama bin 
Laden, and the disposition to flee the antecedents of the intra-Salafi disputes at the time, he did not 
have much significant problem attracting many new young generations of Salafi adherents to the 
Kanama camp.  
Through Osama bin Laden’s financial support, Ali was able to not only establish the camp at 
Kanama, but also to attract the youths from different parts of the region to come to the camp. By 
mid-2003, he and his activists had started training and waging “violent jihad” against the Nigerian 
state from Kanama. They attacked government buildings, including police stations, a local 
government secretariat and a government lodge (Kassim, 2018:11). On September 21st, 2003 
particularly, they staged attacks against police stations in Bama and Gwoza (in the neighbouring 
Borno state). In this instance, they over-powered the police officers at the stations and made-away 
with most of their local ammunitions, including at least about five AK 47s. The Nigerian 
government could not watch them start such a violent attack. In collaboration with the local Yobe 
state police, they launched a serious violent crackdown that dismantled the Kanama camp within 
four days. The result of the raid was that Muhammed Ali and dozens of his boys from the camp 
were killed. Yusuf himself, who was at this time known by the Nigerian authorities, fled to Saudi 
Arabia. He stayed there for about one year. He was only allowed to return to Nigeria through the 
assistance of many political figures within the region, (particularly the then deputy governor of 
Borno state Alhaji Adamu Shettima Yuguda Dibal and Adamu, his old mentor), on the promise 
that he would not propagate violence. Following his return, he moved the group’s base from 
Kanama to Maiduguri. Given more funding from Saudi Arabia, he built a new centre that attracted 
some of the former boys from Ndimi mosque, who had earlier gone to the Kanama camp. From 
there, the group grew from strength to strength becoming one of most vocal activist jihadi groups 
in the region (I will elaborate more on this in the next chapter).   
                                                            
80 Yusuf details this in his lecture “Clearing the doubts” recorded around 2006/2007 in Kano. I have not heard the 
audio version of this lecture myself; however, a detailed written version of the lecture has been presented by Kassim 
and Nwankpa (2017:35-41). 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter has presented the socio-political, ideological and the organisational background upon 
which BH evolved in Northern Nigeria. It presented this through the analysis of six main political 
opportunity structures: The Northern Nigerian culture of Islamic activism evolving from the 
history of Islam in the region; the Northern Nigerian Colonial legacy; Northern people’s Congress; 
the Nigerian return to democracy in 1999; the intra-ideological dispute between the two main 
Salafi-networks (Izala, and Ahlus Sunna); and mobilisation of resources from cooperation with al-
Qaeda, particularly Osama Bin Laden. Its central argument was that these main 
structures/conditions provided the political opportunities upon which Mohammed Ali (2002, 
Kanama) and later Mohammed Yusuf (2005, Maiduguri) established the group in the region.  
First, the chapter traced BH’s religio-political activism to Usman dan Fodio’s jihad and subsequent 
establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, where the use of violent activism was justified as a 
legitimate tool against Hausa despotic rulers and state oppositions. It explained how this unique 
religio-political history had bequeathed the region with a unique identity that encouraged the 
formation of opposition activists’ group and the use and justification of violence as a legitimate 
tool against state oppositions. Based on this unique history, Islam became a unique resource upon 
which political activism are galvanised and mobilised against state opposition, within the region.  
This phenomenon was further exacerbated by the colonial legacies and consequent secular 
Nigerian state that emerged at independence. With the region’s al-Shari’a foundation being 
threatened by the Western-based system of the colonial state, more opportunity for religious 
opposition against the state emerged. Having a prospect of independence easily transformed to the 
formation of a political party (NPC), that towed along regional and Islamic lines. In the contexts 
of political agitations that are defined along regional and ethno-religious at the end of Nigerian 
civil war, this helped make Islam the marker of identity and a tool for political contention in the 
region. In situations whereby one region or religious group is not represented in the country’s 
federal character, the situation is easily interpreted as a “political marginalisation”, and Islam is 
easily used as a tool to galvanise socio-political against state opposition.  
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This was the case in the dawn of a new democracy in 1999, when Obasanjo, a Southern Christian 
former Military head of state won the Nigerian Presidency in 1999. The political opportunity that 
emanated from this led to increased advocacy for Shari’a activism, conceived to be the right system 
to return the region to its correct economic, religious and political path. Led by different Islamic 
organisations, this became the trademark of socio-political activism within the region. By 2001, 
all the twelve states in the region had adopted Shari’a as their respective states’ penal codes. With 
the freedom democracy afforded, this came pretty easy.  
However, the enthronement of the Shari’a did not create the much desired “true Islamic” 
environment as most of the actors who championed it within the Salafi networks had promised. It 
also did not necessarily create the much-needed economic boom or the procurement of a corrupt 
free environment, as the Salafi activists had advocated during the al-Shari’a advocacy. These, as 
time went on, ignited silent protest among young Salafi adherents, who felt betrayed by the main 
Salafi establishment. Empowered by a rising Salafi actor (Mohammed Yusuf), who had pounced 
on the political opportunity created by this, as well as the feelings of “political marginalisation” in 
the region (from Obasanjo’s Presidency), these young Salafi adherents left the old Salafi 
establishments to join the newly established al-Qaeda-funded movement in Kanama. At Kanama, 
these groups of youths, easily found a natural home to practice their faith without being 
compromised by the corrupt Islamic establishments and their Nigerian state collaborators.  
However, within two years, the Nigerian government dismantled the camp. Ali, the leader of the 
group and many other members of the group were killed. However, Yusuf who had been the 
spiritual leader of the group, survived. Following his return from self-imposed exiled in Saudi 
Arabia, he would move the group’s base from Kanama to Maiduguri. Using funding from Saudi 
Arabia, he built a new centre that attracted some of the former Kanama boys, who survived the 
previous raid. From here, the group grew from strength to strength, becoming one of most vocal 
activist jihadi group in the region. The analysis also showed that Ali had been able to establish the 
Kanama camp because of the financial assistance he received, very likely from al-Qaeda. These 
material resources combined with other political structures within the region provided him with 
the window of opportunity to both establish the group, as well as attract other Salafi activists who 
had stayed earlier at the Kanama camp. 
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All these demonstrates the significance of political opportunity structures in the formation of 
Salafi-oriented groups. As the analysis demonstrates, Salafi-oriented groups are much like regular 
social movement organisations. They do not evolve in a vacuum; instead, they are sensitive to the 
specific conditions and the political structures present within the socio-political environment they 
identify. It is these structures that provided the needed political opportunity to establish their 
groups. In the presence of such political structures, activists can draw from the political 
opportunity structures to establish their organisations. 
Different from many previous analysis on Kanama camp, I found particularly the availability of 
funds a very important resource for establishment of such groups. The ability of religious actors 
such as Ali, to form new associations or collectivise their religio-political activism has a lot to do 
with their ability to mobilize resources and to conduct their organisation on the basis of planned 
and rational action. Social movement scholars, such as Jeroen Gunning and Ilan Baron (2013),  
McAdam et. al. (2001) and Tilly (2004) have in the past pointed out that even though there could 
ideological motivations or strain/conflict within organisations, such elements may not necessarily 
be transformed to a mobilisation of new movements. Rather this happens in the presense of 
resources. Such resources, provides movement actors with the political opportunity and rational 
orientation for action. Religious actors like regular social movement actors should not be 
understood as actors that only operates under the sway of ideological conflicts, sentiments, or 
emotions. Rather, they should be understood in terms of the logic of the availability of incentives, 
costs and benefits, as well as opportunities. In the absence of such resources, even in the case of 
many grievances and ideological motivations, activists may not be necessarily able to mobilise 
and form their organisations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: BOKO HARAM’S USE AND JUSTIFICATION OF ARMED 
VIOLENCE  
  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the emergence of BH was discussed, arguing that the evolution of the 
group is better understood in the context of six main political opportunities. This chapter is a 
continuation of that narrative. However, in addition to the analysis of the different conditions that 
influenced the adoption of violence, the chapter will also discuss the different mobilisatory 
conditions and resources which the group’s leadership could call upon that encouraged the use of 
this strategy. The chapter is prefaced with a discussion of how Mohammed Yusuf was able to build 
the group when he returned from Saudi Arabia; what the group’s goals were, and how it grew to 
become a very formidable activist organisation with branches in different parts of the region. There 
is also an analysis of how two main conditions created a political opportunity for the adoption of 
this strategy: the group’s involvement with the local Borno state politics; and the violent 
interactions and engagements with the Nigerian security forces created the political opportunity 
for the adoption of this strategy. The chapter concluded that even though the group had 
ideologically already moved to jihadi positions at the time it was established in Maiduguri, it was 
the fall-out from these conditions that catalysed the decision to use this strategy (violence) in 2009.  
 
5.2 From Kanama to Maiduguri: The Reign of Yusuf as the Leader of Boko Haram  
After the destruction of the Kanama camp in December 2003, most of the people who survived 
the raid dispersed to various Northern Nigerian cities. Others who had contacts with GSPC, fled 
and joined the SOMO group in the Sahara Desert and Algeria (Kassim, 2018:11). Yusuf himself, 
who was at that time known by the Nigerian authorities fled to Saudi Arabia. For his suspected 
involvement with the group in Kanama, “the Nigerian Taleban”, he was declared wanted by the 
Nigerian police. He stayed in Saudi Arabia, for about one year. While in Saudi Arabia, he held 
series of talks with many actors in the region including the very same Adamu Jafar, whom he had 
a doctrinal disagreement with, before the Nigerian government dismantled of the Kanama camp. 
He also met with the Deputy Governor of Borno State, Adamu Dibal, who in 2005 was also in 
Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage. According to Kassim (2018), Adamu at this time advised him to hire 
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a lawyer and explain his lack of involvement with the Kanama group to the Nigerian security 
forces. It is not clear that Yusuf eventually hired a lawyer as was advised by Adamu. What is clear 
however, is that both men (Adamu and Dibal) worked together to facilitate Yusuf’s return to 
Nigeria at that time. Together, they negotiated for his return to Nigeria (Kassim, 2018:12; Zenn, 
2018:121), on the promise that he would not support jihadi violence against the Nigerian state.   
Upon his return in Nigria, Yusuf focused on building up his own group. He is credited to have 
openly condemned the use of violence against the Nigerian state by the Kanama group. He 
acknowledged that although the youths had studied under him, and that he shared their goals, he 
“never urged them to use violence” (Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:32). Considering Yusuf’s 
ideological position, this is most likely correct. Almost all my sources agree that what was more 
important for Yusuf at this time was to build up a “new organisation”. He wanted to build a 
formidable and more popular organisation, within which it would be possible to bring about the 
much needed al-Shari’a change in the region.  
In earnest, he convened an internal meeting that included most of the dispersed members of the 
“Nigerian Taleban” from the Kanama camp, most of whom he had known from his time at the 
Ndimi mosque. After the meeting, they all pledged their allegiance and to listen and obey his 
commands in his upcoming activism and rebuilding process (Kassim, 2018:11). In the beginning, 
Yusuf used a makeshift venue outside his home to set-up the base for the group. After some 
months, he relocated to a permanent site in a land donated to him by his father in-law, Baba Fugu 
Mohammed, who was also an influential businessman in the city81. It is not clear where Yusuf got 
all the funds he used to do all this at this time82. However, what is obvious is that Yusuf had some 
sort of funding by the time he returned to Nigeria. With this funding, he was able to begin the 
building process of the new group.  
                                                            
81 Anonymous interview by the author with a police officer in Kaduna (March 2017). 
82 All my respondents were quite unsure where Yusuf got the initial money, he used to rebuild his group. Some who 
tried to provide answer speculated that the funding may have come from the Saudi Arabian government. However, 
knowing Yusuf’s ability at this time, I didn’t find this credible. Looking at previous literature, I also did not find 
evidence of financial support between Yusuf and either the Saudi government or other tangible actors. Most scholarly 
discussions about this were quite speculative (Zenn, 2018:121; Kassim, 2018:11). Here, Yusuf’s funds during this 
period were credited to have come from his ‘friends’ in Saudi Arabia. This is not clear enough. Moreover, who these 
friends were, remain unknown. 
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A quick explanation of Yusuf’s personal life at this juncture is important to help capture the 
background against which the former Ahlus Sunna activist established the group in the region. The 
story about Yusuf’s personal life is not quite clear. However, some of my respondents who knew 
him from the Ndimi mosque explained that he was born in 1970 in a very poor family in Girgir 
village of Jakusko local government, in the present day Yobe State83. He is described as a “self-
made man”, in terms of how he managed to achieve what he did despite his poor economic 
background84. He is credited to have been financially responsible for his education, studying up to 
a diploma level in the University85. It is also believed that he was first introduced to his radical 
jihadi ideas by his father, who was a poor imam that ran a Tsangaya Qur’anic school. According 
to my source86, he was so radical with his criticisms of Western education at that time, that the 
Emir of Gasua considered him dangerous to his Emirate. As a result, he was expelled from the 
Gasua Emirate. He would later move to Kano in a place called Regionsaki where he continued his 
teachings. He later joined forces with Marwa, during the reign of the Maitatsine movement. He is 
believed to have been killed during the security forces’ raid on the Maitatsine movement in 198087.  
Growing up without his parents, Yusuf eventually found his way to Maiduguri; the Borno state’s 
main economic centre. It was there that he met Baba Fugu Mohammed, who later become a sort 
of a foster parent to him. According to my sources, Yusuf would for his devotion, dedication and 
hard work in his business, be taken in by Fugu88. He (Yusuf) ended up marrying one of Fugu’s 
daughters; they have about three children together. Yusuf also had three other wives, with whom 
he had nine more children. It was on the basis of this personal relationship with Baba Fugu 
Mohammed, that he got the land from him to build his new centre. He named the centre Ibn 
Taymiyyah, after the famous thirteenth century Islamic cleric, whose writings have strongly 
influenced modern Wahabbi/Salafi thoughts. This centre, according to most of my sources, was 
well planned. It had a mosque, a school building and several guest rooms, to accommodate the old 
students from the Ndimi mosque and the Kanama camp; as well as the new students, who are 
                                                            
83 Interview by the author with an anonymous police officer in Kaduna (March 2017) 
84 Interview by the author with anonymous Police officer in Kaduna (February 2017) 
85 Interview by the author with anonymous Izala cleric in Kano (March 2018).  
86 Interview by the author with an anonymous police officer in Kaduna in Kaduna (March 2017) 
87 Anonymous interview by the author with a JTF member in Abuja (February 2017).  
88 Interview by the author with several police respondents and the religious clerics in Kaduna and Kano (March 2017).  
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joining the group from different parts of the Northern Nigeria, and from mostly the Kanuri regions 
of Niger and Chad (Onuoha, 2015).  
To distinguish his group from the previous Kanama group, Yusuf would take the name 
Jama’atuAhlisSunnLidda’awatiwal-jihad (the People Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), rather than Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunnah 
and the Community of Muslims) that was associated to the Kanama group. Together with some of 
the significant actors in the group, Yusuf was also involved with dawah campaigns in different 
states of the region. They travelled to different parts of the region, preaching and selling the group’s 
message to the people, especially to the youths. By 2007, Yusuf’s group had established branches 
in some of the important states within the region, (especially in Bauchi, Adamawa, and Katsina 
and even in Diffa in Niger). From these centres, Yusuf made sermons, where he tried to spread the 
group’s message. From time to time, he also released these sermons as DVDs, audio cassettes and 
pamphlets to the public. These helped popularised the group and drew many youths to his centre.  
The way Yusuf structured his group bore full inprints of a typical movement organisation. First, 
the organisation had a hierarchical structure that had Yusuf at the top as both the spiritual leader, 
and the commander-in-chief (amir ul-‘aam) of the organisation. He was assisted by three deputies 
(na’ib amir ul-‘aam I and II). Under the deputies, there was the apex executive Shura Council 
(decision-making), made up of the heads of the different centres. The function of this council inter 
alia was to over-see and deliberate on the most important decisions of the organisation. Each of 
the centres of the organisation, particularly that of Yobe, Katsina, Adamawa and Bauchi states 
where the group had its biggest influence and corresponding branches were represented in the 
council. The centres also have their own mini Shura councils (Onuoha, 2015). The figure 1 below 
is a hypothetical representation organisational structure of the organisation during Yusuf’s days. 
 
 
Figure 1 
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This hierarchical and organisational structure made it easier not only for communication, but also 
for a fostering of a sense of opportunity for a career path within the organisation.  
On socio-political aspects, BH’s activisms were defined by Yusuf’s advocacy for an Islamic-based 
theocratic (al-Shari’a) system of government. Like most Salafi actors within the two Salafi 
establishments, he rejected Western-based democratic system of government. For Yusuf: 
Democracy positions the people as an authority in rivalry with God. From 
democracy, multiple evils flowed, all of them cloaked as freedom: for example, 
“freedom of belief “allowed for apostasy from Islam. ...Democracy “is the school 
of the infidels: following it, having dealings with it, or using its system is unbelief... 
(Yusuf, 2009:63). 
In the Nigerian case, he traced the establishment of this system to British colonialism and 
consequent introduction of secular values (boko). For him, it was because of this system that the 
region had become defined by what he and other Salafi establishments conceived as religious 
weaknesses, moral decadence and socio-economic disadvantage (Yusuf, 2009)89. Hence, it must 
be rejected. Thus, he maintained an extremist version of the region's Salafi tenets, such that unlike 
his fellow Salafi actors, he disapproved participation in employment in institutions coming from 
democracy, including working with the Nigerian government. For him a “true Muslim” cannot 
                                                            
89 This idea was also repeated in an interview with anonymous Ahlus Sunna cleric in Kaduna (March 2017). 
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reject Western democracy and yet work within an institution that is established by the same system 
he rejects. Such a practice is simply illogical, because the two issues form part of the same package. 
Hence, such practices are haram (forbidden) (Yusuf, 2009). 
Another major area of disagreement between Yusuf and the Ahlus Sunna leadership, was on the 
status of the Nigerian state and its institutions. Yusuf questioned the authority of the state and these 
institutions, particularly, the police and the other security forces. In the course of his heated 
disputes with many within the region, he would refuse to recognise the Sultan of Sokoto as the 
nominal head of all Nigerian Muslims, in some occasions regarding him as “Sarkin Sokoto”, i.e. 
“King of Sokoto”, rather than that of the Muslims in the region (Thurston, 2016). All these 
institutions are for Yusuf, imposed institutions, coming from the colonial imposed system of 
government of Nigeria. Hence, they should be rejected by all true Muslims.  
As a solution, Yusuf presented s strict al-Shari’a theocratic system, and a return to Qur’anic 
dictates that governed the Northern Nigeria before the colonial era. For him, the Shari’a law is a 
perfect and complete. “It is appropriate in every time and place, globally” (Yusuf, 2009: 143). It 
is also the only way to restore the region (and by extension, the country) to its rightful religious, 
political, social and moral path. Thus, it is imperative for every true Muslim, including religious 
and political leaders to join in this advocacy.  
Yusuf’s ideas on how to change to this system was also quite consistent with the then mainline 
Salafi thoughts within the region, (at least before the main Salafi actors began to take a more 
moderate turn90). Like most actors (including his former mentor Adamu), he preached and 
supported the type of Salafi cannon that favoured political change through arm struggle 
(Anonymous, 2012:120-122). Consistent with this kind of preaching, he frequently extoled people 
like Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, Sayyid Qutb, and Hassan al-Banna as the type of Salafi actors 
who had followed the true path of Islam (Anonymous, 2012; Mamoud, 2018: 90). In this sense, 
Yusuf also demonstrated an overlapping thought with other international SOMOs, which in turn 
provided the ideological underpinnings for his movement.  
                                                            
90 Andrea Brigaglia (2015) and Kassim (2018) had brilliantly analysed how the main establishments had initially 
supported jihadi violence but took a more moderate tone at the dawn of Shari’a  implementations after 1999. I will 
elaborate on this a bit more in the next section.  
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However, on the question of when the right time is to use armed struggle against secular political 
leaders; Yusuf’s ideas were quite complicated. As I have explained in the previous chapter, even 
though he promoted al-Shari’a system, he was skeptical (at least from the begining) on the need 
to use arm struggle against political leaders. Unlike the leader of the previously dismantled 
Kanama camp, he was quick to point out that such strategy must be applied after enough Islamic 
evidence must have been established (Iqamat al-dalil/al-Hujja) against them through proselytism; 
when such rulers would no longer use ignorance as an excuse (Kassim, 2018:12). Applying this in 
the Nigerian context, Yusuf believed that such strategy should be delayed until the true message 
of Islam has been properly established through proselytisation. Within such contexts, secular 
political rulers would not only be able to use ‘ignorance’ as an excuse, the delays would have given 
his organisation an opportunity to attract a large followership and support communities, which 
would be better indoctrinated to fight jihad against such secular rulers (Kassim, 2018:12).  
From 2005 to 2007, Yusuf consistently spread these messages. Throughout these years, he and his 
group operated more like a moderate revivalist activist group, attempting to change the region and 
country’s political system. Yusuf intentionally avoided violent confrontation with the state. 
Despite his support for armed struggle, he and his group generally abstained from the use of 
violence against either the Nigeria state, or any of the local state governments within the region. 
The group only officially adopted and subsequently used violence against the Nigerian State in 
June 2009, after they had become well established in the region, and had been involved with the 
local Borno state government on different levels. Below is an analysis of how these inter-relations 
and involvement with the local Borno state politics created the political opportunity for the 
adoption of this strategy.   
5.3 The Beginning of Armed Struggle against the Nigerian State  
Two main conditions accelerated BH’s adoption and use of armed struggle in 2009: the group’s 
brief involvement in the state’s institutionalised political system and the Nigerian government’s 
violent repression of the group. 
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5.3.1 Involvement in the Borno State’s Institutionalised Political System91 
The influence of activists’ involvement in institutionalised political system in investigating the 
temporality of jihadi violence in a SOMO against a state is important because it bears directly on 
the question of “reform versus revolution” (Wiktorowicz and Hafez, 2004:66). Within the SMT 
scholarship, this specific condition has been investigated both in general and in specific contexts, 
as a condition propitious for determining the adoption of violence in social movement scholarship 
(Wiktorowicz and Hafez, 2004; Hafez, 2004; Godwin, 1997). In this case, a social movement 
organisation is assumed to be less likely to adopt violent activism, when its leadership or 
individuals within its leadership have procedural and substantive involvement in the state’s 
institutionalised political system(s). Involvement here could be in the form of political 
appointments, positions within the state policy making institutions, becoming a member(s) of 
parliament or even informal ties with individuals within the state institutions. Thus, operating 
within such institutions, activists can exert political influence on the state, negotiate better reform 
agendas, communicate with the state, or assert some form of formal or informal pressure that 
enables the state to change its laws or policies, in line with the group’s goal (Hafez, 2004: 37-60; 
Wiktorowicz and Hafez, 2004:61-88). Hence, such groups are less likely to adopt less conventional 
tactics such as violence because they have access to these traditional options, within which it is 
easier to bring about the desired socio-political change. On the contrary, social movement 
organisations are more likely to adopt violent activism when its activists are cut-off from the states’ 
formal policy-making channels or institutions, especially after some periods of having such 
involvements. In the absence of such involvement, activists are not only likely going to struggle 
to exert influence (effect policy change), they are also likely going to be limited from using 
conventional means to achieve their goals. This, thereby, reinforced the disposition for 
unconventional means such as violence, and it increased the possibility for its adoption as a 
strategy for goal attainment (Amaechi, 2017; Godwin, 1997; Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004). 
Jeff Goodwin’s (1997) study of collective violent revolutions in “developing countries” illustrates 
this, very succinctly. In this case, the American social movement scholar showed how movement 
                                                            
91 In social movement scholarship the term “institutionalised political system” is often used as a broader socio-political 
category, to refer to the set of formal state institutions such as the executive bodies, judiciary organisations, 
parliaments, government ministries, policy implementing agencies -and informal mechanisms, procedures and policy 
styles by which state elite governs. 
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organisations, particularly those in authoritarian regimes, tend to be more violent and revolutionary 
in “countries that are more exclusive” (that is: countries where movements have no access to 
institutionalised political institutions) than in countries where groups have more access to 
institutional politics. The social movement organisations’ lack of access to the state 
institutionalised politics re-enforces their resolve for the adoption of violence against authoritarian 
state opposition. “Exclusive regimes”, he argues, “tend to incubate radical collective action: those 
who specialise in it tend to prosper because they come to be viewed by many people as more 
realistic and potentially effective than political moderates, who themselves come to be viewed as 
hopelessly ineffective” (Godwin 1997:18). On the contrary, “an accessible political system 
discourages the sense that the state is ‘un-reformable’, or that it is an instrument of a narrow class 
or clique and (accordingly) needs to be overhauled” (Godwin, 1997:18).  
Mohammed Hafez and Quentin Wiktorowicz’s (2004, 61- 88) also made a similar analysis in their 
discussion of the use of violence against the Egyptian state by Salafi-oriented Gama al-Islamiyya 
group in the late 1990s. Literature showed how the Egyptian government’s limiting of political 
involvement of opposition actors to the state’s institutionalised political systems (what they called 
“political deliberation”), after some tangible opening of state institutions, made it so difficult that 
the initially moderate Islamist group could no longer legitimately expand their political influence. 
This set the context for the formation of the Gama al-Islamiyya, within which violence was 
justified as a strategy to exert influence. Thus, in violence the activists easily saw an effective 
alternative, (which in their judgement is properly justified due to their exclusion from the state 
institutionalised political system). Using such strategy, they would not only be able to put pressure 
on the Egyptian government, they would also be able to achieve their goals. Hafez and 
Wiktorowicz’s point here is that the ability to effect major political influence due to involvement 
in institutionalised political systems provides movements with the possibility to be directly 
engaged with the state through other forms of legal or systematic contention whereas inability to 
effect change due to lack of involvement on the other hand minimises options and hastens the need 
to resort to radical strategies that is already incubated in such groups. When groups are excluded 
from the formal and informal institutionalised system of governments, violent activism often easily 
presents itself as the best possible option to exert influence.  
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In investigating BH’s case, I saw similar, but slightly different patterns in the adoption of violence 
in 2009. Despite having already developed his jihadi ideological positions, Yusuf’s final resolve 
to use violence on the Nigerian security forces (further on the different elements within the local 
Yobe and Borno state governments), grew much later, after he and his group had become involved 
and had worked closely with the Borno state government. It is believed that amid his group’s 
growing influence in Maiduguri in 2006-2007, the All Nigeria’s People’s Congress (ANPC)92 
gubernatorial candidate, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff allegedly sought the support of Yusuf and his 
group, during his campaigns for a second term as the governor of Borno. Strictly from a political 
perspective, this makes perfect sense, since Yusuf’ whose growing youth following could bring 
significant electoral votes. In return for this support, Sheriff promised a stricter implementation of 
Shari’a law, (something BH had been advocating for), if he wins (Brigaglia, 2015; Smith 2015). 
Yusuf’s group went as far as occasionally joining the governor in some of his campaign rallies. In 
some of such cases, they stood by the governor, allowing themselves to be used as political thugs 
during the campaigns93. As expected, Sheriff won the election. For the second time, became the 
governor of the state. Upon his electoral victory, he appointed Buju Foi94, as his Commissioner of 
                                                            
92 ANPC was the Nigerian main opposition political party at the dawn of Nigerian return to democracy in 1999. In the 
run-off to the 2015 Presidential election, the party had merged with other small opposition parties to form new party 
All Progressive Congress (APC). The party defeated the former ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2015 
election. 
93 The use of youths as political thugs is not new to Nigerian Politics. In the past several of such youths have been 
reported to have been used by the Nigerian politicians (including those in the South) as thugs in run‐up to 
elections. Here, they are used to harass, intimidate opponents and snatch ballot boxes if there is a suspicion that 
the election results were not going their way. But once the elections are over, the politicians often stop paying 
them and leave them to their fates (Smith, 2015). This was what happened in the Sheriff’s case with the youths 
from the Yusuf camp. These youths worked for the governor during the elections. But as soon as the elections 
ended, the governor tried to distance himself from them. This information has also been corroborated by a White 
Paper report from the Nigerian Former Interior Minister, Abba Moro, who headed the Nigerian government 
committee, mandated by the government in 2011 to look into youth recruitment in the Boko Haram crisis. In the 
report, the former minister traced in detail the assimilation of some of the youth militias known within the region 
as ECOMOG, (in reference to the West African military force formally stationed in War‐ravished African countries) 
into BH after the 2007 election. The Report claims that some of these thugs were armed and were used extensively 
as political thugs during the 2007 gubernatorial election. But having achieved their primary purpose, the politicians 
left the militias to their fate after the elections. With no visible means of sustenance, some of the militias 
gravitated towards religious extremism, the type offered by Mohammed Yusuf. The government White Paper 
Report is still available from Ini Ekott’s Newspaper article to the Nigerian Premium times, Government White Paper 
Indicts Prominent Politicians for Creating Boko Haram. The article is still available at: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/131694‐government‐white‐paper‐indicts‐prominent‐politicians‐for‐
creating‐boko‐haram.html. 
94 Buji Foi was a local Borno state politician. He had worked with Sherriff during his first tenure. However, during 
that period, he had become one of Yusuf’s close allies and major financier. 
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Religious Affairs. This was supposed to provide Yusuf’s group access to the state’s 
institutionalised political system the very opportunity to push for their al-Shari’a agenda. The 
group’s inability to achieve any substantial change despite being this close to power would provide 
a basis for frustration, and later to more disposition for violence.  
Most of my respondents who had followed the activities of BH closely during this period explained 
how Yusuf was frustrated by his group’s inability to achieve any substantial change, despite being 
very close to power (the state institutionalised politics). They explained that in working within the 
local Borno state government, Yusuf genuinely thought that he could progress his al-Shari’a 
agenda. In earnest, he began to engage with the state, bringing along his group’s uncompromising 
version of the Shari’a law. During this time, he also systematically doubled down on his criticisms 
of the state’s constitutional democratic system, arguing that it is a form of Kufir (unbelief). For 
him therefore, the state should abandon its democratic system, its constitution, and flag, in 
exchange for a theocratic al-Shari’a system. However, when it became obvious that such a system 
was not going to be accepted, because of its unviability and incompatibility with the already 
existing democratic system, Yusuf and his group became frustrated. Hence, they started to seek an 
alternative method to coax the state to buy-into their message and achieve their al-Shari’a goals.  
Within the state’s different Shari’a institutions, objection to Yusuf’s call for stricter Shari’a 
implementation was even more pronounced. Yusuf had to work with some of the traditional actors 
within the main Salafi networks95, with whom he had doctrinal disagreement in the region. In 
                                                            
95 The al‐Shari’a advocacy and the consequent adoption of Shari’a by the twelve states in the region at the dawn of 
democracy in 1999 opened‐up opportunities for numerous Izala and Ahlus Sunna activists to come closer to 
political power in their respective states. Having worked in different capacities in the al‐Shari’a advocacy, most of 
them were appointed (rewarded) to different government institutions, which controlled the Shari’a 
implementations in the different states (Amaechi, 2017; Brigaglia, 2012a). In fact, the Ahlus Sunna and Izala 
activists formed part of a majority of the Yan Hisba militia members. In the key Northern state of Kano for 
example, activists like Jafar Adamu got appointed to different political positions. In 2003, when the issue of the 
Shari’a penal code reform had assumed a heated political dimension during the gubernatorial elections of 2003, he 
(Adamu, with the Ahlus‐Sunna leadership) had taken an open stance against the then Kano governor Rabiu 
Kwankwaso (1999‐2003) of the PDP (People’s Democratic Party). Besides being accused of corruption, the then 
Kano governor was also judged as being too reluctant and hypocritical, in the implementation of Shari’a reforms in 
the state. So instead of Kwankwaso, the SCSN and the Ahlus Sunna openly supported the candidate of the ANPP 
(All Nigerian Peoples’ Party), Ibrahim Shekarau, promoting him as the authentic champion of Shari’a. Upon, his 
electoral victory, Shekarau appointed Adamu to a position (first as a member, and then to head the institution) in 
the state‐run Hisba Board, a body entrusted with security matters, public morality, and implementation of the new 
Shari’a codes in the state’s public life. However, Adamu would later resign his position when he became 
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working with other Islamic establishments in the region, most of these actors, became what Kassim 
(2018:14) calls “jihadi revisionists”; by shelving some of their Salafi radical tenets96. Also, to be 
able to work within these institutions, they had stopped some of their attacks against the Sufi orders 
and become more “moderate and less critical of the state. This means, amending their ideologies, 
or framing it in such a way that it accommodates the possibility of working within the system, 
something Yusuf would not accept. This is how one of my respondents put it:  
By working with the states, the ahlus sunna (and the izala) had already soft pedalled 
in their advocacy for jihad and radical transformation. They had realised that they 
cannot be working with the state’s institutions, and yet be criticizing them as 
unbelievers. The option was either to work with the state to try to implement a 
reasonable version of the Shari’a law, to continue to insist on the uncompromising 
version. They chose to work with the state and amend their teaching. 
This was the reality Yusuf faced. Despite being close to power, he would soon realise that there 
was no pathway to success through the state engagement. In the coming months, Boi at the behest 
of Yusuf resigned his political appointment, citing dishonesty on the part of the government in 
implementing the Shari’a mandate97. Now, having no real chance of achieving the kind of change 
they desired through the legal engagement with the state, internal debate and discussion in the 
group around unconventional means naturally grew. Considering that the group has already moved 
to the jihadi position, jihadi violence would appear as one of the first options to force the hand of 
the local Borno state government. At least in this context, political rulers can now no longer use 
the “excuse of ignorance” for their inability to enthrone al-Shari’a, having been repeatedly 
informed (by the group’s activism) of the consequences of not embracing such theocratic system. 
This is well captured in one of Yusuf’s lecture during this time: 
What will stop them …is ‘jihad’ (taking jihad here to mean arm struggle). 
                                                            
disillusioned with the institution’s collusion with the state, and level of corruption within the institution. For more 
on the collaboration between the state and the main Salafi establishments see (Brigaglia, 2012a; Loimeier, 2012).   
96 It is important to reiterate that Yusuf’s push for this uncompromising version of theocracy and implementations of 
Shari’a law had long been the main cannon of the Salafi establishments. In fact, it was not him, but rather the Salafi 
establishments that abandoned their initial jihadi position. An elaborate analysis of this has been provided by Andrea 
Brigaglia (2015). 
97 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala scholar (Kano, March 2017). 
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But how are we going to carry out the jihad? With whom are we going  to  
carry out the jihad? Allah made me to understand that first and foremost,  
we must embark upon the preaching towards Islamic reform. Then, we will  
have to be patient until we acquire power. This is the foundation of this preaching 
towards Islamic reform. It was founded for the sake of jihad, and we did not hide  
this objective from anyone98. 
A similar idea is also portrayed in another lecture: 
We establish iqamat al-hujja for them, but you might not know since you have never 
gone to the presence of the Divisional Police Officer to discuss this issue. On the 
other hand, I have been called several times to their office. There was a time I was 
invited by the Director-General of the State Security Service—look at Ibrahim and 
others were the people who escorted me. I went to their office, and we sat with him 
to discuss the mission of our preaching towards Islamic reform ... Anyone about 
whom we are certain to have establish evidence upon is an apostate from Islam. If 
it is the taghut, you should present evidence to him, but once you present your 
evidence, it is over99. 
All these for Yusuf further explained that the requirements for establishing evidence on the 
political rulers have been fulfilled. Hence, the organisation was therefore ready and justified from 
their ideological perspective, to begin their armed struggle against the Nigerian state. From this 
background, he and his Shura council would reach a verdict on the use of armed struggle against 
the state and the political rulers.  
                                                            
98 This statement was culled fromYusuf’s lecture titled “History of the Muslims” cited in Kassim and Nwankpa, 
2017:94). 
99 This statement was culled from Yusuf’s lecture titled “History of the Muslims” cited in Kassim and Nwankpa, 
2017:97). 
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5.3.2 The Nigerian State Violent Response (Reactive and Indiscriminate Repression)   
Another important condition that catalysed BH’s decision to adopt violence in 2009 was the 
Nigerian government’s violent response. Here, I have looked at how the Borno state government’s 
response and that of the Nigerian government, helped provide more justification and 
encouragement for the group’s adoption of violence, after they had withdrawn from working with 
the state. Different interviews from many actors within the Nigerian security forces show that the 
Nigerian state government’s response had started with some sort of “pre-emptive and selective 
targeting”100, but it later became indiscriminate when the group’s anti-state rhetoric persisted. At 
the height of Yusuf’s anti-state rhetoric, the Borno state government had successfully targeted the 
group’s leadership. On several occasions, they arrested Yusuf and some of his assistants. Twice, 
he was charged, but his prosecutions never went forward. In late 2008, the Borno state government 
banned Yusuf and his then deputy Abubakar Shekau from preaching in public (Williams and 
Guttschuss 2012:32). Rather than deter Yusuf from his anti-state rhetoric, these arrests and public 
intimidations further played into Yusuf’s hands as a tool to mobilise his base. Upon Yusuf’s 
releases from bail and return from Abuja (where he was held), the BH leaders was often greeted 
by thousands of his followers, who closed some streets of Maiduguri in symbolic celebrations. 
These celebrations elevated his hero status in the eyes of many, thus becoming a potent tool for 
him to recruit and draw more people into his cause.  
Things continued this way until in the middle of 2009, where Yusuf’s persistent violent rhetoric 
and continuous advocacy for al-Shari’a, the Borno state government, in collaboration with the 
Nigerian government changed tactics. As one of my respondents explained it, “we now began to 
extend the target base.”101 Rather than just targeting Yusuf and the group’s leadership, the state 
security force’s approach became more proactive and indiscriminate. Every member of the group 
                                                            
100 Within the social movement discourse, scholars have often made distinction between the two main dimensions of 
repression; pre-emptive and selective targeting or reactive and indiscriminate targeting (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004: 
67-71). Repression is considered as pre-emptive and selective when it is applied before the opposition movement has 
gathered momentum and is targeted at the certain individuals within the group. In contrast, it is reactive and 
indiscriminate when it is applied in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle –that is after the activists have gained 
organisational momentum. Here, the targeting is random and not selective. The assumption here is that it is not all 
forms of repression that encourages violence. Rather what determines whether repression encourages violence is the 
manner in which the state combines the timing and the targeting of the repression. 
101 Interview by the author with an anonymous police officer in Kaduna (February 2017). 
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was now a potential target. First, they began to monitor the activities of even low members of the 
group. By early 2009, the Borno state government had also deployed more police troops on the 
streets of Maiduguri including the dreaded Operation Flush II Task Force102, whose real job 
according to one of my police sources was to “checkmate BH’s violent excesses”. A heated 
interaction between this group and the Operation Flush II Task Force would turn out to be a major 
precipitant for the group’s use of violent jihad against the Nigerian security forces. 
The violent altercation between the Operation Flush II Task Force and members of BH happened 
on 11th June 2009, when members of BH were on their way to a funeral in the Gwange area of 
Maiduguri. Confirming one of the several previous reports about this incident (Smith, 2015; 
Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:33), one of my respondents who had worked with the Operation 
Flush in Maiduguri in 2009 (although he was not himself part of this mission), recounted how the 
encounter with the BH activists happened. According to him, the BH activists on their way to the 
cemetery spotted some unarmed Boko Haram members, who were being forced by the members 
of the Operation Flush II task force to perform “frog jumps”103. The arrested members were found 
‘guilty’ of refusing to wear their motorcycles helmet, a transportation policy newly enacted by the 
state, to protect commercial motorcycle riders104. On spotting their members being humiliated by 
the security forces, BH activists tried to ‘rescue’ them from the security men. When they failed’, 
they tried to forcefully engage with the security officers, who in response started firing at them. 
According to my respondents, “the officers only shot at their legs and did not try to kill any of 
them.” In firing at the activists, they wounded about 17 members of the group105. 
A deeply enraged Yusuf had a different version of what happened; he later appeared before his 
followers and deliver a passionate and fiery speech labelled “Open Letter to the Federal 
Government of Nigeria”106. In the speech, he lashed out at both the Nigerian government and the 
                                                            
102 Operation Flush II Task Force was a joint group of mobile and regular police squad. The group on paper was set 
up by the local Borno state government in early 2009, to help the police combat the armed robbery and other petty 
crimes in the state. 
103 Frog Jump or other humiliating exercises is “discipline” approach often used by the Nigerian security forces to 
punish people they deem guilty of minor infractions, once they are caught. 
104 Refusing to obey secular authorities like the Nigerian security forces is consistent with BH’s Salafi ideology. Before 
this, Yusuf had in many occasions drawn from the idea of tawhid to argue that that obeying such authorities is 
tantamount to polytheism (Yusuf….). So, refusing to follow orders from the Operation Flush was not out of order, at 
least from the point of view of the group.  
105Interview by author with an Anonymous police officer in Kaduna (February 2017). 
106 Yusuf’ speech is still available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f89PvcpWSRg.  
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security forces, calling them murderers and accusing them of intentionally targeting his group 
without justification. This is an extract from the speech:  
Several Boko Haram members were taking four corpses for burial at Gwange 
Cemetery, he began: They ran into some Nigerian army members along with mobile 
policemen belonging to Operation Flush under the leadership of Ali Modu Sheriff, the 
governor of Borno state. They opened fire on the procession, and at the moment 18 
brothers are in hospital receiving treatment. One was shot in the back. Two bullets 
were removed in an operation. There was one who was shot in the groin. A bullet 
brushed someone close to the eye. If it had moved an inch, he would have been killed. 
Another one had both his legs battered. Somebody was shot in the thigh. We said that 
we would not rely on rumours and stories reaching us, which was why we refused to 
comment yesterday until we went and saw for ourselves. We went and saw them 
drenched in their blood. They did nothing; they did not insult anyone; they did not 
commit any crime. But simply out of sheer aggression, which is the hallmark of the 
government of Borno state. 
Subsequently, Yusuf began to threaten that he would take revenge on the Nigerian security forces, 
unless the Nigerian government investigates the incident, apologises to his group and makes 
reparations for what they had done. He practically prepared his group and started mobilising 
material resources for the violent battle (stacking up guns and other ammunitions in the group’s 
different centres). The fact that his organisation had become more established at this time, made 
this a bit easier. With the group’s experience of activism and level of operation in the region, 
activists were likely going to see the need for such form of activism, especially if there is a believe 
that it would protect the group’s hard earned resources. Movement actors are more likely to be 
convinced on the need to resort to arms in case whereby such groups have more to lose, than when 
they had not infested much in the group. The call for violence is more likely to evoke more support 
from the group because the group had more to lose if they were decimated (Hafez and 
Wiktorowicz, 2004). If inaction entails continuous loss, it was more likely that there was a greater 
inclination towards risk to mitigate the losses.  
Ideologically, this also makes sense. Now, the Borno state government can no longer use 
“ignorance” as an excuse for not implementing Shari’a. Having repeatedly argued publicly and in 
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the different Shari’a boards, the state’s political rulers have been duly informed; hence it is no 
longer inappropriate to use armed struggle against them.  
 
5.4 Mobilisatory Resources  
Two main mobilisatory resources helped Yusuf to mobilise his activists for this strategy: financial 
resources and the group’s centres. A significant amount of BH’s financial resources were 
generated internally through monthly dues and financial contributions by members of BH 
themselves. At the peak of the group’s popularity (2006-2007), it is believed that Yusuf had also 
encouraged his members to sell-off their goods and property and commit the money to the cause107. 
Most of his followers contributed, and from these contributions, Yusuf was also able to provide 
some form of welfare assistance to the particularly impoverished members of his group. Other than 
this, other forms of funding for the group were also generated through selling his audio recordings 
and books (pamphlets). Like most known religious imams in the region, Yusuf made and released 
audio recordings in the markets among his sympathisers. This served two purposes: disseminate 
his message and generate funding for his group. The money from this was channelled to the 
group’s cause. 
Other financial resources may have come to the group from some of the politicians within the 
region. In the past, politicians such as Ali Ndume, a former governor of Bauchi state (1999-2007) 
and a serving Nigerian senator representing Bauchi South; Alhaji Shettimma Pindar, Nigerian 
former Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe, Adamu Dibal, the former deputy governor of 
Borno state known to have helped negotiate for Yusuf’s return from Saudi Arabia after the Kanama 
violent incidents (Amaechi, 2013; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:24). These allegations got much 
credence when the Nigerian Former President made an audacious statement in 2012 that BH had 
infiltrated the different arms of the government, as well as the security agencies such as the police 
and the army (Smith, 2015). Other reports have also linked people like Buji Foi and the former 
governor, Sheriff who had entered into an agreement with Yusuf earlier, stating that they have all 
been identified as possible sponsors of the group at that time. Some of these reports claim that the 
                                                            
107 Interview by the author with an anonymous Izala scholar at Kano (March 2017). 
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governor may have funnelled funds to the group through Foi when his relationship with Yusuf was 
good (Smith, 2015). 
Other reports (Smith, 2015) even claimed that Sheriff’s pact with Yusuf included monetary support 
for the group. These claims were re-enforced by the extra judicial killing of Buji Foi by the 
Nigerian security forces in the peak of BH’s violent crack-down in 2009. A video on YouTube 
shows the defenceless former Commissioner being brutally shot multiple times by the Nigerian 
security forces108; many within the Nigerian public believe that Foi was murdered from the 
governor’s order, to prevent him from exposing his financial involvement with the group. 
Although most of these claims are very difficult to verify, due to BH’s continuous underground 
nature, it is not unreasonable to believe that some Northern Nigerian politicians had supported and 
may have provided Yusuf and his group some sort of material support in the early stages of the 
group. With the little popularity the group enjoyed at the time, due to its anti-establishment 
rhetoric, it would make sense for politicians to align with the group. This is probably what 
prompted Sheriff’s earlier alliance with Yusuf, and the consequent appointment of his (Yusuf’s) 
collaborator to his cabinet. Such was a calculated political move by the ex-governor to cement his 
alliance with Yusuf and his group. It should be stressed however that Sheriff and many of the other 
northern Nigerian politicians implicated in such reports have continued to deny these reports 
(Smith, 2015). With Yusuf dead, perhaps nobody would ever know some of the Nigerian 
politicians involved in the group at this stage.  
Beyond Nigeria, it is very likely that Yusuf may have had financial support from his ‘friends’ in 
either Saudi Arabia or elsewhere (Zenn, 2018:121; Kassim, 2018:11). It is not clear, who these 
friends were. The first possible sponsor was al-Qaeda, since he had already indicated his interest 
in Nigeria, and may have also followed this up with the establishment of the Kanama camp. If he 
had supported the establishment of the Kanama camp in 2002, it was unlikely that he was going 
to discontinue supporting the mission that promised some sort of continuity in the region. 
However, in the face of no serious evidence, I am a bit sceptical to make this conclusion. As I see 
it any conclusion of al-Qaeda’s support of Yusuf at this time, should be more of a hypothesis, until 
                                                            
108Video about Foi’s death is still available online on YouTube at: 
https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=Buji+Foi%2c+killed+by+the+police%2c+you+tube+video&view=detail&m
id=013680B8D32751B7DEF5013680B8D32751B7DEF5&FORM=VIRE 
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there is more evidence to justify it. What is clear in any case is that Yusuf did have some sort of 
financial resources at this time, albeit small. With such resources, he and his group were able to 
acquire different ammunition such as bows and arrows, daggers, machetes, some locally made 
guns, a few bomb making materials, a few Kalashnikovs and a number of AK 47s109. Some of 
these ammunitions were recovered by the police in the aftermath of the first violent altercation 
with the security forces. According to my respondents, they purchased most of these ammunitions 
from the black market, across the region’s border with Niger and Cameroon. They stocked them 
up in the group’s different centres around the region, to be used when they finally began the violent 
jihad against the Borno state government. The availability of such ammunitions brought in more 
emboldenement for the group’s all-out assault on the Nigerian security forces. 
 
Another important resource that helped Yusuf mobilise support for violence against the Nigerian 
security forces at this time was the group’s centres and its organisational structure. The fact that 
Yusuf had already existing centres in the different regions at this period helped him concretise the 
importance of this strategy and advance its use against the state. Within the physical structure of 
these centres, Yusuf and the different group leaders had a religio-social platform to showcase the 
group’s acquired ammunition, as well as prepare their followers to prepare for the ordeal that await 
them once the violent jihad was declared. My respondents explained how within these centres, 
Yusuf and other leaders in the group gathered members of the group, trained them on how to use 
the ammunitions, provided information about potential attacks and articulately discussed the 
group’s plans going forward110. The arrangement of meetings at these centres brought-in more 
legitimacy to the use of such strategies in a very volatile environment. Such legitimacy would 
further embolden activists, for the task ahead.  
The group’s first strike occurred on 26 July 2009 in the city of Bauchi (where  had very loyal 
disciples), many kilometres away from where the police attack happened. Reports from Smith, 
(2015) put the estimated number of Boko Haram members involved with this attack at 70. Armed 
with locally made guns and grenades, the activists from the Bauchi branch descended on two 
                                                            
109 Separate interviews by the author with an anonymous JTF personnel and a Nigerian police officer in Kaduna, 
(March 2017). 
110 Interview by the author, with two anonymous Ahlus Sunna clerics in Kaduna (February 2018).  
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locations: a police station and a mosque belonging to Izala. The local police there were completely 
taken unawares. Not prepared for this kind of attack, the few policemen on duty on the station had 
to abandon their duty posts. It needed new larger deployment from the state command to keep the 
attackers from breaking into the armoury.  
This was just the beginning. In the coming days, BH activists in other parts of the region would 
follow up this attack with similar, but more coordinated attacks. Probably energised by the 
availability of a few AK 47s, grenades, and some locally made weapons such as bows and arrows, 
as well as the success of the Bauchi attacks; they descended on police stations in Potiskum in 
Yusuf’s home state of Yobe, and in Wudil area in Kano state. In Maiduguri (the city, where BH’s 
has its strongest support), the group also attacked three local police stations (including the police 
headquarters), police training camp and a prison (Smith, 2015). These series of attack would 
change the group’s narrative, from being a group which merely preached anti-state jihadi 
messages, to a group now willing to use violent strategies to achieve their aim. The dynamics have 
now changed. 
To continue to mobilise his group, Yusuf consistently framed the group’s violence as not only 
necessary, but also as a defence strategy to circumvent attacks by the Nigerian security forces. 
This is how he put it in his speech: 
The same way they gunned down our brothers on the way, they will one day come 
to our gathering and open fire if we allow this to go unchallenged. The way they did 
this; they will commit terrorist acts against women if they are allowed. We’d rather 
die than to wait for them to commit aggression against our women or to come to our 
gathering and humiliate us. You should know we would never keep silent and allow 
anyone to humiliate us. It’s not possible for someone to come and shoot our brothers. 
We take them to hospital and bear their medical bills while [the shooter] goes home, 
without giving a damn. It’s not possible.... Mad soldiers. As long as they are not 
withdrawn from the city, there will be no peace111 
This kind of framing, resonated with the activists not only because it emphasised the activist’s 
sense of solidarity with their wounded and slain brothers, it evoked a sense of self-defence. In this 
                                                            
111 Yusuf’s video still available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nYGyYEA1Y8 
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situation, violent retaliation becomes a significant asset for self-defence. Here, inaction is not an 
option, since it could depict cowardice and loss of even more resources that had already been 
achieved by the group through many years of activism. 
Faced with this situation, the Nigerian government had to respond. In the next few days, Umar 
Yaradua (the then Nigerian President) would commission a new set of security personnel, the 
Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF), to assist the local security forces in dealing with the situation in 
the region. According to a security report I obtained from one of my JTF respondents, who was 
part of the first group of security personnel deployed to the region, the JTF’s mission was simple: 
“to bring calm and normalcy to the states where BH is causing problems, with immediate effect” 
(JTF Security Report on Boko Haram, 2009:2). This, as the respondent explained, entailed 
“crushing Yusuf and his group, so that calm will return to the region.” In justifying this, he 
explained that “The Federal government could not just fold their hands and watch BH continue to 
cause havoc and disturb public peace. We had to go and restore peace and order to the region”112. 
That was exactly what they did. This is how another member of the JTF personnel puts it: 
The government could not afford to continue to let the group operate freely when 
they are continuously threatening to bring down a democratically constituted state. 
The government had two choices, either they check-mated the group’s excesses or 
they crush the group immediately. Whichever one they choose; the use of force was 
absolutely necessary113. 
Obviously, the state would choose the second option. In the coming days, the military troops sent 
to the region would help the local police in the region violently crush the group. For few days, 
members of the security forces roamed the streets of Maiduguri, indiscriminately arresting, 
detaining and killing people suspected to be members of the Yusuf’s group. But, as they went 
deeper, Boko-Haram also fought back with the resources at their disposal, making the environment 
even more tense than it already was. Due to lack of experience and the numerical advantage of the 
security forces, the group would suffer a lot of casualties. Probably, sensing that they did not have 
much chance against the well-equipped security forces, the group would also change tactics. Most 
of them began roaming the Maiduguri streets in the night; fighting and indiscriminately killing the 
                                                            
112 Interview by the author with anonymous JTF member in Kaduna (March 2017). 
113 Interview by the author with anonymous JTF member in Kaduna (March 2017). 
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police and people suspected to be members of the JTF. However, this could still not match the 
JTF’s military power. Within a few days, an estimated 800 members of the group were rounded 
up. Many others were also killed (Smith, 2015). Through this state violence, peace and order were 
temporarily restored in the region. 
While this approach (at least from the security forces perspective) in the short term helped calm 
the situation, it would turn out to be one of most significant motivating factors for further 
development of violence. By proactively and openly subjecting BH activists and suspected 
sympathisers to such violent inhumane abuses, the Nigerian security forces indirectly antagonised 
hitherto inactive supporters and sympathisers, as well as gave Yusuf and the BH leadership the 
tools to not only intensify their members’ moral outrage, but also to use it to encourage and justify 
the resolve to adopt violence. In such cases, violence becomes not only a tool to stop the security 
forces’ abuse on both the activists and the sympathisers, but also an element to justify the 
employment of violence against the members of the security forces. This is how Yusuf puts it one 
of his sermons after these attacks: 
What I said previously, that we are going to be attacked by the authorities, has 
manifested itself in Bauchi, where about 40 of our brothers were killed, their mosque 
and homes burnt down completely, and several others were injured and about a 
hundred are presently in detention. Therefore, we will not agree with this kind of 
humiliation. We are ready to die together with our brothers and we would never 
concede114 
Even my respondents who were members of the security forces found themselves confirming that 
the violent exploitations and the excessive use of force by the security on the activists and 
sympathisers had an impact on why the group’s adoption of violence. In a very rare admission, 
another high ranking JTF member told me:  
Sometimes I have gotten angry at some of my colleagues. Yes, these BH people are 
animals, but when we engaged with them in such manners, we give them and their 
sympathisers the tools to hate us more. Look at this video, (showing me a video, 
depicting BH suspects being shot by members of the security forces), how can you 
                                                            
114 Yusuf’s speech still available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxZXhOpmqSU 
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not be angry, after watching this video? Some of my colleagues were simply carried 
away. They thought that they were in a war. They forgot that they are soldiers, not 
murderers. Remember to be a soldier during war, is different from being a murderer. 
When you are murderer, you simply play into the hands of terrorists. Our attitude had 
given Boko Haram the motivation to recruit members to attack us115.  
Operating in the face of this kind of repression, Yusuf’s followers easily become drawn to answer 
the call to adopt violence, not necessarily because it was as a natural response to defend 
themselves, but because it gave them a sense of solidarity with other mistreated activists.  
Some of my respondents, who were living in the region, particularly in Maiduguri during this 
period described the situation as “a complete war”116. According to one victim of BH violence 
who now was living in one of the camps of people displaced by the BH violence, “there was a 
complete and total chaos everywhere on the streets. We practically could not do anything, other 
than stay home and watch the violence between the security forces and BH unfold.”117 For three 
days, the group was locked in an armed battle with the security forces. The roads were completely 
deserted. The residents of the city had to take cover in churches and military barracks, to avoid 
being caught in the crossfire. Dozens of people presumed to be high profile members of the group 
were abducted and killed. Some who were presumed to be low key members and sympathizers 
were simply locked up and taken to undisclosed police stations. Despite all this, BH kept fighting 
and continued to push the security forces back.  
The environment was tense, even on the third day after the military had been heavily reinforced 
by the regional military divisional headquarters in Jos. According to Smith’s (2015) report, the 
security forces had on this day (28th of July 2009) sought to crush the group once and for all. After 
getting troop reinforcements from the military regional headquarters in Jos, they tactically 
executed a well-coordinated military attack on the group’s mosque and its headquarters. Within a 
few hours, they were able to reduce the group’s mosque and headquarters to rubble. The result of 
this would be piles of dead bodies. Yet, somehow Yusuf managed to survive and escape from his 
domicile, although soldiers remained on his trail.    
                                                            
115 Interview by the author with an anonymous JTF personnel in Abuja (March 2017). 
116 A discussion from two focus group interviews (April 2017).  
117 Focus group interview by the author (April 2017). 
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On the 30th of July, the attacks finally paid-off after the soldiers were tipped off that he was hiding 
in his father in-law’s barn, not far away from the mosque. He was subsequently arrested and 
handed over to the police alive. However, he was later shot by the police, multiple times on the 
chest and at back of the head (Walker, 2012:8; Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:34). The police, 
though, had a different version of how the BH founder was killed. A few hours after his death, the 
Nigerian police officials offered at least two different contradictory versions of what happened. 
While one version claimed that Yusuf was shot while he was trying to escape from police custody; 
another one claimed that he was killed in a shoot-out between Boko Haram members and security 
forces. None of these versions are true. The truth is that Yusuf was summarily executed after he 
was captured alive by the soldiers who carried out the last raid on his father in-laws’ barn. The 
military openly paraded Yusuf before handing him over to the police. He was never killed in a gun 
shoot-out. It is also not plausible that he would try to escape, considering the tight surveillance 
which greeted him at the police station, when he was handed over to the police. Instead, he was 
simply murdered by the police at the police headquarters after he must have been handed over by 
the JTF. This was confirmed to me by many of my sources118.  
One eye witness interviewed by the Human Rights Watch, described seeing Yusuf handcuffed and 
sitting on the ground, saying that they should pray for him, when three enraged policemen opened 
fire on him. According to her, after questioning him for more than one hour, the police simply shot 
him in the head, the stomach and in the chest: “They first shot him in the chest and stomach and 
another came and shot him in the back of his head”, the woman told the Human Rights group 
(Williams and Guttschuss, 2012:35). This version was also corroborated by the US State 
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism in Nigeria, for 2009:  
The Nigerian military captured Maiduguri-based Boko Haram spiritual leader 
Mohammed Yusuf alive after a siege of his compound, and turned him over to 
Maiduguri police, whose colleagues had been killed by the group. A local policeman 
summarily executed Yusuf in front of the station in full view of onlookers, after 
                                                            
118 Interview by the author with separate anonymous interviews with Nigerian police officers and members of the JTF 
in Kaduna (February and March 2017). This information has also been corroborated in many previous research 
(Comolli, 2015; Smith, 2015: Williams and Guttschuss, 2012). 
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parading him before television cameras (Country Report on Terrorism Nigeria, 
2009). 
Later that day, images of what turned out to be Yusuf’s dead body were shown to journalists, with 
his lifeless body tossed with dirt and riddled with bullet wounds119. 
I was lucky to have spoken to one of the police officers120 who was believed to have shot Yusuf in 
Maiduguri, when he was handed over to the police by the JTF. Now stationed in another big city 
in the region, I was given his contact by some of two of his colleagues who worked together in 
Maiduguri. Initially, he was reluctant to talk about the shooting of Yusuf. In the beginning of the 
interview, he tactically avoided discussing how Yusuf was killed. But as the conversation went on, 
he changed his mind, and become more talkative. He admitted to shooting the BH leader, however 
justified it by saying that he was only following “instructions from the Oga on top”. He refused to 
explain further, when I queried him further on what he meant by that; or who the Oga on top was:  
Do you mean, your Police Commander, or the Borno state governor, I asked. He would not answer 
further, instead, he just looked at me sternly and asked that we leave that subject at that for now. 
And I respected his decision, I changed the subject.  
However, some of his colleagues were not as taciturn as he was. Most of them were eager to point 
out to me that they had been within the vicinity where the BH founder was shot. They were also 
quick to explain to me that there was no order from the state or the Federal government to kill 
Yusuf. Rather what had happened according to one of them was that there was an unspoken 
agreement among the local police officers, that “the best way to put the BH insurgency to bed once 
and for all, was to eliminate the group leader, especially after he and his group had been involved 
in the death of some of the local police officers. Thus, seeing Yusuf delivered into their hands by 
the military on one of those raids, was a golden opportunity, no local police officer would afford 
to let go. “The police officer who killed him, may have done so not only because he wanted to 
avenge the deaths of his colleagues, but because he must have thought that it would help eliminate 
the threat of BH once and for all. There was no other reason” I did not bother trying to corroborate 
the veracity of any of these explanations because I did not think it had much significance on why 
the group adopted violence. What was important to me was to understand how the BH founder 
                                                            
119 Focus group interview by the author with victims of BH (April 2017).  
120 Interview by the author with a Nigerian Police officer (Kaduna, March 2017).  
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was brutally murdered in the hands of the security forces, and how this may have influenced the 
trajectory of violence in the organisation later. For whatever reason, it was, it did not have much 
theoretical significance on the how the group had adopted violence.  
This kind of intentional extra-judicial killing is consistent with possible result of the approach 
adopted by the Nigerian security forces at the onset of the onslaught on the group. The security 
forces had started the onslaught against the group with the mentality that BH had to be crushed at 
all cost. In implementing this mandate, the Nigerian security forces had committed severe human 
right abuses. In the wake of the final raid at the Yusuf’s father in-law’s house, the security forces 
had been accused of rounding up young men they suspected of being Boko Haram members and 
forcing them to kneel or lie on the ground, then shooting them point blank without trial (Smith, 
2015). In a particularly hard-to-watch video, alleged security forces were seen shooting dead a 
number of young men in that way. In another similar video, a man identified as Buji Foi, the former 
commissioner for Religious Affairs for Borno state and prominent Boko Haram member, can also 
be seen being forced to walk before being shot dead by the security forces. Yusuf’s father-in-law, 
Baba Fugu Mohammed would also meet similar fate. On invitation by the local police on the 31 
July, the day after Yusuf was killed, the old man was summarily executed at the Maiduguri local 
police station. In 2012, his family was later compensated by the government, with a payment of 
100 million naira (about 5 million Rand), after they had refused for nearly two years to pay 
damages for the unlawful death of Baba Fugu Mohammed.  
All these would temporarily bring the insurgency to an end. Other surviving members of the group 
including Shakau (Yusuf’s deputy, who was brutally wounded), to go underground, into the 
neighbouring camps of similar ideological groups outside Nigeria. Not much was heard of the 
group, until December 2009 when it re-emerged; this time with more determination to fight the 
Nigerian state, as well as avenge the death of its former leader, Yusuf. 
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter set out to analyse the evolution of violent activism in BH. It was part of a general 
attempt to answer the thesis’ second main research question: What conditions triggered BH’s use 
of violence against the Nigerian State? Given that Yusuf and his group had already ideologically 
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moved to a jihadi position, the question was not just about ‘why’; but about also about “when”. In 
other words: When did the group start to see elements within the Nigerian State as a legitimate 
target for jihadi violence? What conditions and experiences around the group helped accelerate 
and justify the group’s use of this strategy at the time they did?  
To contextualise these, the chapter began with a brief recap and description of how Yusuf returned 
to Nigeria, after staying away in Saudi Arabia at the dawn of the Nigerian government’s 
destruction of the Kanama camp. It described how the former Ahlus Sunna actor was able to build 
a new formidable organisation, with possible financial assistance from his ‘friends’ in Saudi 
Arabia. For few years, the group operated more like a moderate revivalist activist group, agitating 
mostly to change the region and country’s political system. They generally abstained from the use 
of violence. The chapter argued that despite the group’s disposition to violence from the 
ideological perspective, the use and adoption of this element only evolved in June 2009, after the 
group had become well established in the region and had already had an experience with working 
within the Borno state government. These interrelated conditions informed internal debate and 
accelerated the use of this element. 
Two main conditions were identified as most important here: the group’s brief involvement with 
the Borno state Government and the Borno state government’s (in conjunction with the Nigerian 
government) method of policing in the wake of the group’s increase anti-state and violent rhetoric. 
With Yusuf’s group growing popularity in early 2007, the group’s leader was able to enter into a 
‘pact’ with an upcoming governor of Borno state, Ali Modu Sheriff, to support his political 
campaigns. The governor in return promised a stricter implementation of Shari’a, something Yusuf 
and his group had been championing. Upon his electoral victory, the new governor partly fulfilled 
his promise by re-appointing Yusuf’s friend, Buju Foi as the state’s Commissioner for Religious 
Affairs. Yusuf himself became a representative in the state’s local Shari’a board. Given such access 
to power, Yusuf now had the opportunity to push for his al-Shari’a agenda. But because Yusuf and 
his organisation’s agendas were completely unviable and considered to be very extreme given the 
various aspects of the political terrain, the state had no choice, but to isolate him. Frustrated, Yusuf 
and his friend resigned from their positions. Since having very little pathway to achieve the 
organisation’s al-Shari’a goals through state legitimate means, unorthodox means such as violence 
soon became more appealing as an appropriate tool. Moreover, this also synchronised with Yusuf’s 
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ideas that jihadi violence could only be permitted in situations when political rulers could no longer 
use ‘ignorance’ as an excuse for not enforcing al-Shari’a. So, Yusuf believes that having made his 
case in the different state’s Shari’a institutions, political rulers in the state could now no longer 
claim ignorant. Therefore, the group is justified ideologically and ready to begin armed struggle 
against the state, especially the Borno state government.  
In the coming days, Yusuf would begin to tune up his anti-state rhetoric, and in some cases 
threatened that he would depose both the Borno state government and the Nigerian State. For this, 
he was on many occasions, arrested and detained. Twice Yusuf was charged. In late 2008, him and 
his deputy, Shekau were also banned from preaching in public by the Borno state government. The 
government also consistently increased the militarisation of the region, to checkmate Yusuf and 
his group’s activities. However, as the group’s goal of changing to al-Shari’a system remain 
unaccomplished, all these measures further pushed the group into becoming more emboldened to 
adopt violence against the state. With access to some resources (in the form of finance and the 
group’s centres), Yusuf was able to articulate these frustrations into more coordinated collective 
violence against the Borno state government and the Nigerian security forces.  
A violent clash between the group and some members of the state’s Operation Flush Task Force 
II, where some members of the group were killed will finally push the group over the line. In 
response to the assault, Yusuf called for the state to apologise and make up for what he believed 
was an injustice on his men. When nothing of this came, Yusuf and his group vowed to retaliate. 
Having been “well-prepared” for this day, he was able to mobilise his group to launch attacks on 
the security forces, relying mostly on the group’s Salafi-jihadism ideology. Having the Ibn 
Taymiyyah centre (as well as other different cells scattered in other parts of the region) as the 
religio- physical space to plan and execute his violent attacks on the security forces, made this task 
easier. In response, the Nigerian government would launch a major “political crackdown” on the 
group. Led by a newly formed JTF, the state descended on the group. But as they attacked, BH 
fought back, leading to total chaos in the region. Violence finally ended on the 30th of July when 
the military captured Yusuf. They handed him over to the local police at the Maiduguri police 
station, who later executed him, putting an end to group, at least so they thought. 
All these highlight the importance of interactions between the state and movement actors in the 
understanding of how SOMOs adopt violence as a strategy for goal attainment. Actors within 
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SOMOs often do this, not necessarily because of the Salafi ideological dispositions existing prior 
to participation in the organisations, but also because of the experience of activism and interactions 
between the group and the state in the socio-political environment in which they operate. As the 
BH case clearly illustrates, it is such interactions that often set the context and encourage 
justification for the mobilisation and adoption of such strategy at the particular “time” such 
strategies evolve.  
The nature of State response to SOMOs is also particularly significant. The paradox of state’s 
violent response is that, while it can repress movements because of its destabilising nature, violent 
response can create more crisis and conditions for SOMOs to adopt and justify further violence. 
As also illustrated by Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) the collective action variant of escalation in 
violence in SOMOs is often more likely to be reinforced and justified when the state escalates its 
violent contention as either defensive or deterring measure. In such situation, reciprocated violent 
activism is more likely going to resonate with activists because it easily feeds into SOMOs 
leadership’s narrative as a defence strategy. Of course, activists could act because they want to 
achieve a purpose; but they are more likely to act if they believe that inaction could be worse – it 
could lead to loss of hard-earned movement resources or to total annihilation of the group. If 
inaction entails continuous loss, it is more likely that there would be greater inclination towards 
risk to mitigate the losses.  
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CHAPTER SIX: BOKO HARAM’S RESOURCES AND SUSTENANCE OF ARMED 
VIOLENCE  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the last chapter on data. The chapter analyses how other sophisticated forms of violence 
evolved and are sustained in the group after 2009. Some of the main forms of violence to be 
analysed are professional targeted assassinations, guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, kidnappings 
for ransom and armed bank-robberies. The chapter begins with a quick historical outline of how 
the group re-emerged from the violent crack-down by the Nigerian security forces in 2009. It will 
explain how the trajectory of the above-mentioned forms of violence is connected to the several 
socio-political conditions and internal dynamics in the group. These include the group’s mutual 
co-operation with similar brother organisations (particularly AQIM, al-Shabaab and Islamic State), 
the internal competition between the different factions of the group and the group leadership’s 
framings of the group’s activism as a form of battle between “true Muslims” and non-believers. 
The chapter argues that these conditions have enabled the mobilisation of more resources, within 
which the group has been able to develop and sustain these different forms of violence amidst 
more militarised Northern Nigeria.  
 
6.2 Profiling the Re-Emergence of Boko Haram (2010-2016)   
The Nigerian government’s 2009 crack-down on BH temporarily put an end to their violent 
campaign. With the death of Yusuf, and a complete destruction of the group’s Ibn Taymiyya centre 
in Maiduguri, all the surviving members of the group were either forced to flee the country or 
forced to go underground (Kassim, 2018). From August 2009, not much was heard from the group 
in the region until the beginning of 2010 when audios and video clips of the group started to 
circulate in the region (Smith, 2015). In the videos, the group through its new leader, Abubakar 
Shekau, they presented themselves as innocent victims of the Nigerian state’s brutal oppression. 
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They also threatened revenge on the Nigerian government’s security operatives, for the death of 
their leader121.   
Abubakar Shekau is a well-known figure both within the BH circle and the Nigerian security 
community. He had been a close confidant of Yusuf and had also preached alongside the late BH’s 
leader during their formative years in Maiduguri. As I recounted in the last chapter, he was banned 
alongside Yusuf from preaching in the public by the Yobe and Borno state governments in 2008. 
Some of my sources say that the relationship between both men goes way back to 1998/1999, 
when both men studied in Maiduguri. They had met through Mamman Nur, another high profile 
BH member, who studied theology with them. From there, the friendship between the three men 
had flourished all through the group’s formative years122. Under him, BH had modified its 
organisational structure previously established by Yusuf. Rather than a strict organisational 
structure, the group now maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows its 
different cells to operate autonomously. Each of the cells and units are interlinked, and generally 
take directives from him, Shekau. 
The genealogy of his birth is not very clear. However, many within the Nigerian security 
community believe that he was born in a village in the north-eastern part of Yobe state known as 
Shekau123. This is probably where he got the name ‘Shekau’. He and Yusuf are from the Kanuri 
ethnic group. Since he took over, Shekau had been the main face of the group’s violent campaign 
both against the Nigerian state as well the Nigerian neighbouring countries such as Niger, 
Cameroon and Chad. He had capitalised on the group’s new relationship with GSPC/AQIM after 
2009 to mobilse resources for other forms of activisms he construes as useful for the attainment of 
the group’s goals. Most of these are detailed in the internal letters released by AQIM in 2017, and 
in some of the files recovered in the US raid of Osama bin Laden’s house in 2011, released by the 
U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. These will be discussed in the up-coming 
sections below.  
                                                            
121 Some of these clips are still available online. An example of one of such clips could be found at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ChTgAjpoyY. 
122 Interview by the author with two anonymous police officers in Kaduna (February and March 2017). 
123 Several interviews by the author with police officers and JTF personnel (February and March 2017). 
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From early 2010, Shekau had led BH to an increased number of violent activisms both within and 
outside Nigeria. Following his ascension to BH’s leadership, he had followed up the release of the 
early footages with assassinations of local clerics and members of the security forces, with his men 
carrying out the attacks in a hit and run fashion. In September 2010, he led his men in a very 
complicated prison break in Jos, Bauchi state. In a well-planned and coordinated attack, the group 
had descended on the Bauchi Federal Prison, housing more than 700 inmates, including about 150 
BH activists captured during the 2009 violent assault. Heavily armed with automatic rifles, and 
professionally made bombs, they sporadically shot at the prison gates and forced their way into 
the prison.  
The group also followed up these kinds of attacks with a series of guerrilla warfare campaigns and 
attacks throughout the region, assassinating politicians and policemen who dared to criticize them 
or stood on their way. Such individuals include: Abbas Annas bin Umar, the brother of the Shehu 
of Borno (30th May 2011), Bashir Kashara, a prominent cleric (9th October 2010), Ibrahim Ahmad 
Abdulahi Bolori, a “non-violent Islamic preacher” (13th March 2011), Ibrahim Birkuti, a well-
known popular cleric (7th June 2011), Mallam Dalu, another well-known cleric in Maiduguri and 
Babakura Fugu, a brother-in-law of Muhammad Yusuf, who had attended peace talks with former 
president Obasanjo (Amaechi, 2013). All these were people who had in one way or the other co-
operated with the government or openly criticised the group. Targeting them was a way of creating 
fear among the people and the general population, to deter them from cooperating with the 
Nigerian government in working against the group in the future. In the wake of the Borno state 
government’s refusal to return the group’s centre in Maiduguri, BH had also assassinated the 
Borno state’s gubernatorial leading candidate, Alhaji Modu Fannami Guio, together with his 
brother and 5 police officers. According to the group’s spokesman in a statement released to the 
press after the attack, the popular politician had been a vocal critic of the group, since its re-
emergence (Amaechi, 2013). He had also been an ally of the incumbent State governor Ali Modu 
Sherif, who the group believed refused to return the group’s mosque to them (Williams and 
Guttschuss, 2012:54). This new tactic had become part of BH’s new form of violent strategy.  
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From 2011 to 2016124, the group has also been able to develop other different sophisticated tactics 
to attack different segments of the Nigerian society and beyond. From the hit and run attacks, the 
group has graduated to the use of different advanced forms of violence such as suicide violence 
(mostly with bombs), kidnapping for ransom, arm robberies and guerrilla warfare. Under the 
guidance of different splinter group leaderships, BH had consistently used its mutual co-operations 
and relationships with similar brother groups to innovate and advance the use of these methods. 
Such methods have made it easier for the group to attack state institutions, international 
institutions, churches, mosques, media houses, security personnel, religious leaders, politicians 
and ordinary civilians both within and outside the region. In 2014, the group has also been able to 
use some of these methods to capture cities such as Gwoza (August 2014), Bama (September 
2014), and Mubi (September 2014), uniting them with the areas around the already dominated 
Sambisa forest, as part of a utopic Jihadist Islamic Caliphate. These cities would later be rescued 
by the combined effort of the Nigerian government security forces, and that of the combined forces 
of the regional governments of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Amidst these increased violent 
interactions with state actors, the group had in 2014 recognized the establishment of the new 
Islamic State. They would finally pledge allegiance to Isis in 2015, leading to further mobilisation 
of resources for the development of new forms of violence to carry-out its attacks in Nigerian and 
beyond.  
 
6.3 Connecting the Interactions and Mutual Co-operation with AQIM and Al-Shabaab to 
the Development and Sustenance of the Specific Forms of Violence in Boko Haram 
In analysing the data, one theme that emerged as a major condition for the emergence of the 
different forms of violent strategy adopted by BH in 2010 was the mutual co-operation and 
interactions between BH leadership and other similar SOMOs, particularly AQIM and al-Shabaab. 
These interactions are detailed in three documents: two files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s book-
shelf by the US Navy SEAL, titled “Letters from ‘Abdallah Abu Zayd ‘Abd-al-Hamid125 to Abu 
                                                            
124 As most of the data for the study were collected in early 2017, the study has not analysed most of BH’s activities 
beyond 2016. 
125 ‘Abdallah Abu Zayd ‘Abd-al-Hamid was AQIM’s regional commander in Tariq (Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade in the 
Sahel). 
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Mus’ab ‘Abd-al-Wadud126“ and “A Letter to Osama bin Laden”, released in March 2016127 and 
January 2017128 by the US office of the Director of the National Intelligence; and another file titled 
“Documents for Advice and Shari’a Instruction to the Fighters in Nigeria”, released by a 
representative of AQIM, Abu Num’an Qutayba al-Shinqiti129 in April 2017130. I will use details in 
these letters to discuss how these mutual co-operations and relationships influenced the evolution 
and sustenance of some of the main forms of violence that evolved in BH, between the end of 2009 
and the end of 2012.  
 
6.3.1 Lone Professional Targeted Assassinations and Guerrilla Warfare in Boko Haram (2010-
2011) 
Letters between Abdallah Abu Zayd ` Abd-al-Hamid’s and Abu Mus’ab ` Abd-al-Wadud accurately 
reveal how most of the surviving members of BH after the 2009 violent crack-down escaped into 
militant training camps in Algeria, Mauritania and Somalia, organised by AQIM and al-Shabaab. 
The letter also showed how Shekau himself survived the 2009 violent onslaught. Contrary to what 
people within the Nigerian security community believed131, the new BH leader was not killed. 
Rather he sustained some serious injuries from the 2009 crackdown. As a result, he was able to 
relocate to a hideout in the Northern Cameroon, where he recuperated. He would take over the 
group’s leadership at the death of Yusuf after he had fully recovered from the injuries. Before his 
death, Yusuf had nominated him alongside Muhammad Auwal or Salisu Wudil as his possible 
successors132. However, because Muhammad Auwal died in the 2009 uprising, and the 
whereabouts of Salisu Wudil remained unknown, Shekau was made to take over the group’s 
                                                            
126 Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd-al-Wadud was AQIM’s over all Commander. 
127These documents are available on the Website of the US Director of National Intelligence at: 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf?start=1. 
128 These documents are available on the Website of the US Director of National Intelligence at: 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2017/item/1737-closing-the-book-on-bin-
laden-intelligence-community-releases-final-abbottabad-documents. 
129 al-Bulaydi was a member of AQIM’s Shura Council. He was killed at the end of 2015 in Algeria in an ambush by 
Algerian soldiers. 
130 I have not seen this document in its original form. However, extracts from the document were culled from Kassim 
and Nwankpa’s (2018:209-213 and 235-239) Boko Haram Reader. 
131 The Nigerian security had at the dawn of the 2009 crackdown claimed that Shekau was killed alongside Yusuf 
(Smith, 2015) 
132 Yusuf had also mentioned Shekau as his second in command from a brief interview, he had with the Nigerian 
security forces before he was murdered (Commolli, 2015:55-58; Smith, 2015). This interview is still available online 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePpUvfTXY7w 
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leadership as the only surviving member of the nominated candidates. Consequently, he was 
elected by the group’s Consultative Council to succeed Yusuf.  
Abu Zeid’s letter dated 24th August 2010 explained how desperate the BH activists needed 
assistance during this period. Desperate to revenge the death of their leader and to cement his 
control of the group, Shekau reached out to AQIM’s leadership. Even without being fully 
recovered from the gun wounds, he sent delegates to the AQIM leadership to Tariq. The delegates 
were supposed to deliver a letter to the AQIM overall commander Abdelmalek Droukdel, through 
Abu Zeid. Here, they were supposed to consult AQIM about advice “on waging jihad in Nigeria”, 
as well as a request for financial support, military training and alliance with the group. The 
delegates included Khalid al-Barnawi, Abu Muhammad, and Abu Rayhana. In making Shekau’s 
case, the AQIM’s Tariq commander also explained to the AQIM’s over all commander that the 
emissaries had trained with the Tariq group of AQIM. Hence, they were already known within 
their circle. In his words: “they have lived with us previously, and we know them well.” This 
previous knowledge of BH activists, would also make it easier to agree on some of the group’s 
demands. In the coming days, he would set up a line of communication with the group. He also 
helped them set up a safe training camp in Niger133.  
 
In his response to Shekau on another letter dated 30th September 2010, Abu Mus`ab `Abd-al-
Wadud expressed this willingness to collaborate with BH. He expressed his satisfaction with 
Shekau’s delegate, saying that he and his group (AQIM) sees it as an initiative for good, towards 
a new era which will confound the Crusader’s plan of aggression towards Islam and its people in 
the Sahelian nations and in Africa generally.” He (Abu Mus`ab `Abd-al-Wadud) also affirmed his 
willingness to effectuate Shekau’s request, but however cautioned Shekau to trade carefully when 
                                                            
133 The setting up of a safe and training camp in Niger is detailed in another letter the AQIM’s regional commander 
sent to the AQIM’s overall commander. In the letter he made a case for AQIM to help Shekau group. According to 
him, they (BH) had a “big problem with weapons and money; and that they also wanted to establish a safe house 
in Niger, for the training of their fighters”. He also explained that he had already agreed to set up a line of 
communications between their group and BH, to be based in Niger. 
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it comes to starting new attacks in Nigeria, to avoid a hasty declaration of jihad without adequate 
preparation. In his words:  
The question of the proclamation of jihad in Nigeria, we advise you not to take any 
decision or to proclaim anything under the influence of shock, but to put it off until 
the time is ripe from all perspectives with calm nerves, together with a 
comprehensive consultation with the jihad leaders in the Islamic world. The present 
stage is one of good preparation, watching and planning. It is necessary to mobilize 
the Muslim community in Nigeria to embrace the mujahidin; then it is necessary to 
prepare well by training and educating the mujahidin, and gathering all the requisite 
military equipment, especially explosive materials. 
Meanwhile, another undated letter discovered at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in 
2011, also confirms that Shekau during this time made a similar request to al-Qaeda itself. In the 
letter he sought al-Qaeda’s imprimatur and indicated his interest to continue to form an alliance 
with al-Qaeda. “There is nothing remaining than for us to know more about your order and 
organisation, because the one who does not know his path will be helpless after the journey”. 
Shekau writes. It is not quite clear, why Shekau still saw the need to write to the al-Qaeda 
leadership, when he had already established a line of communication with its affiliate group. 
Probably he wanted to solidify the relationship between the groups. For whatever reason, these 
initial contacts would result to financial assistance and training from the Salafi organisation (s) as 
evidenced in a letter by Abu Mus`ab `Abd-al-Wadud. In a letter dated July 2010, the AQIM 
commander instructed the Tariq commander (Abu Zayd), to disburse the sum of 200,000 Euro to 
the Nigerian organisation. It is likely that this money was delivered to BH, as Shekau would in a 
subsequent letter to Abu Zayd (dated October 7, 2010), express gratitude to al-Qaeda for the 
“financial generosity and training” offered to the group by AQIM. The group would also continue 
to benefit from AQIM’s financial support and military training throughout the period (Kassim, 
2018).  
Any more doubt about these interactions and collaborations were seen from AQIM’s activities in 
the media during this period. In June 14th, 2010 for example, AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalik 
Droukdel, openly admitted on Al-Jazeera TV that his group works together with Boko-Haram and 
that they had would not hesitate to provide Boko Haram with weapons, support and trainings, if 
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they would ever ask (Amaechi, 2013:80). During this period, the al-Andalus Media of AQIM also 
published Shekau’s `Id al-Fitri sermon, which was the first AQIM’s dissemination of an official 
message attributed to a group other than al-Qaeda or its affiliate (Pham, 2012:5-6). This was 
followed by the release of three videos from the al-Qaeda offering condolences for the extrajudicial 
killing of Muhammad Yusuf and other members of the group in the al-Qaeda. In the contexts of 
the interactions between these groups, these were ways to show solidarity and expression of public 
support for the group’s activism. In the coming days, these solidarity and support would 
materialise into some funding and support of BH’s mission in Nigeria. It would also materialise 
into training in the use of sophisticated ammunition and provision of funds, within which it is 
possible for the group to obtain security intelligence and bribe their way134 through the Nigerian 
security forces. All these would soon define and shape the group’s repertoire of contention when 
they re-emerged in 2010. 
Due to the availability of such financial resources and military training in Niger, Shekau and his 
group gradually became very emboldened to carry-out significant attacks, including the attack on 
the Jos Federal prison (7th September 2010) and the professional style assassinations of politicians 
and Islamic clerics who had spoken out against the group. It cannot be a coincidence that most of 
these attacks had happened mostly after Shekau acknowledged the reception of the financial 
assistance and military training from AQIM. All the attacks involved the kind of sophistication 
and high-level professional training that was not existent among BH members in 2009. It is such 
trainings and material support that made it possible for a previously ill-equipped group to carry 
out such attacks amidst highly militarised environment.  
Ideologically, Shekau did not need to go far to find justifications for this form of violence. Given 
the group’s late leaders’ construction of the group’s activism, he could justify violent activism as 
a sort religious moral duty. In the adoption of violence in the group, the late Yusuf had often 
presented the group’s activists and the entire Muslim constituency in the region as ‘victims’ rather 
than the aggressors in the trajectory of violence in the region. In the previously cited “Open Letter 
to the Federal Government of Nigeria”135 he delivered shortly before the uprising in 2009, for 
                                                            
134 Many of my respondents confirmed that BH had many security personnel under their payroll. Before conducting 
attacks, they often rely on security intelligence from these officers. 
135 This video was accessed from YouTube on 20th August 2017 
at:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f89PvcpWSRg. 
171 
 
example, Yusuf documented what he conceived to be a pattern of anti-Muslim violence in Nigeria. 
He mentioned famous Muslim Christian clashes: the 1987 riots in Kafanchan, Kaduna State; the 
1992 killings in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna; and cyclical violence in Plateau State, dating to 1994. In 
consistent with his previous anti-state rhetoric, he also told his audience that the Nigerian Federal 
Government itself had never been established to do justice; instead “it has been built to attack 
Islam and kill Muslims”. In the wake of a massacre of the Muslim community murdered in Onitsha 
(in 2006), the capital of Anambra State in the Southern part of Nigeria; in retaliation of the murder 
of Christians murdered in the North after demonstrations against cartoons of Muhammad 
published in Denmark, Yusuf told his audience:  
Once (the Christians) have power, once they have control, they show no mercy, 
they show no forgiveness. In Onitsha, they killed everyone.  That’s why we can’t 
put down our arms. Allah said: ‘You should always carry your weapons with you.’ 
Hide them! Allah didn’t tell you to leave your weapons behind. Because if they 
gain an advantage over you, they won’t spare you. You can’t love them, you can’t 
show them love, but you can show resistance. When the Prophet was chased from 
Medina, it was the same people, the same infidels. The same people that chased the 
Prophet from Medina today draw cartoons of him. Why would you love those 
people? Because they’re good at football? Would you wear a shirt with the name 
of someone who doesn’t carry Allah in his heart? Like Ronaldo? Why would you 
love those people? Because they do politics? Because they make movies? Can you 
even think of Muslims being in Guantánamo? In Iraq, people have been humiliated 
in their homes, in their own country. They built their country, and they were forced 
to go on their hands and knees. They were stripped and then raped by dogs. Can 
you imagine? To strip a woman and have her raped by a dog? Can you remain silent 
before such humiliations? Remain silent, and on Judgment Day, Allah will hold 
you accountable…. Even faced with the worst attacks, we cannot back down. The 
prophets were tortured, but they didn’t backdown…. The chehi ‘martyr’ is he who 
practices Islam properly. If he’s killed, Allah will save him, and he’ll be reborn into 
another life…. (Yusuf’s sermon quoted in Apard, 2015:44-45).  
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Although this kind of framing was not the only influence upon which the activists engaged with 
the state security forces then, it was obviously useful in providing Yusuf with the needed 
ideological resource upon which mobilisation for such activism was sustained during that period.  
Emerging in 2010, Shekau consolidate this kind of framing. This time the group had even more 
reason to attack the Nigerian government, namely, the brutal assassination of the group’s activists, 
especially their leader Yusuf. Having these issues in the background, he consistently appropriated 
narratives that intensified the sense that the state was systematically victimising Muslims. This is 
how he puts it in one of his first public statements in 2010:  
 Everyone knows the way in which our leader was killed. Everyone knows the kind 
of evil assault that was brought against our community. Beyond us, everyone knows 
the kind of evil that has been brought against the Muslim community of this country 
periodically: incidents such as Zangon Kataf… These are the things that have 
happened without end136.  
On another occasion he posits,  
 They are fighting us for no reason, because we have said we will practice our 
religion, we will support our religion and stand on what God has said…137 
Using this kind of rhetoric, Shekau made BH and by extension, the Muslim population in the 
region appear like ‘victims’ of successive Nigerian government aggression, a result of which 
violent retaliation against the Nigerian state was necessary. Such retaliatory attacks within this 
kind of framing would appear as the only way to save the faith and the region from the hands of 
the Nigerian state. Following such logic, any Muslim who refused to heed to this ‘call’ (to join in 
the BH activism), would appear as not to be a true Muslim. 
Other people within the BH’s leadership also used this kind of framing. In the aftermath of a 
notorious bomb attack in Maiduguri in December 2010, an alleged BH’s spokesman told 
journalists: “Before, Christians were killing Muslims, helped by the government; now, we have 
                                                            
136 Shekau’s video of January 11, 2012 titled “Imam Abubakar Shekau’s Message to President Jonathan 1,” still 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umkj50SUzck.  
137 Shekau’s video of 30th September 2012 titled “A Message to the World”, still available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txUJCOKTIuk&sns=em. 
173 
 
decided to hunt them down wherever they are” (Smith, 2015:109). Four days later, a statement 
accredited to Shekau on the group’s website claimed credit for this attack, as well as a similar one 
that happened in Jos shortly after the Maiduguri attack. In the video footage, the BH’s leader, 
called the attacks part of a “religious war”:  
We are the ones who carried out the attack in Jos. We are the  Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah 
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad that have been maliciously branded Boko 
Haram…Everybody knows about the gruesome murders of Muslims in different 
parts of Nigeria ... Jos is a testimony to the gruesome killings of our Muslim brethren 
and the abductions of our women and children whose whereabouts are still unknown 
... My message to my Muslim brethren is that they should know that this war is a war 
between Muslims and infidels. This is a religious war (Smith, 2015:110). 
It is interesting to note that most of BH’s attacks on Christians during these periods happened at 
places with re-occurring volatile Muslim-Christian conflicts. Some of my respondents 
interestingly explained to me that, other than the conviction that some of such Christian 
communities had always collaborated with the Nigerian state in targeting their different 
neighbouring Muslim populations, Shekau may also have “intentionally directed these attacks to 
these places because he sought to inflame the already Muslim-Christian tension already existing 
within such communities”. Thus, other than being a mere revenge on Christians, the attacks were 
also tactical plots to galvanize support from the Muslim population, whom he wants to believe that 
he was politically fighting for at the time. I find this assessment to be very credible. Looking back 
at the political situation of the region at the time, (Early 2010) it is easy to understand why Yusuf 
would want to galvanise such Muslim support. The possibility of having a Christian Southern 
President was looming around the corner. Musa Yar’adua, the then Muslim President from the 
region (North) was at that time seriously sick in a hospital in Saudi Arabia. He was hardly seen in 
the public. In the event of his death, his deputy Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the South 
was, according to the Nigerian constitution, to see out his tenure. This means that the region would 
have to endure a power shift to the south and must wait until 2011 to have a chance of another shot 
at the Presidency. In a country where political interests are pursued along regional and religious 
lines, this was a very big political problem. In fact, those surrounding Yar’Adua manipulated the 
situation to keep the vice President, out of the office. It needed the intervention of some members 
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of the Presidential executive council and the senate before he could be allowed to become the 
acting President. He would eventually become the President when Yar’adua died after many 
months in the Saudi hospital. This again reinforced a feeling of political marginalisation, especially 
after the country has had 8 years of Obasanjo’s Presidency (A Christian Southerner) before 
Yaradua’s Presidency. So, evoking this kind of narrative, Shekau was probably hoping to not only 
mobilise his activists to carry out these attacks, but also to draw sympathy from the entire Muslim 
population who opposed the Christian ticket of Jonathan’s Presidency. In retrospect, I would say 
that this calculation had not actually worked, but at least it is not out of place to comprehend that 
Shekau had thought in this direction.  
Another significant implication of this framing is the religio-moral duty function it bequeathed to 
such violent activism. Conceptualising the group’s activism as a sort of moral defence of Islamic 
faith against state/Christian (jihad) collaboration infuses into the activism some sort of imperative 
moral duty. Within such contexts, all violent activism against the unbeliever becomes a sort of 
religious and political moral duty, which demands unflinching commitment and sacrifice 
(including self) to the cause of the religion. This is much greater than any individual activist. Here, 
the activists would no longer see himself as a mere BH activist, but a rather a ‘martyr’ and a 
‘soldier’ for the religion in the global jihad. In this sense, he or she may be willing to lay down his 
life, his possessions and any other earthly possession without flinching, for the sake of this cause. 
In other words, high-risk activisms like suicide violence, which ordinary would not have made 
sense may seem imperative, irrespective of the cost.  
This is a reminiscent of how Islamist actors in the Egyptian case analysed by Wickham (2004:231-
249) were able to mobilise activists to embrace high risk activism. By exclusively defining the 
organisation’s potential targets as aggressors of the Egyptian culture and religious tradition, the 
Egyptian group’s leadership were able to present activists who adopted higher-risk actions against 
the Egyptian state as soldiers of the faith, rather than mere activists. In this case, violent activism 
against such enemies becomes something bigger than the individual himself and the immediate 
socio-political context the activists operate.  
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6.3.2 Suicide Violence (2011) 
Like lone professional assassinations and guerrilla warfare, the use of suicide violence is also 
connected to the availability of resources coming from the mutual co-operation between BH and 
the al-Qaeda affiliate organisations. Having developed in the group, this form of violence became 
one of the forms of violence within the organisation. It first emerged in June 2011, when the 
organisation used it to attack the Nigerian police chief at the Police Headquarters in Abuja. Few 
days before the attack, the Nigerian Police Chief Hafiz Ringim had visited Maiduguri to receive10 
Armoured Personnel Carriers from the Borno State government, in support of the newly 
commissioned JTF to boost the crack-down on BH. During this visit, the police chief had ‘boasted’ 
that his men has already concluded plans to wipe out BH and that their days are numbered138. 
Enraged by the police chief’s statement, BH’s leadership according to my respondents desperately 
wanted to “rubbish the police chief”. The attack was meant to personally attack the police chief, 
as well as show the region that the group was very capable of attacking any segment of the Nigerian 
security force. Thus, in the morning around 9 o’clock, a 37-year-old member of the group 
Mohammed Manga, followed the Nigeria’s police chief’s convoy into the Police Headquarters, 
and detonated his big explosives as he entered the garage gate. Although the police chief luckily 
escaped the attack unharmed, both the suicide bomber and other six policemen standing nearby 
were killed at the spot. The attack was also large enough to destroy about 40 vehicles packed in 
the parking lot (Amaechi, 2013; Pham, 2012).  
What Boko Haram missed/failed in the Police Headquarters attack, they perfected at the UN 
building. On 26th August 2011, Mohammad Abul Barra (27) another Boko Haram militant 
allegedly drove his Honda Accord car into the UN building, ramming it into the two entrance gates, 
and then unto the lobby of the main building, before detonating his car bomb. The wave from the 
blast, according to some of the respondents from the Nigerian security forces, was big enough to 
flatten a water tower; 100 meters away from the main building. According to them, “the effects of 
bomb was (sic) very colossal and very expertly made”. These two attacks marked the evolution of 
Boko Haram’s use of suicide bombing in carrying out political violence in Nigeria. From there, 
suicide violence has become a strategy often used by BH to carry out significant attacks. Between 
2011 and 2017, BH had used this sophisticated form of violent strategy to carry out attacks in 
                                                            
138 Separate interviews by police officers in Kaduna (February and March 2017) 
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different parts of the country (Comolli, 2015, Smith, 2015; Onuoha, 2015). Sometimes, the group 
combines this strategy with guerrilla attacks, where one or several activists set (s) off their suicide 
vest, to clear the way for impending guerrilla attacks by other foot soldiers. In a 20th of January 
2012 BH coordinated attack on the Bombai Police Headquarters in Kano (one of the deadliest 
attacks on Police officers in the region) for example, the group had used a series of suicide bombers 
to clear the way for other foot soldiers to enter the gate of the barracks and gun down unsuspecting 
police officers. The group has also used this method to attack several government institutions and 
churches within the region in the last few years (Smith, 2015: xv-17).   
Reading from the letters released by AQIM and from my interviews with security personnel, it is 
evident that the interactions and mutual co-operations between BH, AQIM and al-Shabaab played 
a very important part in the evolution of this form of violence. The mutual co-operations and 
subsequent reception of arms, military tools, ammunitions and training for strategic planning on 
how to carry out violent attacks had continued from 2010 to 2011. In fact, Mamman Nur, one of 
the initial members of BH at the Maiduguri centre (who is also believed by people within the 
Nigerian security community to be the master-mind behind the first two suicide bombings), had 
trained with AQIM and al-Shabaab after the 2009 violence (Zenn, 2018). Before the suicide 
attacks, together with other activists, he had just returned from trainings in one of AQIM’s 
camps139. He, and some other foot soldiers within the group had also frequently visited AQIM and 
al-Shabaab. This is probably why two days before the suicide attack on the Police Headquarters, a 
BH’s spokesperson, openly claimed that the group sent their members to other Muslim militant 
groups outside the country for training, and that soon they would start welcoming them back into 
the group (Pham, 2012:4). Two of these activists would turn out to be Mohammed Manga and 
Mohammad Abul Barra. Given, that these forms of violence have long developed within these 
international similar groups, it easily became part of an option to carry out such sophisticated 
attacks140.  
                                                            
139 One high-ranking JTF member told me that his source inside BH had revealed this to him. He, however, did not 
provide any evidence to support this. J. Peter Pham, (2012) had also made similar claim. Using sources from both 
Nigerian and US intelligent communities, he explained that Nur had just returned to Somalia where he and his 
followers trained in al-Shabaab camps and forged links with the jihadist group. He only returned to Nigeria in early 
2011 before BH carried out the attack on the UN building.    
140 AQIM particularly had in December 2007, used suicide bombing to attack the UN building in Algiers (Thurston, 
2017). 
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Collaboration with AQIM and al-Shabaab regarding the development of suicide bombing was also 
corroborated by some of my respondents who had opportunity to interrogate some of the BH 
activists. One of my JTF respondents who interrogated two male BH activists, arrested before they 
could detonate their suicide vests  in a market in Maiduguri in 2012 explained that the influence 
of the association with these brother networks in this kind of activism is undeniable: “Those boys 
don’t even try to hide that they were trained with AQIM and al-Shabaab. …They will even tell 
you, how long they were in Somalia perfecting the plans. They took pride in telling us that they 
and these organisations are now one and the same thing... We know this. It is not a secret for those 
of us in the intelligence community.”141 Another high-ranking member of the JTF also made a 
similar claim: “Boko Haram is AQIM, and AQIM is Boko Haram. Without the assistance from 
AQIM, there is no way Boko Haram can know how to plan these attacks.”142 
Indeed, BH has been able to embrace this strategy due to their corporation and affiliations with 
these groups. Having these relationships and mutual cooperation, meant they had access not only 
to financial resources, but also to the experience and the technical know-how required to to adopt 
and carry-out the different coordinated form of violent activism they construe as necessary, to 
achieve their goals in the region. Given that such a radical method had already been used and 
justified within these ‘brother’ groups, particularly AQIM (Thurston, 2017:6), it became natural 
and made easier for them to adopt such a form of violent activism, when the ‘need’ to carry out 
such attacks arose in the organisation.  
The particular use of this strategy rather than other less radical forms of violent tactics also makes 
broad sense when considered that they occurred in the context of the heightened security situation 
in the region. On the inception of BH’s re-emergence in the region, the Nigerian government had 
maintained its militarisation policy. The successive military and civilian governments (including 
the newly inaugurated Jonathan-led administration in 2011) had operated with the policy that the 
resolution of such violent crisis lies in the maximum military crack-down, rather than dialogue143. 
At the dawn of the 2010 attacks, the Nigerian President had commissioned and deployed more JTF 
and military troops, to help the Borno state government tackle the BH crisis in the region. By mid-
                                                            
141 Interview by the author with anonymous JTF personnel in Kaduna (March 2017). 
142 Interview by the author with anonymous JTF personnel in Kaduna (March 2017). 
143 Interview by the author with a high-ranking JTF personnel in Kaduna (March 2017). 
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year, the situation had become very critical, that things such as Okadas (motorcycles that are the 
primary means of locomotion for majority of the people in the region) were prohibited in some of 
the major cities, because they have been the group’s easiest means of carrying-out their attacks 
and escaping, after the attacks. On two occasions within these periods, the President had also 
declared a State of Emergency in fifteen local government areas in parts of Borno, Yobe, Plateau 
and Niger states (December 2012) and in the entire states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (May 
2013), in which cases more severe military action has been devised to curtail the group’s militancy 
(Williams and Guttschuss, 2012: 83). The emergency regulations also permit searches and seizure 
of property within the emergency area without warrant144. An authorised state authority could 
“declare curfew or ban any public procession, demonstration, or public meeting in the emergency 
area, where it was likely to cause serious disorder” (Williams and Guttschuss 2012: 83). 
All these meant that the new BH that emerged in late 2009 had met a new security situation in the 
region, where police vans paraded in every corner of the major cities. There were constant stop 
and search operations by the JTF, even in the remotest villages in the region. Thus, adopting this 
form of violence to carry out attack was construed from a rational calculation that sees this tactic 
as a very potent method; sophisticated enough to be used to attack the different elements of the 
Nigerian security forces, without being thwarted. In the case of the Nigerian Headquarters attack 
in Abuja, it was unlikely that there were any better viable and efficient ways to carry out the attack 
without being stopped. Other means may easily have been thwarted by the Nigerian security 
operatives before the attacker approached the target. Hence, amid such militarised and hostile 
environment, this strategy naturally appeared as a very reasonable and efficient option to carry out 
such strategic attacks, which ordinarily would seem impossible without being stopped.  
Within the BH’s organisational setting, the mutual bonding and interactions between activists help 
explain the individual’s decision to participate in this kind of activism. The personal decision to 
embrace and personally justify participation in a suicide bombing in the face of the Nigerian police 
presence in the region could flow not just from the ideological exposition, but from the 
socialisation process that went on within the group. More than just a mere ideological disposition, 
the individuals’ transition from partaking in the use of just knives and guns, to sacrificing one’s 
life for a greater cause should be seen more because of personal interpretations and internalisations 
                                                            
144 Interview by the author with JTF personnel in Kaduna (March 2017). 
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of the activism that exists within the group. Real transformation for individuals within the group 
to partake in this kind of violent activism obviously did not begin prior to the participation in the 
group. Rather, it may have begun with the individuals’ participation in BH’s activities. Through 
participating in the activities within the group by group members (both violent and non-violent), 
they must have had investments in the group in terms of their identity and emotions that tend to 
create strong linkages with individuals within the group. They must have existed within social 
bonds that superseded previous social ties, which makes attacks against such individuals within 
the group to be easily internalised as personal. Such social bonds are very powerful; they could be 
socially appealing to motivate individual activists to sacrifice their lives to avenge another 
brother’s life, rather than die in the group for nothing.   
 
6.4 Internal Dynamics: Connecting the Use of kidnappings and Armed Robbery to the 
Internal Competition from the Split and Unification of Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad 
al-Sudan by BH   
Other than interactions between BH and other similar SOMOs, another condition that has helped 
influence the sustenance of more sophisticated forms of violence by BH is the internal competition 
between the different actors in the organisation. In the last few years, this internal competition has 
also proved to be another significant mobilisatory condition under which development of forms of 
activisms such as kidnappings and armed robbery ensued in the group. 
Internal competition between different actors in BH first became public when Jama`at Ansar al-
Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, mostly known for its short form, Ansaru, split from Shekau in 2011. 
A close reading of some of the internal letters and an analysis of “Open letter to Shekau” from Nur 
Mamman to Yusuf in 2016 show that the split had happened because of mostly doctrinal and 
methodological disagreement between some high-ranking members of the group (particularly 
Khalid al-Barnawi and Abu Muhammed) and Shekau. Relationship between these actors soured, 
when Shekau refused to listen to the counsel from AQIM in 2011. Before this, the relationship 
between the two groups (BH and AQIM) had in fact continued to flourished, until Shekau began 
to manifest signs of deviation on the issues of al-`udhr bi-l-jahl and takfir al-Muthlaq (being 
excused due to ignorance and excommunication). Thus, he would begin to use violence to carry 
out targeted attacks on the Muslim population, who were fleeing the BH violence. According to 
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Kassim 2018, Shekau, who had at this time begun to argue that anyone, who did not join in the 
BH activism including the entire Nigerian Muslim population, is an infidel. As a result, he started 
to carry out attacks targeted on “innocent Muslims” fleeing the BH violence. For deciding not to 
join the BH activism and deciding to reside under and receive assistance from the Nigerian 
government, Shekau took this kind of Muslim population as ‘infidels’. Their children still attended 
government schools, and they participated in democratic elections, he would argue. For this, they 
are “legitimate target of the jihad” (Kassim, 2018:18).  
This did not go down well with many within the BH leadership hierarchy, especially Khalid al-
Barnawi and Abu Muhammed who felt that the practice was alienating the entire Muslim 
population and “leading the Nigerian people to criticise the religion and the jihad” (Kassim, 2018). 
These two were also among those emissaries that were sent by Shekau to visit Abu Zeid with al-
Barnawi in August 2009. In the coming days, they would together with other eight members of 
BH Shura write a letter to the AQIM leadership, likening Shekau’s actions to that of Antar Zouabri 
of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), from which AQIM split during the Algerian civil war in the 
1990s145. AQIM tried to intervene by sending letters to Shekau (Zenn, 2018:123). When it became 
obvious to them that Shekau was unwilling to change the approach, AQIM encouraged Khalid al-
Barnawi and Abu Muhammed to form a new group. In January 2012, the group announced the 
formation of Ansaru, through a distribution of pamphlets in the different parts of the region146. The 
group was mainly made up of activists who are loyal to Khalid al-Barnawi and Abu Muhammed 
and had trained with AQIM and al-Shabaab. First, they took the name al-Qaeda in the Lands 
Beyond the Sahel, (in identification with AQIM and al-Qaeda), and later Jama’at Ansar al-
Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan in 2012, when they had become very established in the region.  
While this split played out in the public as only as a sign of infighting between BH activists, it 
significantly shaped the development and intensity of other forms of violence (particularly 
kidnappings and arm robbery) that would evolve in the group. Remaining connected to AQIM for 
example, meant that Ansaru were able to adopt the use of kidnappings, which at the time had been 
                                                            
145 Zouabri’s declaration of takfir against the entire Algerian Muslim population who did not join his group had led to 
the foundation of AQIM’s split from the GIA. The practice had alienated and turned many Muslims against the group 
during the 1990s civil war with the Algerian government. AQIM had to split from the GIA, when they could not 
resolve the problem with the Zouabri led GIA leadership (quote)  
146 Interview by the author with a JTF personnel in Abuja (April 2017). 
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part of AQIM’s strategy. In AQIM, they (Ansaru) at least had the collaboration in the technical 
know-how and the mobilisation to adopt this kind of violent activism. Access to training and 
material resources in the contexts of continuous will to engage with the Nigerian security forces 
meant that the group could also mobilise and use this to coordinate high profile attacks, not only 
to raise funds for its other non-violent activities, but also to terrorise people in the region. The first 
time Ansaru used this form of violence was in the kidnapping of Chris McManus and Franco 
Lamolinara—a British and Italian engineer, who were kidnapped near the border with Niger in 
Kebbi State in May 2011, while working on a project for the Nigerian Central bank. In the coming 
days, Ansaru demanded for ransom before they would release the kidnapped individuals. A 
demand for ransom is a practice that has long been used to AQIM. In the past, the group had used 
this strategy to collect millions of dollars from abducted Westerners (Smith, 2015:137). In these 
contexts, this was a clear case of transfer of tactics.  
Given the collaboration and connection with AQIM, Ansaru could find this strategy as a good 
option to raise more money, as well as terrorise foreigners (non-Muslims) doing business in the 
region. However, the ransom never came. Both men were later killed by Ansaru, when a combined 
rescue effort by both the Nigerian and British forces went bad in Kano (Smith, 2018:137). Other 
than these widely reported kidnappings, some of the other attacks by Ansaru include the 
kidnappings and killing of a German engineer in Kano on the day they officially announced the 
group’s formation; a guerrilla ambush attack on Nigerian troops preparing to be deployed to Mali 
in January 2013; a well-coordinated attack in Abuja prison in November 2012 (which freed many 
members of the BH activists) and an abduction of seven foreign engineers on a construction site 
in Bauchi State in 2013 amidst AQIM’s loss of ground in Mali as a result of combined French and 
West African military crack-down on Islamic militants in Mali. In claiming these attacks, Ansaru 
claimed that the attack was in response to French “atrocities” committed in Afghanistan and Mali. 
They later killed the victims in Sambisa forest, when their ransom demand was not met by the 
French government147. Ansaru had also conducted many suicide bombings, targeting mostly 
Christians and elements within the Nigerian security forces. Ansaru had been able to carry out this 
kind of attacks mainly because of their continued co-operation with AQIM. Having this co-
                                                            
147 Interview by the author with an anonymous JTF personnel (Kaduna, March 2017). 
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operation, they had both the financial muscle and the training to carry out fewer but much potent 
and significant attacks. 
On the contrary, Shekau’s group at this time had fewer material resources, in terms financial 
support and less experience in militant training. Thus, they were handicapped and limited to mainly 
local attacks. Starting from the late 2011 to 2013, most of BH’s attacks (Zenn, 2018)148 were 
mainly limited to Borno and Yobe states. Most of these attacks were assassinations of religious 
leaders, politicians and government officials, and small-scale bombings of mosques and churches. 
Not having the kind of financial resources and military arsenal they previously enjoyed with 
AQIM, they resorted to bank robberies and petty local kidnappings. More than being part of the 
group’s religious activism, the robbing of banks and making away with millions of Naira were 
meant to help the group generate the desperately needed material resources for financing the 
group’s activisms. One chief police, who worked in Maiduguri during this period, estimated about 
80 bank robberies and 20 kidnappings from the end of 2011 to 2013. He puts the estimated money 
generated from these robberies and kidnappings at about $10 million149. Although this kind of 
strategy would ordinarily be forbidden for a religious inspired group such as BH, my suspicion is 
that Shekau’s desperate effort to out-compete Ansaru must have motivated him to continue to use 
this strategy. Although this is quite speculative, I believe that within such a competitive 
atmosphere, actions of activists are likely to be affected by that of the other rival group. Through 
an unspoken competition to out-violence the Ansaru group, possibly, Shekau’s actions must have 
been affected by Ansaru’s significant attacks. The fact the Shekau could still want to show the 
AQIM leadership that he is still relevant despite being isolated, also gives more credibility to this 
argument. Within such contexts, it would seem natural to continue to engage in this kind of 
competitive violence with Ansaru. Not having the financial muscle like Ansaru, they were able to 
engage in other forms of violence that didn’t need much material resources to conduct. My point 
here is that, the development and intensity of the attacks in both groups was not just about the 
BH’s continuity in its jihadi activism, it was also about out competing the other group in the use 
of violent activism. Ansaru’s different access to resources means that its violent actions were 
affected by different cost benefit calculations. Tactical decisions were not just about out-foxing 
                                                            
148 For a chronological account of the series of violent attacks by Ansaru and BH, I have relied mostly on Zenn 2018.  
149 Interview by the author with an anonymous police officer (Kaduna, May 2017). 
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the enemy, but also it was about impressing AQIM, as well as about out-competing the rival 
Shekau led faction.  
Things would remain this way until towards the second quarter of 2013. Due to the imminent 
defeat of AQIM and other similar organisations in Mali and its subsequent inability to continue 
financially supporting Ansaru, most of the warring leaders in Ansaru, including Khalid al-Benawi, 
and Nur Mamman150 had shelved their differences, and re-integrated151into the Shekau faction. As 
a result of this reintegration, Boko Haram in general rapidly improved in many tactical areas. For 
instance, kidnappings-for-ransom, which continued to generate millions of dollars for the group 
became its biggest source of income. Suicide bombings, which rapidly increased in the north-
eastern Nigeria were used to conduct significant attacks against the Nigerian security forces (Zenn, 
2018). Sophisticated raids on police stations and military barracks, which led to more acquisition 
of ammunitions influenced the overthrow of territories in eastern part of the region. And finally, 
the use of more media and social media narratives, which began to incorporate some of the former 
Ansaru themes (Zenn, 2018).  
It was not a coincidence that these improvements began mostly after the March integrations. It was 
also during this time that the group began to increase the extent of its attacks outside Nigerian 
borders, starting with an attack on a military barracks in Monguno along Borno State’s border with 
Niger (a natural entry point for militants from Mali to re-enter Nigeria). In the months after the 
Monguno, raids also continued in Baga, Marte, Maiha, Damatru, Benisheikh, Bama, Konduga, 
Gujba, and Demba152. There were also so many kidnappings of both local and foreign individuals 
from August 2013 to the middle of 2014, which resulted in the deaths of more than 1000 people 
in the region. My JTF respondents explained to me, how most of the people who carried out the 
kidnappings were practically ex-AQIM and BH combatants who re-joined BH after Mali. one of 
the respondents said, “Some of them were actually Arabs. They also had abundance of Hilux vans, 
sophisticated ammunitions and several different fighters, with which made carrying out such 
                                                            
150 It is not clear whether Nur was ever part of Ansaru faction at this time. Most sources, including the letter from 
AQIM are not explicit on this. What is clear, however, is that he was among those who disagreed with Shekau’s thesis 
in 2011. Probably for fear of his life, he had also left and hidden himself away from Shekau at some point.     
151 Three main factors contributed to the integration of al-Benawi’s and Nur’s factions into BH in 2013. First, AQIM 
was unable to continue supporting Ansaru after the French-led military intervention in Mali in 2013; Shekau was 
ordering the killing of Ansaru members; and Nigerian counterterrorism operations had eliminated key Ansaru cells.  
152 Interviews by the author of several JTF personnel at Kaduna (March 2017) 
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attacks became a bit easier”153. BH’s propaganda videos154, at this time, that showed BH activists 
with several Arab looking men chanting war songs and shooting sophisticated ammunitions in the 
air. My assessment is that those were AQIM members who had aligned with BH and had then 
formed part of their violent activism in the region. It was during this time that Shekau men carried 
the highly reported kidnapping of more than 200 school girls from Chibok, a small town in Borno 
state. Although this action was not wholly supported by the al-Qaeda leadership155, the attack 
demonstrates the influence of the new imports that returned from Mali. Due to all these attacks, 
the group became stronger than ever. By early 2014, they had begun to abandon their previous 
guerrilla tactics, and instead begun to capture and keep towns as part of a territorial extension in 
the region. In August 2014, Yusuf would declare the captured territories as part of his Caliphate. 
As the Nigeria military steadily withdrew from its bases in these areas, Shekau’s group extended 
their territorial conquest. However, none of these should down play the relevance of the intention 
to continue to carry out these attacks by the activists, which arise mostly because of their belief in 
their jihadist mission, as well as the interactions with several elements within the region. My point 
is that amid these resources, activists are more emboldened, because of the mobilising effects such 
resources entails.  
In July 2014, Shekau voiced support for Islamic State in Iraq and Levante of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, ahead of al-Qaeda’s head Ayman al-Zawahiri and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. 
In March 2015, the group formally pledged allegiance and was officially confirmed by their 
spokesman some days later. The alliance with the new ISIL group had gone through a gradual 
process. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate from a mosque in Mosul, Iraq and the 
formation of ISIS (a name which had recently been changed to Islamic State to align with its global 
aspirations) in 2014 had coincided with BH’s occupation of territories. As AQIM became 
increasingly estranged from Boko Haram, the group strategically saw a very viable opportunity to 
align itself with the Islamic State. By late 2014, Boko Haram had established a line of 
communication to some of the North African former AQIM members who had defected to the 
                                                            
153 Interviews by the author of a JTF personnel (Kaduna, March 2017) 
154 My JTF respondents showed me several videos of BH activists with Arab looking men, parading themselves as 
part of BH in the Sambisa forest. 
155 Al-Qaeda had in a statement in 2014 condemned the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, as this goes contrary to their 
theological thesis of not attacking innocent Muslims. See Adam Nossiter and David D. Kirkpatrick article of May 
7th 2014 on NewYork Times available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/africa/abduction-of-girls-an-act-not-even-al-qaeda-can-condone.html 
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Islamic State and ran a pro-Islamic State media agency in Tunisia called Africa Media (Ifriqiya 
L’ilam). In January 2015, these activists would set up an English, French and Arabic-language 
Twitter account called al-Urwa al-Wutqha for Boko Haram, with Abu Musab al-Barnawi (an 
alleged son of Mohammed Yusuf, who had in the last five years risen to a key leadership position 
within the group) as the Twitter account’s official spokesman (Zenn, 2018: 117). The group would 
finally make the pledge of allegiance on March 7, 2015, after a consultative council meeting was 
held by all the factional leaders of the group (Zenn, 2018:128). Shekau appeared in the Twitter 
account in February 2015 (Zenn, 2018:128). From then on, the group would change its name to 
the Islamic State’s West African province (ISWAP). Shekau automatically assumed the position 
of Governor, while Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi maintained his position as the official spokesman. All 
factions withheld their ideological differences to support Shekau in the new ISWAP group.  
Other than the influence on violent activism, due to the material support, another major visible 
“fingerprint” of IS in BH’s activism had been on their propaganda and media exposure. The pledge 
was accepted by al-Baghdadi’s spokesman and praised in 10 other Islamic State videos from 
Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Iraq and in the Islamic State’s English-language propaganda 
magazine Dabiq (Zenn, 2018:126). With such media presence, BH’s activism and local attacks 
did became more of global issue. Its social and violent activism became fully merged into the 
Islamic State’s social media system, together with the Africa Media members, such as Abu Malik 
Shaybah al-Hamad, who had also pledged allegiance to IS. In these social media networks, these 
outlets have also encouraged foreign fighters to ‘migrate’ to Nigeria, to join the ISWAP’s jihadi 
cause, as the group has again begun to lose momentum as a result of both the Nigerian government 
and the joint military Multi-National (of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin) Joint Task 
Force renewed military attacks on the group in 2015. In fact, with the formation of the joint military 
Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) involving Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin 
in the beginning of 2015, and a renewed effort by the new Nigerian President, Mohammed Buhari, 
things had begun to turn bad for the group. Within one year of the group’s pledge to IS, the regional 
coalition forces have been able to re-take several towns previously taken by ISWAP and have 
consequently eliminated much of the group’s authority in north-eastern part of the country. The 
unofficial Jihadist Caliphate that Shekau declared in August 2014 has also now become non-
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existent. BH was further pushed into the Sambisa forest by the continuous military attacks on these 
forces.  
 
6.5 Shekau Isolated From AQIM, al-Shabaab and ISIS (2016-) 
In the aftermath of the destruction of the BH’s Islamic Caliphate in the region, the continued 
intensity and development of different forms of violence continued to be influenced by the 
mobilisation of resources and the continuous military attacks (by the Nigerian JTF and the regional 
MNJTF). With the increased military attacks against BH, Shekau, who had grudgingly accepted 
the IS thesis of limiting his attacks on non-Muslim population began to find ways to carry out 
attacks on both Nigerian and the neighbouring countries involved in the fight. By early 2016, he 
had started to attack the Muslim population, whom he believes were also legitimate targets, 
because they had continued to live under and had continued to receive assistance from the Nigerian 
government. On the 24th March 2015 under his command, BH attacked the residents of Damasak 
(Nigeria), as they were fleeing from the coalition forces, taking about 400 women and children156. 
They also launched several lone attacks on different segments in the region, including mosques. 
Between 1 and 2 July, 97 people, mostly men were also killed in numerous mosques suicide 
attacks. These were all part of Shekau’s response to the new renewed Nigerian JTF and Multi-
National Joint Task Force’s (MNJTF) offensive against the group.  
These attacks were not accepted by other fractional leaders such as Nur Mamman and Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi. Unlike Shekau, these men often employed the theological tool of deferment (irja’) and 
had opposed the view that “ordinary Muslims” who did not join ISWAP or who continued to 
receive services from an ‘infidel’ government and humanitarian organisations are themselves 
necessarily “infidels.” Reading from the letters the activists sent to AQIM, it appears that they only 
want to kill Muslims who were actively opposing the jihad. Like the Ansaru faction in 2012, they 
only wanted to focus on targeting Christian ‘proselytisers’ or the Nigerian government. More 
importantly, they were also not convinced that the attacks on civilians and on ordinary Muslims 
as paraded by Shekau was of any benefit to the organisation’s main goal. Such attacks as argued 
in one of al-Barnawi’s videos would only cause the organisation to lose the support of the Muslim 
                                                            
156 Interview by the author with anonymous JTF personnel in Abuja (April 2017).  
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population, whose support they felt was important for them to achieve their aims. The inability of 
the different leaders in the group to resolve this, would lead to a complete breakdown in the 
relationship between Shekau and most of these actors.   
Probably worried about how the IS leadership would interpret this conflictual relationship, a very 
calculated Shekau in early 2015 sent about 8 letters to the Islamic state. In the letters, he raised 
many issues. Four of these issues are for me the most important ones: First, his ideological 
differences with al-Barnawi, especially on the issue of capturing Muslims who are not involved in 
the group’s activisms, as slaves. Secondly, the issue of carrying out attacks in markets involving 
Muslims, and the declaration of takfir on the refugee’s fleeing Boko Haram’s violent activities in 
the region. Third, the issue of takfir on those who possess national identity papers such as a 
passport.  Finally, on the judgement regarding targeting Western secular schools, I was not able to 
access Shekau’s letters myself, but a two-part audio lecture titled “Expose: Open Letter to 
Abubakar Shekau”157 addressed to Shekau from Mamman Nur explained the contents of Shekau’s 
letters. Nur’s lecture Shekau also suggests that the Islamic State had also responded to these 
questions. In responding through their office for Research and Studies, ISIS gave a theological 
treatise admonishing Shekau on how to carry-out further attacks on the region. Writing as the 
coordinator of this ISIS office, Abu Malik al-Tamimi explained to ISWAP that living in the land 
of unbelief itself is not tantamount to takfir, except if it is accompanied with the obligation to 
approve acts of unbelief or declare alliance to the people of unbelief. He also explains that it is 
unlawful to migrate, “when emigration becomes mandatory, desirable, and permissible”.  
On the question of waging attacks in markets, al-Tamimi invoked “the principle of Tatarrus” to 
explain that it could be permissible and not permissible to attack jihadi adversaries who immerse 
themselves within the civilian population, which are predominantly non-Muslim. This depended 
on the context. On the question of possession of national identity papers, he argues that it should 
only be regarded as takfir if it is accompanied with a show of loyalty and support to the country of 
unbelief as well as subservience to its laws. Finally, on the question of attacking Western secular 
schools, al-Tamimi responded that it is permissible to attack them in Europe and other Crusader 
countries in Africa if the students from such schools are commissioned into military service to 
fight against the jihadis. Further, it is even more permissible “to attack the Western secular schools 
                                                            
157 A version of this lecture was drawn from Kassim and Nwankpa (2017:453-455). 
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if the students are non-Muslims, but the benefit of the attack should be determined by the people 
of authority in the jihadi circle”158.  
It is not clear whether Shekau received these letters or not, as most of the communications were 
supposed to go through people within the Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi’s faction of the group. Whatever 
be the case, Shekau’s continuous flaunting of some of the instructions (through his killings of BH 
activists and numerous attacks on innocent Muslims) from the IS would put him in the 
organisation’s “bad books”. By August 2016, IS demoted him from being the governor of ISWAP, 
and instead declared al-Bernawi as the new governor of ISWAP. Without informing Shekau, they 
used an interview159 with Abu Musab al-Barnawi in their Al-Naba newsletter to announce that al-
Barnawi has been made the new wali (governor) of ISWAP, thus indicating that Shekau was 
demoted from the position (Kassim, 2018, Kassim and Nwankpa, 2017).   
Less than a day after this interview, Shekau responded. In 10 minutes YouTube video, he 
contended the decision as unfair. He declared that although he still believed al-Baghdadi (the 
leader of IS) was a Caliph, he is never going to follow al-Bernawi. Instead he was now reviving 
Boko Haram, which had ceased to exist after the formation of ISWAP and was reverting to be its 
leader again. In explaining his decision, he explained the ideological differences between him and 
al-Bernawi:  
“My brothers in Allah, I received a message you sent regarding the selection of a 
new Governor. My brothers, Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi and those with him are saying 
that if a Muslim enters a land of unbelief but does not manifest his enmity to the 
unbelievers there, he is not an unbeliever. However, we say that such a person is an 
unbeliever. Afterwards, they said that if he (a Muslim) does not show his enmity to 
the taghut who rules by other than Allah’s revealed law, he is not an unbeliever. 
However, we say that such a person is an unbeliever.  
We found this in Allah’s Book and the Sunna of His Messenger. We wish to follow 
the Sunna of our Messenger. Patience after patience, O Shaykh! It is obligatory upon 
                                                            
158 I have relied on the English translation of the Shaykh Abū Mālik al-Tamīmī (Anas al-Nashwān): “The Nigerian 
Questions, as translated by Kassim (2018:22). The original version of this response in Arabic is available at: 
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/shaykh-abucc84-macc84lik-al-tamicc84micc84-anas-al-nashwacc84n-
22the-nigerian-questions22.pdf.  
159 An audio version of this interview is available at: https://jihadology.net/2015/03/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-
new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-states-shaykh-abu-muḥammad-al-adnani-al-shami-so-they-kill-and-are-killed/ 
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you to show us the truth of the matter in the Book, the Sunna and according to the 
understanding of the pious predecessors. Allah knows my brothers in Allah. As a 
result, we cannot follow a person who commits a major unbelief or polytheism, 
knowingly, with an explanation, and not based on misinterpretation. No, this is not 
possible…160  
This video was also followed up four days later by Shekau’s military leader, nicknamed Man 
Chari. In the new footage, the Chari further explained Shekau’s polemic: 
On this issue, we say the man whom you appointed to this position does not follow 
a sound doctrine from authentic Salafism. On this basis, we will not follow him. Our 
leader, Shekawi (Shekau), wrote eight letters to you where he explained that those 
people follow the ideology of irja’. You asked him about the meaning of irja’, and 
he explained to you in his third message, but you did not respond. Before these issues, 
we had already informed you that they split away from us, becoming isolated from 
us, but you did not do anything. We have also sent you several questions but did not 
receive any response from you—except that suddenly, we heard this news. As a 
result, we say that we are with our Imam, Abu Muhammad b. Muhammad Abubakar 
al-Shekawi, may Allah preserve him161 
Despite Shakau and his military leader’s complains, he was not reinstated as the governor of 
ISWAP. From the middle of 2016 until January 2017 as data for this thesis was being collected, 
he faces a crisis of legitimacy with the other top members of ISWAP and Boko Haram. The 
doctrinal dispute and the open verbal confrontations between him and other factional leaders 
within the organisation had continued. As he had personally severed ties and criticised AQIM, he 
also “temporarily”162 lacks the possibility of re-aligning with al-Qaeda. The last al-Qaeda 
acknowledgement of Boko Haram appears to have been in July 2014, when the leader of AQIM’s 
Tunisian “sub-affiliate,” Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, sent a letter to al-Qaeda leaders, including Shekau, 
arguing that Ayman al-Zawahiri should pledge loyalty to al-Baghdadi as a way of marginalising 
Islamic State hardliners and ending jihadi infighting. Al-Tunisi would later retract his opinion upon 
                                                            
160 A written transcript of this video was culled from Kassim and Nwankpa (2017:468) 
161 Message from the soldiers by Man Chari and Abubakar Shekau, quoted in Kassim and Nwankpa (468). 
162 I use “temporarily” because it is very difficult to predict how things would turn out in the group.  
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advice of other al-Qaeda scholars and leaders (Zenn, 2018: 139). Also, it seems that once al-
Baghdadi declared the Caliphate in June 2014 and Shekau claimed the Chibok kidnapping in May 
2014, al-Qaeda may have fully ended the relationship with Shekau.  
Amid all these, BH’s violent activities including the use of suicide bombings and kidnappings for 
ransom under Shekau have been reduced to low level attacks. Largely because of reduced material 
resources from either AQIM and IS, Shekau has struggled to mobilise activists and generate the 
kind of intelligence needed to coordinate such forms of violence. Most of his activities are now 
focused on winning the support of foot soldiers, as well as potential recruits into the group. This 
is probably why the release and production of propaganda videos and images showing the 
resilience of his factions and their battlefield gains in their war against the Nigerian Army has 
increased during this period (Kassim, 2018). This is probably going to continue amid lack of 
material resources needed to conduct high profile attacks.  
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the development and sustenance of different forms of violent activism 
in BH, particularly the lone professional assassinations, suicide bombings, kidnappings for 
ransom, armed bank robberies, and guerrilla raids on military and police barracks. Starting with a 
synopsis of the use of these forms of violence from the time the group re-emerged in 2010, it traces 
how these different forms of violent activisms have remained part of the group’s strategy for goal 
attainment.  
The chapter explained how most of the BH activists had escaped into the neighbouring countries 
at the dawn of the 2009 crack-down by the security forces, where they aligned and trained with 
AQIM and al-Shabaab. Shekau, who succeeded the group’s founder, took advantage of these 
contacts. While recovering from gun wounds, he was able to establish contacts with AQIM and 
probably al-Qaeda leadership, who helped his group with both training and material resources he 
needed to re-launch their activism in the region. The chapter argued that it was the availability of 
these resources and framing of the group’s initial ideology of victimhood by Shekau, which 
portrays BH and the entire Muslim population in the region as victims rather than the aggressors. 
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This enabled Shekau and his group to develop the first forms of violence used in the group when 
they re-emerged in 2010. 
Meanwhile, arriving in the region in 2010, Shekau’s group quickly realised that the region was no 
longer how it used to be before the 2009 crackdown. In the after math of the 2009 crack-down, the 
Nigerian government had maintained a militarisation policy of the region: JTF and military troops 
paraded every corner of the major cities. There were constant stop and search operations, even in 
the remotest villages, security personnel randomly declared curfew and bans on any public 
procession, and demonstration and suspicious public gatherings were constantly banned. 
Therefore, for them to launch their attacks, the group had to adopt more sophisticated means, with 
which they could conduct their attacks without being stopped. Hence, they invented the use of 
shoot and run strategy, using motorcycles and local power-bikes that gives them easy access to 
escape. As a result, they targeted and killed key security personnel, religious leaders and politicians 
who in one way or the other stood in their way of their success or had helped the security forces 
in 2009. Where there was a need to carry out major attacks in the heart of the country’s capital 
Abuja, they adopted the use of suicide bombing. Within such a militarised and security-tight 
environment, this tactic appears logical as the most potent and efficient means to carry out such 
strategic attack, which ordinarily would seem impossible to carry out without being stopped. 
The development of activism such as suicide bombings, kidnappings for ransom, guerrilla attacks 
and raids on military and police barracks had also followed a similar path. Aside using historical 
narratives from Salafism to frame it as a moral obligation, the development of such activisms was 
influenced by the group’s continuous mutual co-operation with similar networks and internal 
competitions between different factions that evolved in the group. Having been used and justified 
within these similar organisations, such forms of violence tactics easily became an option to be 
used in BH. In cases when the groups were temporarily cut off from any of its global similar parent 
group, like in 2012 and currently, the organisation has developed these forms of violence to locally 
generate resources to buy weapons and ammunitions, to be able to continue to carry out its attacks.  
All of these highlight the importance of resources in the development of specific forms of violence 
and the sustenance of such violence within SOMOs. To adopt a specific form of violent strategies 
SOMO leaders use different resources available to them to create crucibles for mobilisation. The 
availability of certain resources infuses the ability to adopt certain strategies which such resources 
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incorporate (Della Porta, 2009; Amaechi, 2013). The availability of certain resources influences 
both the willingness and the ability of SOMOs’ to adopt the specific kinds of violent activisms 
they use, to maximise impact and the efficaciousness of their groups’ goals  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has used the case of BH to study the emergence and the subsequent development of 
different forms of violence in SOMOs, using BH as a case study. Drawing mainly from the idea 
of “political opportunity” and “resource mobilisation” from SMT, it conceptualises the 
organisation as a “movement organisation”. Hence, like its social counterparts, it regards the 
evolution and use of violence within the group as dependent on several specific mobilisatory and 
political opportunity structures within and around both the organisation and the socio-political 
environments the group identifies. The theoretical assumption is that such structures provide the 
window of opportunity, upon which such organisations, and the subsequent different forms of 
violence strategy evolve. Once they evolve, such strategies remain contested, and develop in 
accordance to constraints and opportunities available to such groups, as they navigate their socio-
political terrain. 
On this basis, three main research questions were formulated: (1) Under what socio-political 
structures did it emerge in the Northern Nigeria? (2) Under what conditions did the group began 
to use violence against the Nigerian state? (3) Finally, what specific forms of violence does the 
group use; and how are these different forms of violence sustained in the group? The idea here was 
not to provide a chronological account of all the various forms of violence that have been used by 
the group; but rather, to situate the use of this strategy to the specific shifting organisational and 
socio-political conditions the organisation identifies.  
For the data, the study relied mostly on semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews with 
individuals who have in-depth knowledge on the possible inner workings of the organisations. 
Such individuals include religious leaders (particularly those within the Salafi networks), 
politicians within the region, victims of BH violence and finally security personnel working within 
the area. In addition, the study has also drawn on secondary sources such as videos of different 
leaders in the group, Yusuf’s manifesto, and finally, recently released letters between BH and the 
AQIM leaders, about the internal functions of BH. These sources contain ethnographic data, which 
contextualises both the evolution of the group and development of different forms of violence in 
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the group in the specific political and mobilisatory structures within the group and the Northern 
Nigeria. 
 
7.2 Research Findings and Implications to Previous Research  
There are several key findings from this research. I present these findings in accordance with the 
study’s three main research questions: the emergence of the organisation; the evolution and 
justification of violence in the organisation; and finally, the further escalation of the different forms 
of violence in the organisation. 
7.2.1 The Emergence of Boko Haram 
In investigating the emergence of BH, the thesis identified six Northern Nigerian specific socio-
political structures: The Northern Nigerian culture of Islamic activism; the colonial legacy; the rise 
of NPC in post-independent Nigeria, the al-Shari’a advocacy at the dawn of democracy in 1999; 
the intra-ideological dispute between the two main Salafi networks (Izala and Ahlus Sunna); and 
the al-Qaeda influence. These conditions provided the socio-political background upon which the 
SOMO was established, first by Mohammed Ali at Kanama in 2003, and later by Yusuf 
Mohammed at Maiduguri in 2005.  
On socio-political aspects, the data shows that the whole idea of religio-political activism in the 
Northern Nigeria was rooted in the region’s culture of Islamic activism, which dates back to the 
history of Islamic religion with Sheikh Usman dan Fodio in the nineteenth century. Drawing from 
Islam’s understanding of politics and religion, and from its theological concepts such as “jihad”, 
the respected Fulani cleric was able to mobilise socio-political activism, which justified the use of 
violence against despotic Hausa Kings. By so doing, dan Fodio subtly “concretise” the role of 
Islam as a mobilisatory resource within which oppositional political activism could be galvanised 
in the region. A formation of sound organisation around Islamic theological doctrines would 
consequently become an important way to engage with the state, especially in the face of 
unfavourable socio-political conditions.  
This phenomenon was further exacerbated by colonial legacies and consequent secular State that 
emerged with colonialism. Colonialism came with many socio-political changes in the region. 
Among these changes were a substitution of the region’s Sokoto Caliphate’s al-Shari’a system 
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with Western-based constitutional democracy and an introduction of British education system that 
undermined the region’s Islamic-based education system. These changes seriously challenged the 
hegemonic position of Islamic authorities in the region, and soon created the opportunity for 
resentment and political opposition against the state. Given the region’s religious history, colonial 
activists easily used Islam as a tool to mobilise people against the colonial state. Due to the partial 
success some of these resistant groups achieved, Islam become more entrenched as a vital 
mobilisation tool for socio-political activism. Invoking the region’s and general Islamic religio-
political history, become a potent strategy to build political momentum, as well as to mobilise 
people around a common socio-political cause.  
These kinds of practices continued in the independent Nigeria. The independent state, having been 
institutionalised on colonial foundation was easily interpreted as a continuation of the colonial 
state and thus was ideological rejected. With the prospects of self-rule, this easily transformed 
colonial resistance into the formation of a formidable political party, the NPC. In such a party, 
activists could at least strive to re-write the colonial legacies and return the region back to its 
Islamic roots. Operating within a multi-ethnic and tripartite regional society, (religion) Islam easily 
became the ideal resource to articulate the region’s political grievances and unite people for a 
vibrant socio-political activism. For that reason, therefore, the party grew and become very popular 
in the region. The party has remained the most popular political party in the region today. However, 
the consequence of this, is that it further entrenched the role of Islam, as well as regional religious 
identity as the pre-eminent marker of political contention, especially at the Nigerian federal 
government level. A lack of representation of Muslim or Northern activists at the Nigerian Federal 
government level become easily interpreted as “political marginalisation”; and as such creates 
grievances and political opportunities for tensions between the ruling ethnic group and the region. 
Drawing on such political opportunities, different activists from the region ceased on the 
opportunity to establish activist groups which advocated for political systems that are hoped to 
return the region back to its al-Shari’a roots.  
This was the case in 1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian rule, with Olusegun Obasanjo 
emerging as the new Nigerian president. Since Obasanjo was a Southerner and Christian, his 
electoral victory was easily interpreted as “political marginalisation” in the Northern Nigeria. 
Thus, given all the freedom democracy brings, there was a political opportunity for activists from 
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many religious networks within the region to become bolder and re-start activism for al-Shari’a- 
a system that is generally believed to bring the region to its proper Islamic, economic and political 
freedom. The situation became worse in 2001, when Obasanjo, in his constitutional right decided 
to dismiss all the high-ranking military officers, who had held political offices. Those most highly 
affected were the Northerners. As if this was not enough; the president would also in defiance to 
a possible agreement he had with some Northern Nigerian political elites about ceding power after 
his first tenure, started campaigning for a second term. This was completely against the belief that 
he (the President) was only going to hold forth the Presidency until 2003, after which he was 
expected to hand over to a Muslim Northerner. This further set the context for more conditions 
and restlessness for al-Shari’a or other forms of religio-political activism. Soon, bolder agitations 
for al-Shari’a and the enthronement of Islamic supremacy at the centre of the Nigerian government 
ensued. By the end of Obasanjo’s first year in office, twelve states from the Northern region had 
adopted Shari’a law as their state’s penal code. It was on this background that a socio-political 
activist organisation that wants to return Nigeria to its al-Shari’a system resonated with many 
activists within the region.  
On the socio-religious aspects, the data found that the evolution of BH was very rooted in the 
internal dynamics within the established Salafi networks within the region. At the dawn of 
democracy, many activists within these networks were at the forefront of al-Shari’a advocacy, 
advocating that a return of the region to its former Shari’a based system was the best way to return 
the region back to its religious and economic boom. Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the 
case. Although the Shari’a law was enthroned in twelve different states of the region, the system 
did not create the much anticipated religious and economic boom, as most of the actors who 
championed it within the Salafi networks had promised. In fact, in implementing the Shari’a laws, 
the states ended up empowering the Sufis and forced the Salafists to accept a doctrinal 
compromise; the very issue the Salafis had always wanted to change. Despite the region’s public 
show of religious consciousness and the Shari’a law implementation, the region remained 
characterised by political corruption and lack of accountability in the public offices. There was 
also a tremendous lack of basic infrastructures, poor education systems, lack of basic health care, 
and youth unemployment, especially among the Salafi youths, the majority of whom had not 
attended Western education system. These, as time went on ignited silent protest among young 
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Salafi adherents, who felt betrayed by the main Salafi establishments. Empowered by al-Qaeda-
funded Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Yusuf, another rising Salafi actor (Mohammed Yusuf), 
who had become famous both through his criticisms of the main Salafi establishments at the Ndimi 
mosque, and through his activism during the al-Shari’a advocacy, these young Salafi adherents 
left the old Salafi establishments. They joined Ali in his newly established al-Qaeda-funded camp 
in Kanama. In the Kanama camp, they easily found a natural home for “true Islamic freedom”; a 
version of the faith that would not be compromised by the corrupt Islamic establishments and their 
Nigerian state collaborators. 
The data also reveals that Mohammed Ali, the leader of the group at the Kanama camp was a 
member of the al-Qaeda. He was able to establish the Kanama camp largely because of the 
financial assistance he received from Osama Bin Laden. Before returning to Nigeria he had studied 
under al-Qaeda scholars in Sudan and had also fought in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda. He had met 
Osama Bin Laden in Sudan, with whom they had agreed to open an al-Qaeda training camp in 
Nigeria. For this, he received about 3 Million dollars to set up the camp. However, within two 
years, the Nigerian government dismantled the camp. Ali, the leader of the group and many other 
members of the group were killed. But Yusuf, who had been the spiritual leader of the group 
survived. He would stay in Saudi Arabia for about one year. He was only allowed to return to 
Nigeria at the intervention of Jafar Adamu (his mentor) and Adamu Dibal (the then deputy 
governor of Borno state), on the promise that he would not be involved in any more violence in 
the region. Following his return in 2005, he moved their base to Maiduguri, and with more funding 
from undetermined ‘friends’ in Saudi Arabia, he built a new centre that attracted some of the 
former Kanama boys, who survived the previous raid. From there, the group grew from strength 
to strength, becoming one of most vocal activist organisations in the region. 
The identification of the evolution of BH to the six political structures confirms the understanding 
in several previous research (Anonymous, 2012; Brigaglia, 2015; Kassim, 2015; Thurston, 2015; 
Zenn, 2018) that SOMOs like BH do not evolve in a vacuum. However, different from 
concentration on ideas within Salafism as the primary motivator for such organisations, the BH 
case shows that the evolution of such groups is also sensitive to the specific socio-political and 
environmental structures (Loimeier, 2012) within the Northern Nigeria, where the organisation 
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identify/operate. These political structures in themselves do not necessarily produce SOMOs, 
rather they provide the window of opportunity upon which activists establish such organisations.  
The findings also show that the role of material resources is particularly significant. The 
availability of resources impact both the willingness and the ability of SOMO actors to establish 
their organisations. In the case of BH, the availability of material resources from al-Qaeda and that 
of Yusuf’s “friends” from Saudi Arabia provided the enablements for the two men to establish 
both the Kanama camp and the formation of BH later in 2005. Ali and Yusuf’s ability to build on 
both the grievances from the political events in the region and on the fallout from the 
disappointment regarding lack of Shari’a implementation in the region, to establish either the 
Kanama camp or the Ibn Taymiyyah centre in Maiduguri, depended a lot on the availability of 
financial resources available to them. Given such material resources, activists are likely to be 
empowered to establish their organisations, as well as the kind of initial activism they construe as 
useful for the success of their organisations.  
Thus, activists who establish SOMOs are often encouraged not necessarily by religious ideologies, 
but by rational calculus to achieve certain socio-political or religious goals. Cognitive processes 
mediate between political environment and resources, to influence religious or social activists to 
sacrifice their time, money, and energy, in pursuit of certain believed goals. As has been 
consistently identified in SMT scholarship, frustrations or ideologies may influence grievances, 
but they do not necessarily transform to contentions in the form of collective violent actions. For 
such to happen, there must be the existence of other resources in the form of intermediary variables 
(money, mobilization structures such as centres within which activists mobilise), which influence 
the internal debate within the movement to encourage the transformation of these individualised 
discontents into collective activism. Without these elements, it is impossible to transform 
grievances and frustrations into any form of collective activism. 
 
7.2.2 The Adoption of Violence as a Strategy for Goal Attainment  
Two main conditions accelerated the adoption of violence after Yusuf took over the organisation 
in 2005. Firstly, the group leadership’s involvement in the Borno state institutionalised politics. 
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Secondly, the Nigerian state’s (in conjunction with the Borno state government) indiscriminate 
method of policing of BH’s activists.  
 
The data showed that despite having already ‘moved’ ideologically to jihadi position, Yusuf and 
his group never really begun to use violence against either the state actors or the security forces, 
until 2009. Returning to Nigeria from Saudi Arabia, Yusuf was able to build a new group in 2005. 
As a result of financial resources from Saudi Arabia, he was able to quickly build-up a group that 
attracted most of the Salafi youths, who had survived the Kanama violent crack-down. In 
identification with his Salafi mission, he took the name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunn Lidda’awatiwal-jihad 
(the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). He relocated the 
group’s main base from Kanama to Maiduguri, establishing a mosque in a land given to him by 
his father in-law. From there, he espoused the group’s message to other parts of the region, through 
the making and releasing of DVDs, audio cassettes and pamphlets of his messages. He and others 
within the group’s leadership were also involved in dawah campaigns in different parts of the 
region. All these helped increase his popularity in the region. By 2009, the group had branches in 
some of the major cities and states within the region.  
As the wave of the group’s popularity continued, he entered into a pact with an upcoming governor 
of Borno state governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, on the promise that he (Sheriff) promulgated a strict 
implementation of Shari’a law. Upon Sheriff’s electoral victory, he appointed Buju Foi, Yusuf’s 
friend and BH’s collaborator, as the state’s Commissioner of Religious Affairs, on Yusuf’s 
recommendation. Yusuf also become a representative in the state’s Shari’a board. With these, 
Yusuf and his group had access to the Borno state’s Shari’a board and the state institutionalised 
political system. From such access, he and his group continuously pushed for a strict theocratic 
system, which technically entailed dissolution of the existing system. This was obviously unviable 
and considered to be very extreme by different actors in the state. Hence, the state had no choice 
but to reject and isolate him. Frustrated, he and his friend also resigned from working within the 
state’s institutionalised political system. Since he was no longer tied to the state’s political 
institutionalised apparatus, violent activism became more appealing as an appropriate medium to 
bring about the change he and his group desired for the state.  
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In those days, he started by intensifying his criticism against the state. In some cases, he would go 
as far as threatening to depose the state. For this, he was on many occasions, arrested and detained. 
Twice he was charged, but his prosecution never went ahead. In late 2008, Yusuf and his deputy, 
Shekau were also banned from preaching in public by the Borno state government. However, as 
the group’s goal of changing the state system remain unachieved, all these further pushed the group 
into becoming more hardened and louder with more controversial and anti-state rhetoric. 
Convinced of the need to adopt violence, Yusuf also began to secretly acquire weapons and 
ammunitions to start his violent jihad against the state. Due to increased access to some material 
resources, and in the background of the state’s increased indiscriminate targeting of the group’s 
leadership, Yusuf was able to finally articulate his frustrations into more coordinated decision to 
start attacking the Borno state government and the Nigerian government security forces.  
A violent encounter between Yusuf’s group and the Borno state’s newly formed Operation Flush 
Task Force II in June 2009 would finally push the group over the line on the use of violence against 
the Borno state government. For their non-compliance with a new law instructing all motorcycle 
drivers and passengers to wear helmets as a safety precaution, the members of the Operation Flush 
had on that incident shot and killed some members of Yusuf’s organisation. Yusuf’s men had not 
complied with this law probably because they believed that obeying it was an affront to polytheism. 
Obeying such secular laws was tantamount to according reverence to something other than God. 
Rather than obey the security forces, they chose confrontation with them. 
In the coming days, Yusuf would call for the state to apologise and make up for what he believed 
to be injustice on his men. This never came. This further infuriated Yusuf and provided him with 
the appropriate basis for justification of reciprocated violence against the Nigerian security forces. 
Having been “preparing” for a day like that day, Yusuf was able to mobilise his group. Relying 
mostly on the ammunition previously gathered for such events, he and his group launch attacks on 
the security forces. The Ibn Taymiyyah centre (as well as other different cells scattered in other 
parts of the region) was also there as the religio- physical space to plan and execute their violent 
attacks on the security forces, this came pretty easy.  
In response, the Nigerian government would launch a major “political crackdown” on the group. 
Led by a newly formed JTF, the state descended on the group. But as the Nigerian government’s 
method of policing become more indiscriminate and brutal, BH found more justification to become 
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more emboldened in their choice for violence. Thus, they fought back, leading to total chaos in the 
region. The violence would finally end on the 30th of July when the military captured Yusuf. They 
handed him over to the local police at the Maiduguri police station, who later executed him. This 
would temporarily put an end to group, until 2010, when the group re-emerged with more 
sophisticated forms of violence.  
BH’s case highlights the significance of both the involvement of SOMO activists in the state 
institutionalised politics and the role state actors in the provision of the appropriate political 
opportunities for violence in SOMOs. Activists are more likely to draw on violent ideologies in 
the face of brutal state violence, especially when there is availability of resources. Against violent 
interactions with the state, activists are more likely to draw up violent ideologies within which it 
is possible to respond to state’s violent approach. On the contrary, they are likely to find reasons 
to suspend the use of violence strategy in the face of reduced opportunities and constraints, even 
when there is an obvious ideological conviction for violence. Unfortunately, the paradox of State 
repression in response to violent activism in SOMOs is that while it helps the State take control of 
the situation, its very nature itself creates crisis and conditions for internal debates and more 
justification for violence within SOMOs.  
This explains the timing and the temporality involved in the evolution of violence in SOMOs. In 
many cases, the use of violence in SOMOs do not evolve arbitrarily (Amaechi, 2017; Gunning 
2009). Activists do not necessarily subscribe to violent activism, because they are empowered by 
ideology. Rather, the cognitive conviction to adopt such often mediates between the volatile 
political environments, the availability of resources, and the experiences inside the movement 
organisations, given the stage of the organisation. There is often a rational calculus that such 
activism (at least from their calculation) above other strategies, is the best option with which to 
achieve the group’s identified goals. This rational calculus regarding the tactical efficacy of such 
activism also determines the initial preparation and intensity such activism takes. 
Contrary to the popular perception that SOMO leaders are irrational, religious bigots, BH’s case 
shows that such actors are often very calculative. They are as much rational as activists within 
broad-based movement organisation. Just like other activists in social movement organisations, 
these activists are likely to seek to acquire and allocate resources to maximise the goals of their 
movement organisations under political opportunities and constraints. These opportunities and 
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constraints made possible by the presence of resources both within the group and within the 
political environment, enter their rational calculus to help shape intra-movement debates over the 
efficacy of different strategies, including violence. 
 
7.2.3 The Escalation and Sustenance of Different Forms of Violent Activism  
In investigating the further use and escalation of violence, the study first identifies five major forms 
of violence: lone professional assassinations, suicide bombings, kidnappings for ransom, bank 
robberies, and guerrilla raids on military and police barrack. These forms of violence have in the 
last seven years (2010-2017) become the main tools used within the organisation to carry-out 
significant attacks. However, the progression from simple use of locally made guns, knives and 
machetes to these sophisticated forms violent repertoire did not happen overnight. The data reveals 
that these progressions is better understood when linked to the political opportunities that came 
from the availability of resources (material and ideological) due to the group’s interactions and 
mutual corporations with similar brother networks, as well as the internal competition from the 
different factions within the group.  
At the dawn of the 2009 crackdown by the security forces, most BH activists had escaped into the 
neighbouring countries, where they aligned and trained with AQIM and al-Shabaab. Shekau, who 
took over the group’s leadership after the death of Yusuf had relocated to an unknown destination 
in Northern Cameroon. Upon his recovery from gunshot wounds, he re-established contacts with 
AQIM. He sent delegates to AQIM asking for financial assistance and training. Upon the reception 
of such assistance, he led the group on a campaign of violent attacks in the region. As a result of 
these material resources and an added framing of the group’s initial ideology of victimhood, which 
portrays BH and the entire Muslim population in the region as victims rather than the aggressors, 
Shekau was able to re-assemble and mobilise the scattered BH activists to re-start their activism 
in the region in 2010. This time the group had even more reason to attack the Nigerian government: 
they had to revenge the death of their leader and other members of the group, whom the Nigerian 
government “unfairly” killed in the 2009 crack-down of the organisation. 
However, Shekau’s men would soon realise that the region was no longer how it used to be before 
the 2009 crackdown. In the aftermath of the 2009 crackdown, the Nigerian government had 
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maintained a militarisation approach that saw BH activists as simply a bunch of criminals that had 
to be crushed at all cost. Using this approach, the federal government had increased the presence 
of security personnel in the region. Under the new measure, security personnel could randomly 
declare curfew and bans on any public processions, demonstrations or suspicious public 
gatherings. As a result, attacks in the region became a bit more difficult. For the organisation to 
continue to carry out its attacks or engage with the security forces in the region under such a 
militarised environment, they had to devise more advanced and sophisticated means that could 
match those of the security forces. This was the background upon which suicide bombing evolved 
in the organisation. Instead of using locally made knives and bows and arrows, they had to employ 
machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles and car bombs, to carry out their well-planned guerrilla attacks. 
These advanced weapons appeared to be the best means with which the group could still compete 
with the Nigerian security forces, as well as effectively carry out their attacks without being 
stopped.  
First, Shekau and his group started with a high-level hit-and-run assassinations of selected 
individuals and high ranking JTF personnel stationed in the areas using motorcycles. With this 
strategy, the group were able to easily evade arrest after each attack. Using this they targeted and 
killed some of the commanders of the joint task forces that were conducting the operations in the 
region. To further demonstrate continuity with the original dismantled 2009 set, the group also 
attacked local politicians and religious leaders, who had cooperated with the police and implicated 
the BH members in the 2009 raid. They re-took houses belonging to members of group, who either 
died or escaped the first raid. The people who had taken over these houses were either killed or 
forced to vacate them. Due to the success of these attacks, the group became bolder and more 
emboldened. In September 2010, with the help of AQIM, the group would also attack the Federal 
government prison in Jos, Bauchi state. In this case, they liberated about 150 BH inmates together 
with about 550 other inmates.  
Other forms of violent strategy such as suicide bombing has also developed in similar fashion. 
With this method of violent strategy, the group has been able to carry-out major significant attacks, 
which ordinarily would not have been possible. The first time the group used this was in 2011, 
when they used it to attack the Nigerian police chief at the heart of the country’s security capital. 
Within such a militarized and security-tight environment, this tactic appears naturally as the most 
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potent and efficient means to carry out such strategic attack, which ordinarily would seem 
impossible to carry-out without being stopped. The fact that this form of violent strategy had long 
been developed in those similar “brother” organisations (who had continued to work with BH), 
makes the adoption of this strategy very natural. These relationships and cooperation meant that 
by the time BH needed to step up its attacks, they have access to both the experience and the 
technical know-how required for the adoption of this radical form of violence that already exists 
within these organisations. In fact, Mohammad Abul Barra, the 29-year-old who executed the 
group’s first suicide bombing at a UN building in Abuja in 2009, returned from Somalia a few 
days before he carried-out the attack in Abuja. Thus, given that such a radical method had already 
been developed and justified within these ‘brother’ groups, this strategy was at least an option to 
be adopted by the group. In such a militarised and hostile environment where the group operated, 
this strategy naturally appeared as a very reasonable and efficient option to carry out such strategic 
attacks, which ordinarily would seem impossible to carry out such attacks without being stopped.  
The significance of this mutual co-operation is also exemplified in the intensified use of this form 
of violence in 2013 and 2014, when the different factions of the group who trained and fought with 
AQIM in Mali, re-integrated into the group. Through much added resources, the group was also 
able to develop and intensify the use of other forms of violent strategies such as kidnappings and 
guerrilla attacks, which they had learnt from their interactions with AQIM. Using these methods 
of violence, they were able to intensify and carry out attacks, which ordinarily would have been 
impossible. Some of the resources entail the ability to adopt certain strategies which such resources 
incorporate (Della Porta, 2009; Amaechi, 2013). The availability of such strategies from this co-
operation impacts on both the willingness and the ability of activists to mobilize strategies with 
which they can use to maximise the impact and efficaciousness of their groups’ goals (Oberschall, 
1993; Amaechi 2013, Gunning & Baron 2013).  
This was also similar in the case of use of kidnappings for ransom in the group (which developed 
after 2011 and intensified in 2013 and 2014). However, in addition to the interactions and mutual 
co-operation between BH and the similar organisations, this form of violence is connected to the 
internal competitions between the different factions of the group. As a function of Ansaru’s split 
from the Shekau in 2011, the development and intensity of the different attacks in both groups was 
not just about the BH’s continuity in its jihadi activism; rather it was also about out-competing the 
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other in the use of violent activism. Access to different resources meant the ability and motivation 
for different forms of violence. Thus, tactical decisions to use the different forms of sophisticated 
violence were not just about out-foxing the Nigerian state, or just a continuation of the groups' 
violent activism, it was also about ability, and using this ability to impress AQIM, as well as about 
out-compete the rival faction.  
All these demonstrate the significant role of resources in the sustenance of different forms of 
violent activism. Obviously, the development and use of different forms of violence in BH are 
sensitive towards the availability of resources, which comes from the organisation’s interactions 
and mutual co-operation with other similar Salafi organisations. To adopt specific strategies, 
movement organisation leaders use different resources available to them to create crucibles for 
mobilisations. Religious ideology or violent confrontations with state authorities can create 
enabling political opportunities for movement organisations to act; however, without the 
corresponding resources (in the form of ideological framings, the financial resources to buy 
ammunitions, or training in arms from similar networks) SOMOs leaderships may find it difficult 
to sustain such violence over a long period of time. These resources can determine both the form 
and the intensity which these strategies take within such organisations.  
The evolution of suicide violence is more of a result of availability of resources that came with 
mutual co-operation and interactions with similar organisations, than a result of ideological 
imperative evolving from the organisation’s radical Salafists ideology as some studies about such 
groups imply. This strategy did not simply emerge as a static, individual Salafis disposition, prior 
to participation in the movement organisation. Instead, it was more of a result of experience of 
activism within the group. Dispositions to violence may have started before participation in the 
organisation, but the decision to participate in collective violent activism was re-enforced through 
participation in the group: the experience of activism both within the group and exposure to other 
similar brother organisations. By participating in such activism, and by being exposed to such 
organisations, individuals within such groups internalised and personalised the organisation’s 
goals and interests, such that ‘necessary’ strategy, which ordinarily would not appeal to them 
became personally meaningful and more acceptable. Given such a background, individuals 
sacrificing their life for the sake of the group, therefore, make perfect sense. Under such structured 
conditions, adopting such strategies becomes a duty bigger than the individual. 
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Of course, the fact that organisations like BH have access to theological concepts within which 
such activism has been justified makes it easier for “talented” actors like Yusuf or Nur to mobilise 
such forms of violence in the group. From such theological heritage, activists could construe 
violent activism as a sort social and religious duty that demands self-sacrifice. However, this does 
not in any way imply that the existence of such concepts automatically leads to suicidal violence. 
For this to happen, suicidal violence needs to be framed in a such a way that it resonates with the 
activists’ individual, historical, organisational and socio-political conditions. There also need to 
be corresponding resources, within which it is possible to carry out such forms of violent activism.  
 
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
Despite the potential contributions of this thesis to the study of SOMOs, this research is not without 
its own limitations. Two of these limitations are most significant: First, the inability to strictly 
make a general conclusion about SOMOs. Given that this study is a case study, it has only 
concentrated on BH. While this has provided an opportunity for an in-dept analysis, its findings 
have limited implications on other SOMOs around the world. BH is only one among many SOMOs 
around the world. Since activisms within such organisations are affected by specific contextual 
and organisational dynamics within such organisations, findings from this cannot be generalised. 
Findings from this study can only be generalised theoretically (analytic generalisation).  
Secondly, the inability to engage with former or current BH activists. As detailed in Chapter three, 
I had initially intended to engage with a set of participants from BH. Assumptions are that such a 
set of participants would have given the study access to unique primary data about both the 
emergence of the group and development and use of violence within the group (something, many 
previous researchers about the group have not been able to accomplish). Also, the consequent 
recourse to engage mostly with only security personnel, politicians, religious clerics and victims 
of BH violence meant that the data is inevitable coloured by assumptions of the group from these 
participants.   
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7.6 Final Thoughts  
This study has used the case of BH to study the use of violence in SOMOs. Based on the application 
of SMT paradigms into the analysis of this Northern Nigerian-based organisation, this research 
hopes to have theoretically broadened the understanding of how SOMOs use violent activism. The 
main argument of the thesis has been that the emergence of such organisations and the evolution 
of activism within them, including violence are similar to traditional social movement 
organisations. Despite their religious orientation, they are dependent on the availability of 
resources and political opportunities as their traditional social movement organisations 
counterparts, albeit in a different degree. Like their social counterparts, activists within such 
organisations are also affected by their actional calculus and the internal dynamics within the 
groups, the prevailing socio-political contexts, state practices towards them and the availability of 
mobilisation structures in their groups. 
Strategies such as violence in such groups do not evolve arbitrarily or in a vacuum: they belong to 
organisational and shifting social milieu which structure and constrain them. Movement activists 
would likely suspend the adoption of such strategy in the presence of limited resources, even when 
there is an obvious ideological conviction. In other words, activists do not necessarily utilise 
violent activism, because they are empowered by ideology. Rather, the cognitive conviction to 
adopt such strategies often mediate between the volatile political environments, the availability of 
resources, and the experiences inside the movement organisations, given the stage of the 
organisation. There is often a rational calculus that such activism (at least from their calculation) 
above other strategies, is the best option with which to achieve the group’s identified goals. This 
rational calculus regarding the tactical efficacy of such activism also determines the initial 
preparation and intensity such activism takes. 
This being the case, violence should not be exceptional in SOMOs. Like every other form of 
movement activism this element is often part of movement organisation dynamics, which involves 
organisational structuring and normative framing that is facilitated by resources and political 
opportunities. How the movement actors’ structure and restructure their organisation’s behaviour 
depend on the availability of resources and the level of opportunities and constraints within the 
political environments upon which they identify. Therefore, referring to BH (or any other SOMO 
who use violence) as ‘Salafi-jihadist’ was avoided in this research. Such tag not only connotes an 
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‘exceptionalisation’ of one form of activism (violence) within such group, it also downplays 
significance of other forms of activisms that evolve within such organisations. 
The development of different forms of violence such as suicide bombing, kidnapping for ransom, 
and armed robbery, which evolves within SOMOs, are not unique to Salafi-oriented groups. Much 
like the case of BH, these forms of violence are more of access to material resources and internal 
competition within such organisations rather than jihadi ideological motivations. Activists within 
SOMOs embrace such activism (practically moving from lower-risk, to higher-risk), not 
necessarily because they arose from an ideological imperative from Salafi-jihadism, but because 
they were socialised through their experience within the group, from training with similar brother 
organisations and from connection of the group’s activism to the individual experience within the 
movement. As I see it, rather than being a result of static or ideological dispositions that exist prior 
to participation in such organisations, the choice and the decision for such activism are often 
influenced by the experience of participation inside the movement organisation. On the contrary, 
these kinds of activism may evolve in any movement organisation irrespective of the ideological 
orientation of such organisations. The increasing use of such radical forms of violent strategy in 
Salafi-oriented movement organisations does not imply that such forms of activism are unique to 
such groups. It also does not mean that these kinds of groups are inherently violent. What this 
shows however, is the tactical ability of activists within such groups to frame activism in such 
terms that it resonates with activists operating within their groups. Operating within similar socio-
political contexts, and having similar political opportunities, activists within regular social 
movement organisations could also mobilise their activists for similar radically violent strategies, 
without being indoctrinated in any religious concepts.  
Of course, the fact that SOMOs have access to ideologies and concepts within Salafism, within 
which such violent activism where justified, makes it easier for talented SOMO leaders to motivate 
activists for such activism. Such heritage provides talented leaders within SOMOs an opportunity 
to provide actors with both the political identity and violent ideologies upon which to justify 
violent activism. This, however, does not in any way imply that the existence of this concepts or 
ideologies in organisations would inevitably result in adoption of such armed violence. For this to 
happen, armed violence needs to be framed in such a way that it resonates with ’activists’ historical 
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and socio-political conditions. Such organisations would need to have access to corresponding 
resources, within which it is possible to motivate such activism.  
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Appendix B: A Letter of Solicitation for Participation in the PhD Research 
 
University Of South Africa (UNISA) 
School of Humanities, Department of Religious studies and Arabic 
 
Dear ............................................ 
I hereby invite you to participate in a semi-structured interview, which is part of a research being 
conducted by me Kingsley Ekene Amaechi, in fulfillment of PhD research in the department of 
Religious Studies and Arabic, University of South Africa.  
Research Title is The Adoption and Escalation of Violence in Religious Movements: The Case of 
the Boko-Haram in Nigeria. 
Purpose of the study is to understand the adoption and development of violence in Islamic 
oriented movement organization. Using Boko-Haram in Nigeria as a case study, the research aims 
to gain a deeper insight into why and how this element develops in such movement organizations. 
Your Role as A Participant: I chose you to participate in this research because I believe that your 
experience as a ... ................................................................can contribute much to the 
understanding and knowledge of this element within the group. Your participation will consist of 
an audio recorded semi-structured interview lasting approximately for about 1 hour. During the 
interview, I will ask you questions about the emergence of the group, their ideology, and the 
development of violence within the group. I will also ask you questions about factors which must 
have contributed to the development of this element both within the group and within the region 
where the group operates.  
Your right as a Participant: Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. In other 
words, it is your choice whether to participate or not. During the interview, you are not obliged to 
answer all questions. In fact, you may pass on any question that makes you uncomfortable. Also, 
at any time during the interview, you are free to stop your participation, of which there is absolutely 
no penalty for discontinuing your participation.  
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Confidentiality: You can also be assured that although the entire interview will be tape-recorded, 
your name will not be mentioned or identified on the tape. The essence of recording the interview 
is only to ensure an accurate understanding and recording of your responses. The tape will be kept 
in a secured location that is accessible only to me, to be destroyed after the research. In fact, every 
information and data collected from you must be treated in the strictest confidentiality and will be 
used for academic purposes only. No one else except me, or my supervisors may listen to them. 
Never will your name or anything that gives away your identity appear in any report, publication 
or presentation resulting from this study, unless if you indicate otherwise (in which case we would 
have another discussion about this).  
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation. 
 
Yours Sincerely  
 
……………….. 
Kingsley E. Amaechi 
For Further Questions please contact me at kingsleyokafor06@gmail.com 
Phone no. +27838806473, +2348021381297 
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Appendix C: Consent Form 
Consent Form  
I have read the information concerning participating in the study about The Adoption and 
Escalation of Violence in Religious Movements: The Case of the Boko-Haram in Nigeria. I am 
aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure an accurate 
recording of my responses. I am aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the 
publications to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations would be 
anonymous. In case where this would not be the case, it would be with my permission. I have also 
been informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty. With the full 
knowledge of the on-going, I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study.  
 
...........................................                     ...........................                                                      ................ 
Name of Participant                                      Date                                                                     Signature 
Gender                                                        .................. 
State of Origin                              ................................................................... 
Religious affiliation                       ..................................................................... 
Ethnic Affiliation                           ....................................................................... 
......................................                        .............................                                                   .................. 
Name of Researcher                                      Date                                                                     Signatue 
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Appendix D: Letter to the General Commander of the Nigerian JTF 
University of South Africa (UNISA) 
School of Humanities, Department of Religious studies and Arabic 
 
The General Commander,  
Nigerian Joint Task Force  
C/O The Police Unit commander (UC) Imo State, Nigeria. 
20th February 2016. 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Application to Interview Boko-Haram Prisoners   
I hereby kindly request to be given the opportunity to interview Boko-Haram suspects held in the 
Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison, as part of a research being conducted me Kingsley Ekene 
Amaechi, in fulfillment of PhD study in the department of Religious Studies and Arabic, 
University of South Africa.  
Research Title: The Adoption and Escalation of Violence in Religious Movements: The Case of 
the Boko-Haram in Nigeria. 
Purpose of the interview: To understand how, and when violent activism evolved and developed 
within movement organization. Using these suspects as a window into the Nigerian Boko-Haram, 
I aim to gain a deeper insight into why and how this element develops in such movement 
organizations. 
The Inmates' Role As Participants: I chose to have them participate in this research because I 
believe that their experience as a members or former members of the group can contribute 
immensely to the understanding and knowledge of this element within the group. Their 
participation will consist of an audio recorded semi-structured interview lasting approximately for 
about 1 hour. During the interview, I will ask them questions about the emergence of the group, 
their ideology, and the development of violence within the group. I will also ask them questions 
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about factors which must have contributed to the development of this element both within the 
group and within the region where the group operates.  
Their right as a Participant: Their participation in this research is entirely voluntary. In other 
words, it is their choice whether to participate or not. During the interview, they are not obliged to 
answer all questions. In fact, they may pass on any question that makes them uncomfortable. Also, 
at any time during the interview, they are free to stop their participation, in which case there is 
absolutely no penalty for discontinuing their participation.  
Confidentiality: You can also be assured that although the entire interview will be tape-recorded, 
their names will not be mentioned or identified on the tape. The essence of recording the interview 
is only to ensure an accurate understanding and recording of their responses. The tape will be kept 
in a secured location that is accessible only to me, to be destroyed after the research. In fact, every 
information and data collected from them must be treated in the strictest confidentiality and will 
be used for academic purposes only. No one else except me, or my supervisors may listen to them. 
Never will their name or anything that gives away their identity appear in any report, publication 
or presentation resulting from this study, unless if they and you (as the director of JTF) indicate 
otherwise (in which case we would have another discussion about this). 
Upon your approval for the interviews, I will go further to contact the inmates and their legal 
councils for the permission. I will also contact the prisons to ensure that the interviews are 
conducted in a civilized and secured environment. Thank you in advance for your anticipated 
cooperation.  
Best regards. 
Kingsley E. Amaechi 
.……………………… 
For Further Questions please contact at: Email: kingsleyokafor06@gmail.com 
Phone no. +27838806473, +2348021381297 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Guide for Interview Participants  
Topic Main Questions Additional Questions  
The emergence of 
Boko-Haram 
 When did you first hear 
about BH? 
 How would you 
describe the evolution 
of the group in the 
Northern Nigeria? 
 What was your first impressions about the
group when they first emerged? 
 What did you understand then was the
group's main aim at the time? 
 In your estimation why do you think, these
group chose your area? 
 What do you think attracted the group to
your area at that time? 
The use of Violent 
strategy by BH 
 When did you first hear 
that the group now uses 
violent strategy? 
 Have you or any 
member of your family 
had a first-hand 
experience of Boko-
Haram? 
 If yes, when did this 
happen? 
 
 
 Why do you think the 
group uses violent 
strategy now? 
 
 Can you describe these   incidents?  
 How did you survive? 
 What was the message you got from the
group from these incidents? 
 
 
 Islam is often believed to be one of the main
factors which influences the adoption of
violent strategy within such group; do you
agree with this assumption? 
 Does the fact that the group has a salafist
background have any influence in the
emergence of this element? 
 From your experience, do you think there
are other elements both within and outside
the group that contributes to the
development of this element?  
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The Further 
Escalation of 
Violence 
 What do you see as the 
major significant 
development in the way 
in which BH carry out 
its attacks now?  
 What do you think is 
the cause of these 
developments? 
 Under what circumstances do you think
these developments occurred within the
group? 
 Who are the people behind these
developments? 
 Do you think there is also a connection
between these developments and your
earlier mentioned factors that caused the
development of violence in the group? 
 
Conclusion of the 
interview 
 Is there any other thing 
regarding the 
development of 
violence within the 
group that we have not 
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touched upon and you 
wish to discuss? 
 Do you want to add or 
withdraw anything on 
some of your previous 
answers? 
 
 
 
